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THEME AND VARIATIONS IN STATUTORY
PRECLUSIONS AGAINST SUCCESSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY
EPA AND CITIZENS
PART ONE:
STATUTORY BARS IN CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS
Jeffrey G. Miller*

When Congress enacted our modern environmental statutes' in the
1970s, it sought to provide effective enforcement.* It adopted several strategies to achieve that end, one of which was authorizing multiple enforcers
against violations of the statutes: the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), states, and private citizen^.^ It reasoned that three potential en* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. White Plains, N.Y. The author especially thanks three students whose help was invaluable in preparing this Article. Lisa
Jackson, Pace Law School LL.M. '02, who challenged his preconceptions and made him
reexamine several issues, particularly the "to require compliance" language in the citizen
suit bars; Sharon Bridglalsingh, Pace Law School LL.M. '02; and Erin Flanagan, Pace Law
School J.D. '05. The author first presented the concepts elaborated in Parts II.B.2 and 1I.D. I at
the 2003 Widener Law Review Symposium, "Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirtysomething: A Celebration and a Summit," on April 3, 2003, and published the sections as Overlooked Issrres in rhe "Diligenr Prosecution" Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10 WIDENER
L. REV. 63
(2003).
The environmental statutes discussed in this Article are the pollution control statutes,
including: the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. $3 7401-7671q (2000); the Clean Water
Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. $5 1250-1387 (2000); the Resource Conservation & Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. $5 6901-6992k (2000); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. $ $ 9601-9675 (2000);
the Federal Insecticide. Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. $5 136-136y
(2000); the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. $5 2601-2692 (2000); the
Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), 42 U.S.C. $5 300f to 300j-26 (2000'); the Marine
Protection, Research. and Sanctuaries Act ("MPRSA"), 33 U.S.C. $5 1401-1445 (2000);
and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act ("EPCRKA"), 42 U.S.C.
$5 I lOOl-1 1050 (2000).
William L. Andreen, The Evolrrtion of Water Pollrction Control in the Unired StatesSrare, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972, Part I , 22 STAN.ENVTL.L.J. 145 (2003)
(detailing the failure of and dissatisfaction with earlier water pollution control efforts that
led to the enactment of modern water pollution control legislation in 1972). Prominent
among these factors was the failure of government, particularly state governments, to irnplement and enforce earlier legislation. Id. at 194-99.
Congress directly authorized EPA and citizens to enforce the statutes in specific EPA
and citizen enforcement provisions. It indirectly authorized states to enforce the statutes by
authorizing them to implement and enforce state programs in place of the federal program.
See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b) (2000). For an example of a state using the citizen
suit authority, see United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992). In addition,
by authorizing an interested "person" to bring a citizen suit and defining "person" to include a
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vironmental plaintiffs would provide more comprehensive enforcement
than one. But Congress recognized that empowering three enforcers could
result in successive enforcement actions against the same violations, possibly causing duplication and conflict in. enforcement proceedings and
remedies. To limit duplication and conflict, it developed a three-element
(notice, delay, and bar) preclusion device against some successive enforcement. It placed versions of the device in all of the statutes' citizen suit
provisions and in many of their EPA enforcement provisions. The device
generally bars subsequent citizen enforcement if the government "has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting . . . an action . . . to require comp l i a n ~ e . "EPA
~ enforcement may be barred by state actions, and either EPA
or state actions may bar citizen enforcement.
Many defendants have argued the preclusion device shields them from
citizen and EPA enforcement actions when a state takes any action, no matter how weak or ineffective. Their arguments raise diverse legal issues
and have resulted in a plethora of judicial decisions interpreting the device. Most of the reported decisions concern the preclusive effect of state
enforcement on citizen action^.^ Courts interpreting the provisions on
these issues6 divide into two camps: (1) those interpreting the device in
accordance with its plain meaning, often favoring successive enforcers,
and (2) those interpreting it to give deference to prosecutorial discretion,
often disfavoring successive enforcers. The circuits split on some of the issues, clearing the way for the Supreme Court to resolve the division.'
"State," it indirectly authorized states to use the federal citizen suit authorities that authorize any "person" to enforce. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. $ § 1365(g) (2000). It adopted other
strategies for effective enforcement, primarily strict civil liability and severe sanctions and
remedies in the enforcement provisions. See, e.g., id. $5 1319, 1365.
CAA $ 304(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. $ 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). The corresponding language
in the citizen suit provisions of the other statutes is identical or virtually so.
This could reflect either the fact that states take more enforcement actions than EPA
(see infrrr note 68 and accompanying text) or the perception of citizen enforcers that EPA
enforcement actions are more effective than state actions, or a combination of both. See
also infru note 8.
The issues are discussed infru in Part 11.
' These splits occur most clearly under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g) (2000), which
will be examined in Part Two. Under (6)(A)(ii) & (iii) of that provision. a state action may
preclude a citizen suit only if the state acts under "a State law comparable to this subsection" or under "such comparable State law." The First and Eighth Circuits have interpreted
the provision broadly to allow almost any state action to block a citizen suit. See Ark.
Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that state authority
need not afford citizens the same right of participation in enforcement as the federal statute, as long as it provides some meaningful participation); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n,
Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the state is not required
to act under authority that is comparable to the federal enforcement subsection to block a
citizen suit, as long as it has comparable authority elsewhere in its arsenal of enforcement
remedies). The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the provision more
narrowly to allow a citizen suit in the face of state action. See McAbee v. City of Ft. Payne,
318 F.3d 1248 ( 1 lth Cir. 2003) (holding that state authority must be comparable to federal
provision in all regards to block citizen suit); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518 (6th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that state authority must provide citizen with same rights of
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There is obvious potential for procedural duplication and conflict
from allowing successive enforcement actions. As discussed below, Congress recognized that disallowing all successive enforcement actions would
pose a profound danger to achieving compliance with environmental requirements and therefore opted to limit rather than eliminate the potential. A
bar on all successive enforcement actions would likely encourage a rationally acting violator, when faced with the prospect of zealous enforcement action, to solicit an immediate action by an enforcer it perceives to
be less zealous, often the state.8 By soliciting and settling that action on
relatively favorable terms, the violator could invoke the preclusion device
to avoid more effective action by another enforcer. This is not a hypothetical chimera; judicial decisions detail examples and commentators report
i t to be a common p r a ~ t i c e In
. ~ over 125 reported citizen suits, almost all
of the decisions examined in Part I1 of this Article, citizens filed complaints after states had taken action that citizen plaintiffs believed to be
unacceptably weak.
The desire of some courts to honor the state's prosecutorial discretion
by interpreting the preclusion device liberally encourages violators to
seek the protection of state enforcement. The danger here is not merely that
less effective enforcement nlay oust more effective enforcement; rather, the
graver danger is that settlements between violators and state enforcers for
remedies short of compliance may block subsequent enforcement for
compliance with federal law. That result effectively allows agreements between violators and state enforcers, with the support of federal courts, to
amend and weaken the federal statutes. Of course, much state enforcement
is strong and effective and does not raise this specter. Fortunately, the
preclusion device is worded to distinguish between effective and ineffective government enf~rcement.'~
But some courts disregard the distinction, to
the detriment of the statutes and environmental protection. There is a major
irony in the proclivity of some courts to be zealous guardians of prosecutorial discretion from the perceived ravages of citizen suits; prosecutors

participation as federal statute to block citizen suit); Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1 1 1 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that state must act under
authority comparable to federal enforcement section to block citizen suit, even if state has
comparable authority elsewhere in its arsenal of enforcement remedies).
See supra note 5 . The tendency of violators to seek the protection of state rather than
EPA enforcement could also reflect the fact that states generally can act faster than EPA.
Thus it may be possible for the state to commence an action within the time period allowed
for preclusion, while EPA may not be able to do so. An attorney for the DOJ noted that the
federal government seldom files preclusive actions after receiving sixty day notices of
violations from potential citizen enforcers because, among other reasons "it generally takes
EPA longer than sixty days to develop an enforcement referral." Mark R. Haag, The Department of Justice's Role in Monitoring Environmental Citizen Suits (1997) (unpublished
paper on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
See infro notes 388-390 and accompanying text.
'OThe preclusion device bars citizen suits only when the government has taken action
"to require compliance," see ittfra Part II.B.2.
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are not seeking the protection of the courts, but violators are. Indeed, when
state and federal prosecutors are heard in citizen enforcement cases, they
support the maintenance of citizen suits." That they do so is clear evidence
that citizen suits do not interfere with the work of government enforcers
or with the results they have achieved in earlier enforcement actions.I2
That violators are the vocal proponents of honoring the prosecutor's discretion should be greeted with skepticism, for their self-interest benefits
from favoring the weakest enforcer.
This two-part Article examines the preclusion device, its legislative
history, and the decisions interpreting it. Part One examines the device in
citizen suit provisions. Part Two, to be published subsequently, will examine the device in EPA enforcement provisions. The two parts develop
a unified interpretation of the device in both sets of enforcement provisions to resolve the tension between achieving compliance and protecting
prosecutorial discretion. The Article concludes that Congress meant exactly what it wrote and enacted: the device solely precludes the successive enforcement it actually addresses. Several of the most common canons of statutory interpretation lead inexorably to this interpretation.I3 But a
phenomenon not yet observed by the courts or commentators is even more
suggestive of it. The preclusion device is a theme with many variations.
While Congress constantly employed the theme of the device throughout
the statutes, it employed variations of the theme's three elements in the
different provisions, reflecting the varying roles it intended EPA, the states
and, to a lesser extent, citizens to play in the implementation and enforcement of each statute.I4 The result is a nuanced pattern of variations,
suggesting that Congress intended the meanings of the constants in the provisions to be identical, and the variations in them to have singular meanings.
The linchpin of the device is the bar element that precludes successive action when the government has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an enforcement action. The one issue not resolved by the words
that Congress used in the device is the meaning of "diligent prosecution."
The term is not precise, and Congress failed to define it. But the preclusions bar citizen suits only when the government "is diligently prosecuting . . . an action . . . to require compliance." Only compliance with the
statutes can secure the environmental protections that are their very purposes. The wording of the preclusion device and the purposes of the statutes, therefore, suggest that diligent prosecution is prosecution that has
brought or reasonably can be expected to bring about compliance. This is
also consistent with the test that federal courts apply when they review
consent decrees under the statutes: determining whether they are consisSee infra note 388 and accompanying text.
'*Seeinfra Parts 1.C-.D.
j 3 Including the plain meaning, expressio unius, in pari material, and narrow reading
of exceptions canons. See infra note 32.
l 4 See infra Part I .
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tent with and carry out the statutes.I5 This strikes a principled balance
between the divided judicial interpretations of the preclusion, affording
the government prosecutor deference in how she attains compliance, yet
barring subsequent suit only if she attains compliance.
The preclusion device does not stand alone in governing when successive enforcement actions may be brought and pursued. Both general
statutory provisionsI6 and common law doctrines" may apply as well. The
degree to which the preclusion device supplants these provisions and doctrines or the extent to which they are interrelated are not explored by this
Article. l 8

Introduction ...........................................................................................
407
I. The Environmental Statutes' Enforcement Provisions and
Their Preclusions ......................................................................412
A. Impacts of Federalism .........................................................412
B. EPA Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions ................ 414
C. Citizen Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions ........... 416
1. Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions ..........................41 7
2. Legislative History ............................................................420
D. An Anomaly: CWA 9 309(g)....................................................425
11. Interpreting Preclusions in Citizen Suit Provisions To Implement
426
Their Plain Meanings ......................................................................
A. What Government Entities May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? ..... 429
1. What "Administrator" May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? ..... 429
2. What "State" May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit? ...................430
a. States, Municipalities, and Indian Tribes ...................431
b. States with Unapproved Programs ..............................434
B. What Government Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit? ................ 435
1. When the Statute Provides that Particular Government
Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit, May Other Government
Actions Bar It? ................................................................436
a. Where the Statute Provides that Only Court
Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit .................................436
b. Where the Statute Provides that Several
Government Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit .............444
See infra notes 351-353 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 5 1738 (2000) (providing, inter alia, "full faith and credit" for state
judicial decisions in every court in the country).
" For example, res judicata, issue preclusion, abstention, and mootness.
Others have begun to do so. See William V. Luneburg, Claim Preclusion as it Affects
Non-Parties to Clean Air Act Enforcement Actions: The Ghosts of Gwaltney, 10 WIDENER
L. REV. 113 (2003); and William D. Benton, Application of Res Judicara and Collareral
Estoppel to EPA Overjling, 16 B.C. ENVTL.AFF. L. REV. 199 (1988). See also infra note 300
and accompanying text.
l5

l6
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2. Must the Government Action Require Compliance To
Bar a Citizen Suit. and When Do Government
Actions Require Compliance? .........................................445
C. When Must the Government Commence an Action To Bar a
Citizen Suit? ..........................................................................449
1 . Must the Government Commence an Action Prior to a
Citizen Suit To Bar It? ...................................................449
2. When Does the Government Commence an Action? ..........452
D . How Diligently Must the Government Prosecute an Action
in Order To Bar a Citizen Suit? .............................................456
1. Must the Government Prosecutiorz Be Ongoing To Bar a
Citizen Suit? ...................................................................457
2. What Is Diligent Prosecution? ..........................................463
a . In Continuing Prosecutions ........................................ 464
b. In Completed Prosecutions and Continuiizg
Enforcement of Orders..............................................465
E . What Citizen Suits May a Government Action Bar? ................ 473
E Conclzisions from Examirzation of the Preclusion Bar .............. 478
I11. Doctrinal Schism in Interpreting Citizen Suit Provisions and
Their Preclusions ....................................................................479
A . Plain Meaning Versus Deference to Prosecutorial Decisions .. 479
B . The Pernicious Effect of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd . v .
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc ............................................484
IV Conclusion: UrziJiedInterpretation of Preclusiorzs in Citizen
Suit Provisions ................................................................................492
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Congress placed nearly twenty versions of the preclusion device in
the EPA and citizen enforcement provisions of the environmental statutes. Its repeated use of the device signals the importance of the underlying tension Congress intended it to resolve: authorization of multiple
enforcers to assure full compliance and recognition that successive enforcement could result in conflict and duplication. Congress's repetition
of the constants in the device establishes that Congress chose it to resolve
those tensions. Congress's use of variations in the device establishes that
it resolved the tensions differently in the various enforcement provisions.
This theme and variations pattern suggests Congress intended the words
it used in each device to mirror the division of enforcement authority it
envisioned in that provi~ion.'~
Most courts faithfully interpret the device in each provision according
to its plain meaning, often favoring successive enforcement. Some courts,
however, ignore the device's plain meaning and interpret it with deference to the prosecutorial discretion of the first enforcer, often disfavoring
successive enforcement. These latter courts not only misinterpret the provision, they undermine the integrity of the statutes. They encourage violators to invite ineffective actions by the weakest government enforcers,
anticipating that courts will forever bar later actions by others seeking
compliance. These courts unwittingly aid violators to enshrine violation,
rather than compliance, as their norm under the federal statutes.
A return to the era during which Congress enacted the environmental
statutes illuminates why Congress authorized multiple enforcers of the
environmental statutes and the role it intended the preclusion device play
in the enforcement scheme. Prior to the 1970s, federal environmental legislation was either non-existent,20 not oriented to environmental protect i ~ n ,or
~ 'lacking effective federal enforcement authority and entirely deferential to state action.22Instead, the federal government assisted states by
l9 In CAA 5 113, for instance, Congress established two approaches for EPA administrative and civil actions against violators. Where the violation is of a state established requirement, EPA must first give the State a notice of the violation and wait thirty days before proceeding. If the violation is of an EPA established requirement, EPA may proceed
without the notice and delay. Compare 5 113(a)(l) with 5 113(a)(3).
20 TSCA, MPRSA, CERCLA, and EPCKRA had not been enacted.
At the time FIFRA was focused at protecting pesticide users by assuring the efficacy
of pesticides rather than protecting the environment from inappropriate pesticide use.
Although there were nascent federal CWA, CAA and RCRA programs, they largely
relied on state regulation. Federal enforcement provisions were weak or non-existent. The
early history of federal water pollution control programs, for instance, is detailed in Andreen,
supra note 2. For a contemporary account of the shortfalls of pollution control efforts, see
DAVIDZWICK& MARYBENSTOCK,
WATERWASTELAND
(1971). The cumbersome federal
enforcement mechanisms are described in Murray Stein, The Actual Operation of the FedL. 47 (1970).
eral Water Pollution Control Administration, 3 NAT. RESOURCES

"
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partially funding their regulatory programs and conducting research.23
Cleveland's burning Cuyahoga River, killer smog in southern California,
and other environmental catastrophes in the late 1960s testified to the
inadequacy of these measures and coalesced growing public concern about
environmental degradation. During the first Earth Day in 1970, an estimated
twenty million people demonstrated across the country to demand environmental protection. During the 1970s, Congress heeded the demand of
Earth Day and, in a bipartisan effort, enacted comprehensive and effective legislation to protect the e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~
Much of the resulting legislation embraced variations of cooperative
federalism, with EPA establishing standards to protect the environment
and EPA or states implementing the federal standards. Most of the statutes offered states the option of implementing the federal statute with an
EPA-approved state program. But mindful of past experience, Congress provided EPA oversight of state implementation. Indeed, Congress granted
EPA a broad range of enforcement authorities to assure prompt compliance with federal mandates, regardless of whether EPA or a state implemented the federal program. Thus, when EPA approves a state program,
the state may enforce against violations of the state program and EPA
may enforce against violations of the federal statute, creating the possibility that both a state and EPA would enforce against the same violating
acts. To ameliorate the possibility of conflict and duplication from successive enforcement, Congress created a preclusion device in the EPA enforcement provisions, with considerable variations among them, mirroring the different balances it struck between federal and state authorities
in different statutes.25
Congress was not content with creating strong EPA enforcement
authorities. Not confident that federal and state authorities would fully
enforce against violations of the statutes, it also authorized citizens to enforce through an ingenious new device, the citizen suit provision. The
device added members of the interested public, acting as private attorneys
general,26to the existing federal and state environmental enforcement cad-,
E.g., Act of June 30, 1948, c. 758, 62 Stat. 1155.
The statutes considered in this Article, see supra note 1, were all enacted or entirely
revamped to their present forms in the 1970s, except CERCLA and EPCKRA, which were
enacted in 1980.
25 In TSCA, Congress envisioned no role for state implementation and in 5 16, for instance, authorized EPA to enforce against violations with no notice to the state. On the
other hand, Congress envisioned almost exclusive state implementation of the RCRA solid
waste regulatory program and in 5 4005(c)(2) authorized EPA to enforce against violations
only in states lacking EPA-approved programs.
26 The House Report on the CWA alluded to the ''private attorney general" doctrine developed in case law. H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 132 (1972), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORYOF THE WATERPOLLUTIONCONTROLACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1972, at 753, 821
(1973) (hereinafter "CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY").See Middlesex Sewerage Authority v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1981). The Court first used the term in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), and has frequently used it in discussing
23

24
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res. To ameliorate the possibility of conflict and duplication from successive government and citizen actions, Congress placed different versions
of the same preclusion device in the citizen suit provisions. It incorporates three elements: (1) a notice of violati~n,~'
(2) a delay between the
notice and the commencement of e n f o r ~ e m e n t and
, ~ ~ (3) a bar on enforcement if a government enforcer has already commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an enforcement action. For each of the above elements, Congress developed a range of variations.
The preclusion device was the child of a Congress seeking full compliance through more and better enforcement. Congress accepted successive enforcement against the same violations as a consequence; none of
its versions of the preclusion device prevented all successive enforcement.
The preclusion device, as an exception to the robust enforcement authorities, should be narrowly construed, consistent with the canon that "provisos and statutory exceptions should be read narrowly" to protect the general
rule.29A corollary to the canon is that exceptions to exceptions should be
construed broadly to protect the general rule. This corollary, in turn, suggests that limitation on the operation of the preclusion device be interpreted broadly to restrict the preclusions, thus protecting the general authority for EPA and citizen suits.30The device in citizen suit provisions, for instance, limits government actions that may bar citizen suits to government actions for compliance. Following the corollary canon, courts should
assure that government actions actually seek compliance before allowing
them to bar citizen suits.
The Supreme Court has commented that the structure and wording of
the citizen suit provisions are so similar across the statutes that Congress's
private enforcement of environmental, antitrust and civil rights statutes. Judge Jerome
Frank appears to have coined the term iii Assoc. i'ndus. v. ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.
1943). See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (2002). See also
discussion in Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Int'l Fabricare Inst., 1992 WL 315188, at *4
(D. Md.).
27 For instance, it required citizens to give notice to EPA and the violator in TSCA, 15
U.S.C. 2619(b)(2)(B) (2000), but to EPA, the violator, and the appropriate state in CWA
505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(A) (2000). The difference reflects the greater role
that Congress established for states in the CWA than in TSCA.
28For instance, in RCRA § 7002(b)(l) & (2), 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(1) & (2) (2000),
Congress required citizens to give notice ninety days in advance of filing suit against imminent and substantial endangerments, sixty days in advance of filing against violations of
non-hazardous waste provisions, and an unspecified time in advance of filing suit against
violations of hazardous waste provisions.
29 See WILLIAM
N . ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
324 (1994)
(citing Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)). See also NORMANJ. SINGER,STATUTES A N D STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
§§ 47.8 and 47.1 1, (6th ed. 2000). This is another
of the intrinsic canons flowing from the plain meaning canon.
30''The logical extension of [the principle that exceptions should be construed narrowly] is that exceptions to the exceptions should be broadly construed." McCune v. Or.
Senior Sews. Div., 894 F.2d 1107, 1 1 13 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Estate of Shelfer v. Comm'r
of Internal Revenue, 86 F.3d 1045, 1049 11.13 (I lth Cir. 1996); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1199 n.67 (3d Cir. 1991).
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use of the same or different terms in a particular provision is significant
in interpreting it.31The theme and variations nature of the preclusion device suggests even more forcefully that the devices be read in pari materia, i.e., "similar statutes should be interpreted ~ i m i l a r l y , "but
~ ~ in a more
sophisticated manner. The theme and variations nature of the device, with
some elements and words recurring from one provision to the next and
others changing, emphasizes suggests the deliberate nature of Congress's
word choices. The constants in the device should be interpreted in the
same manner and the differences should be interpreted singularly. The
words Congress used in a particular provision express its precise intent
and should be interpreted literally, consistent with the two most common
canons of construction, the plain meaning rule and expressio unius, i.e.,
"follow the plain meaning of the statutory text: and "expression of one
thing suggests the exclusion of others."33 When Congress placed the preclusion device in the EPA or citizen suit provisions, it intended the exact
bars to successive enforcement it stated in the device, and no others. Congress's pervasive use of the device in the EPA and citizen enforcement
provisions also suggests that when Congress intended to preclude successive enforcement, it did so in the preclusion device it placed in the enforcement provision, rather than by implying it from another part of the statute.34
Congress achieved its goal of greatly increasing compliance by
strengthened enforcement. Federal enforcement and citizen suits have
played a large role in the i m p r ~ v e r n e n tCourts
.~~
interpreting the preclusion device in accordance with its plain meaning, often favoring successive enforcement, forward the congressional goal. However, compliance

)' "Congress used identical language in the citizen suit provisions of several other environmental statutes that authorize only prospective relief. Moreover. Congress has demonstrated in yet other statutory provisions that it knows how to avoid this prospective implication by using language that explicitly targets wholly past violations." Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). The Court found
differences between the wording of citizen suit provisions in different statutes significant
and differences between the wording of similar provisions in the same statute "[elven more
on point." Id. at 57 n.2.
3Z ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29, at 327 (citing Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992);
TWA, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 326 (1989); Communications
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); and Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations
Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 51 1 (1987)). See also SINGER,supra note 29, at 55 51.01-.08,
particularly 5 5 1.03.
33 ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29, at 323 (citing cases where the canons were applied).
j4 This is particularly relevant in rejecting the contention that the provisions governing
EPA's approval of state permit programs suggests state enforcement actions bar subsequent
EPA enforcement actions. See Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999).
Part Two will address this in detail.
'=To serve as a successful deterrent, civil penalties must be assessed in an amount
"high enough to insure that polluters cannot simply absorb the penalty as a cost of doing
business . . . . Additionally, the probability that a penalty will be imposed must be high enough
so that polluters will not choose to accept the risk that non-compliance will go unpunished." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470,
491-92 (D.S.C. 1995).
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is far from universal and enforcement against violators is far from univerCourts interpreting the preclusion device in derogation of its plain
meaning, often disfavoring successive enforcement, not only ignore congressional intent, they thwart compliance with federal environmental protection requirements. Indeed, they threaten the integrity of the federal statutes. They encourage violators to invite ineffective actions by weak enforcers, in the expectation that courts will bar subsequent enforcement
for compliance, thus making violation rather than compliance the norm.
While some of these courts may be hostile to citizen enforcement, most
simply interpret the provisions to defer to prosecutorial discretion, blindly
following an ill-conceived, off-hand comment by the Supreme Court that
citizen enforcement supplements rather than supplants government enforcement." More importantly, these courts fail to understand that Congress
severely limited such deference by the wording of its preclusion devices
and that successive enforcement rarely interferes with the results the
prosecutor obtained in the initial action." If successive enforcement often
interfered with prosecutorial discretion, we could expect to hear prosecutors
complaining. But they are not. Indeed, when. they are heard on this issue,
prosecutors generally favor citizen suits without q u a l i f i ~ a t i o n .Ironi~~

36 David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Lnw in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd when Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 M D . L. REV. 1552, 1647-51 (1995). See also
Victor Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL.AFF. L. REV. 1 (1997). Study after study by the General Accounting
Office and EPA's own Inspector General conclude that there is widespread non-compliance
with the statutes and that EPA and the states do not enforce against many of the violations.
Hodas at 1603- 17.
" See infra Part 1II.B.
See infrrr Part 1II.A.
39 See, e.g., Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 41 1 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
EPA argued that RCRA Subchapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter D as enacted) open-dumping
regulations were enforceable by citizens despite EPA approval of state plan); Citizens for a
Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 11 11, l l 18 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
EPA agreed with citizens that only state penalty assessment orders could bar citizen suits
under CWA Q 309(g), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town
of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 n.8 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that EPA argued that only states
with approved CWA permit programs can issue orders that may bar citizen suits); SPIRG
of N.J.. Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983)
(stating that EPA, New Jersey and New York argued that EPA CWA Q 309(a), 33 U.S.C.
Q 1319(a) compliance order was not an action in court); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 474 (D.S.C. 1995) (stating that EPA brief
"generally supported" citizen enforcer's positions). Similarly, EPA officials have testified
before congressional committees in support of citizen suits. See, e.g., Pending Clean Water Act
Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Nat. Res. Of the Horrse Comm. on
Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. 212-13 (1994) (statement of Steven A. Herman,
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA); The Water Quality Act of 1994, and Issues
Related to Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 3948 Before the Subcomm. on
Water Res. and Env't of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103d Cong. 290
(1994) (statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA).

'*
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cally, it is the violators who argue for prosecutorial d i s c r e t i ~ nWhen
.~~
lawbreakers extol respect for prosecutorial decisions, we should all beware.

I. THEENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES'
ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS
AND
THEIRPRECLUSIONS
This Part examines: (1) the enforcement authorities that environmental
statutes4' grant to citizen enforcers; (2) their preclusions against successive
enforcement for the same violations; and (3) the legislative history of the
authorities and their preclusions. But first it describes the diverse federalism strategies Congress adopted in the different statutes-strategies that
explain much of the variation in the preclusion devices, particularly in EPA
enforcement provisions.
A. Impacts of Federalism
Federal environmental statutes follow two general federalist strategies relevant to understanding the preclusion device. The first gives EPA
authority to implement and enforce the statutory program, with little or
no role for states.42Congress usually adopts this approach to regulate activities of single or centralized industries, such as registering pesticides as safe
for sale or determining allowable emissions from motor vehicles. The second strategy provides roles for both EPA and states in implementing and
enforcing the statutory program.43Congress usually adopts this approach
to regulate widespread and decentralized pollution producing sources, such
40 Industry spokesmen before a House subcommittee hearing on amendments to the
CWA, including the administrative penalty authority that became CWA Q 309(g), testified
that EPA had no business enforcing against violations of the CWA in states with approved
CWA permit programs. A spokesperson for the Chemical Manufacturers' Association
stated, "CMA urges that the Act be amended to give the states the sole authority to enforce
state issued NPDES permits." Possible Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and
Transp., 97th Cong. 966 (1982) (statement of Monte Throdahl, Sr. V.P. of Monsanto Chem.
Co.). He further stated that "EPA should not be allowed to bring an enforcement action for
a permit violation occurring in states administering approved programs. States that have
assumed exclusive responsibility for implementation of NPDES program should be given
sole enforcement responsibility." Id. at 987. A spokesperson for the American Paper Institute testified that EPA penalty actions could result in "undercutting state NPDES agency
enforcement efforts. There is no useful purpose to be served by EPA initiating a separate
enforcement action from that already undertaken by a state permitting agency." Id. at 939
(statement of Peter E. Wrist, V.P. for Forest Products, Mead Corp). Not surprisingly, both
opposed enactment of CWA Q 309(g), as did all other industry spokespeople testifying.
4 1 See supra note 1.
42TSCA, 15 U.S.C. Q Q 2605 & 2615 (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. QQ 9604 & 9606
(2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. #$ 1412 & 1415 (2000); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. $8 136a & 136v (2000);
CAA, 42 U.S.C. QQ 7521-7554 (2000).
43 CAA, 42 U.S.C. $8 7401-76714, except for $9 7521-7554 (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C.
$9 1313, 1313a, 1329, 1341, 1342, & 1344 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. QQ 6926, and 69426949a (2000); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. QQ 136v & 136u (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. $5 300g-1-300g-3
(2000).
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as pesticide use or solid waste disposal. Statutes establishing multiple regulatory programs may employ both strategies for different purposes.44
Statutes following the first strategy give EPA sole regulatory authority, but provide a variety of accommodations with states. Some give states
no role,45and some actually preempt state r e g ~ l a t i o nOthers,
.~~
however,
explicitly allow parallel state programs and authorize EPA to accomplish
its mission by contracting with states.47Statutes adopting the second federal partnership strategy generally authorize EPA to establish national
standards and allow states that so desire to assume the primary role in
implementing them. These statutes establish a default EPA authority to implement the standards if a state elects not to do so or fails to meet the federal
requirements. They also typically provide a variety of mechanisms for EPA
oversight of implementation by states that elect to assume the primary
role48and for EPA enforcement regardless of whether states have assumed
the primary implementation role. Some of the laws mix programs with
stronger and weaker state roles.49All but one of the statutes also provide for
enforcement by citizens acting as private attorneys generaL50

The CAA, for instance, adopts the first strategy for its program regulating automobile emissions, 42 U.S.C. QQ: 752 1-7554 (2000), and the second strategy for regulation of
emissions from other sources, 42 U.S.C. QQ: 7401-743 1 (2000).
45 See, e.g., MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. $9 1401-1445 (2000), regulating disposal of material
in international waters, with little role for states.
46 CAA, 42 U.S.C. Q 7543 (2000), preempts states from'regulating motor vehicle emissions (other than ORVs), with the exception of California.
47 See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. Q 9604(d) (2000).
48 The CAA, CWA and Subchapter I11 (as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted) of RCRA
follow this model, establishing permit programs that may be administered by EPA or states,
with EPA as the default administrator. If a state wishes to administer a program, it must
establish a program that EPA approves as meeting all the requirements of the federal statute. EPA may withdraw its approval from the state program if it ceases to meet the federal
requirements. CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q: 1342(b) & (c) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q 6926(b) & (e)
(2000); and CAA, 42 U.S.C. Q 7661a(d) & (i) (2000). Under the CAA provision, however,
EPA may impose sanctions on non-complying states rather than withdrawing its approval
of their programs. 42 U.S.C. Q 7661a(i) (2000).
49 RCRA incorporates both types of programs. Subchapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter
D as enacted) authorizes EPA to establish standards to be met by non-hazardous waste
landfills, but leaves it to states to administer programs to assure compliance with the standards. 42 U.S.C. Q Q 6941-6941a (2000). If the states fail to do so, the statute gives EPA no
authority to administer the program in their stead but gives it only limited enforcement
authority to enforce against landfills not meeting the standards. On the other hand, Subchapter Ill (as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted) authorizes EPA to establish standards to
be met by hazardous waste handling facilities, 42 U.S.C. Q 6924 (2000), and contemplates
that states will administer programs to assure compliance with the standards. 42 U.S.C. Q 6926
(2000). If the states fail to do so, the statute requires EPA to do so and gives it strong
authority to enforce against facilities not meeting the standards. 42 U.S.C. Q 6928 (2000).
FIFRA contains no citizen suit authorization. This anomaly is explained by the differing jurisdictions of congressional authorizing committees over the statutes. All of the
other statutes have in common at least one Senate or House authorizing committee with
jurisdiction over other environmental statutes (the House Commerce Committee or the
Senate Environment Committee), but FIFRA's authorizing committee in both chambers is
the Agriculture Committee.
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Congress rarely reflected the differences it intended in the federalist
balances between EPA and states in the range of enforcement authorities
that it provided EPA and citizen enforcers. Congress often did reflect differences in federalist balances, however, in the preclusions it placed on
the exercise of those authorities. This was particularly true with regard to
EPA enforcement authority: Congress generally placed no preclusion on
EPA enforcement in programs in which EPA was granted authority to
implement and enforce with little or no role for state^,^' but placed a wide
variety of preclusions on EPA enforcement in programs with shared
authority to implement and enforce between EPA and states. On the other
hand, Congress placed a more uniform preclusion on citizen suits, regardless of whether implementation authority is shared between EPA and
the states.52Thus, federalism considerations prompted the enactment of
and many of the variations in the preclusion devices, particularly in the EPA
enforcement provisions.
B. EPA Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions

Congress developed quite different variations for each of the preclusion device's three elemenkS3They may or may not require the potential
enforcer to delay commencement of its enforcement action for periods up
to ninety days. They may or may not bar the potential enforcer from commencing particular actions, or any actions, if another enforcer has already
commenced any action or a particular action. The many possible combinations of these variations provide Congress a nuanced device, with a wide

See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. $5 2615 & 2647 (2000).
Compare CAA, 4 2 U.S.C. $ 7413(a)(3) & (4) (2000) (requiring EPA to notify a state
afrer EPA takes enforcement action in the state) with SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 5 300h-2(c)(5)
(2000) (barring some EPA enforcement actions if the state has taken particular enforcement
actions). This may be because states had pollution control laws and bureaucracies before Congress found federal legislation and a federal bureaucracy necessary. Though Congress enacted strong federal environmental legislation in the 1970s because states had failed to
assure environmental protection and, in particular, had failed to enforce existing environmental law, Congress maintained a strong state presence in much of the new legislation.
See Andreen, supra note 2, at 194-99. See, e.g., CWA. 33 U.S.C. $ 1251(b) (2000) ("It is
the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution."). Resulting tensions between state and federal laws and bureaucracies were inevitable, and a rich literature has documented those tensions. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A P~iblicChoice Analysis, 115 HARV.L. REV. 553 (2001). Federalist tensions in
environmental enforcement have also been subject to study and commentary. See CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN
& DAVIDMARKELL,
REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT
AND
THE STATEIFEDERAL
RELATIONSHIP
(2003); David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based
Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory
and Reality, 24 HARV.ENVTLL. REV. 1 (2000); Hodas, supra note 36; Robert R. Kuehn,
The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV.
2373 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrijce? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State lmplementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALEL.J. 1196 (1977).
53 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
52
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spectrum of effects on successive enforcement against the same violations. The broad range of variations that Congress crafted for the device
underscores its understanding of federalism concerns. The congressional
judgments can best be given their correct meaning by following the canons of statutory interpretation and giving the preclusions' different wordings
different meanings.
The statutes provide an arsenal of EPA enforcement remedies, ranging
from simple notices of violation54 to criminal incarceration and fines.5s
Between are administrative orders to assess penalties,56require complian~e,~'
revoke permits,58 stop sales,59 recall products,60 seize goods,6' prohibit
federal grants or contracts to violating fa~ilities;~?
and civil judicial actions to assess penalties,63to enjoin compliance,@to ban new connections
to sewers,65 and to abate imminent and substantial e n d a n g e r m e n t ~ . ~ ~
Some provide augmented incarceration and fines for knowing violations
that place others in peril of life or limb.67While EPA and states have
many potential enforcement actions to invoke, they conduct most enforcement by issuing administrative orders. EPA directs about ten percent
of its enforcement effort, and states direct about five percent or less of
their enforcement effort toward judicial actions.68
Congress included the preclusion device in many of the EPA enforcement provisions, with considerable variations in the three elements of the
basic notice, delay, and bar provisions, ranging from no preclusion to almost

s4CAA.42 U.S.C. 3 7413(a)(I) (2000).
55 Id. 3 7413(c).
56 CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 13 19(g) (2000).
57 Id. fj 1319(a)(l) & (3).
58 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 3 6928(a)(3) (2000).
59 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. 3 136k(a) (2000).
GCAA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 7541(c) (2000).
61 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. fj 136k(b) (2000).
6'CWA, 33 U.S.C. 8 1368 (2000).
63 Id. 3 13 19(d).
Mid. 3 1319(b).
65 CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1342(h) (2000).
66 Id. 3 1364.
67 Id. 3 13 19(c)(3).
68Between 1977 and 1989. EPA annually referred to the DOJ between 20 and 60 cases
for criminal prosecution, and between 100 and 350 cases for civil action. It also issued
between 1000 and 4000 administrative orders annually. EPA, No. 20E-2001. ENFORCEM E N T ACCOMPLISHMENTS
REPORT:FY 1989 15-17, illustrations 1-3 (1990). at http:ll
w w w . e p a . g o v l C o m p l i a n c e l r e s o u r c e s / r e p o 1989accomp-rpt.pdf.
~
Between 1985 and 1989, state environmental agencies annually referred between 400 and
900 cases to their attorneys general for judicial action and issued between 8500 and 12,500
administrative orders. Id. at 19, illustrations 5-6. Federal and state enforcement maintained
these rough ratios in later years. In 1994, for instance, EPA referred to the DOJ 220 cases
for criminal prosecution and 430 cases for civil prosecution, while EPA initiated 3,600
administrative enforcement actions on its own. At the same time, states took somewhat
over 11,000 enforcement actions. EPA, No. 300-R-95-004, ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
ACCOMPLISHMENT
REPORT:FY 1994 2-2 to 2-3,4-2 to 4-8 (1995), or http://
w w w . e p a . g o v l C o m p l i a n c e l r e s o u r c e s l r e p o ~
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complete preclusion. Where a provision falls on the preclusion spectrum
is a function of the relative strength of EPA authority in the balance Congress struck between federal and state implementation of the program
being enforced. From the strongest to the weakest EPA enforcement provisions (and the correspondingly strongest to the weakest preclusion devices),
they: (1) impose no preclusion on EPA enforcement in a statute authorizing exclusive federal irnplementati~n;~~
(2) require EPA to notify the
state after EPA takes enforcement action against a violation of federally
established standards in the state;70(3) require EPA to give the state notice
before EPA takes enforcement action against a violation of state established standards in the state;7' (4) require EPA to give the state notice before
EPA takes enforcement action against a violation in the state and bar EPA
action if the states takes "appropriate" enforcement action against the violati or^;^* (5) bar EPA from taking some enforcement actions against a violation if EPA or the state has taken specific enforcement actions against
the violation;73 and (6) bar EPA from taking any enforcement action
against a violation if the state has taken "appropriate" action.74States have
similar arsenals of enforcement remedies in their statutes.
The legislative history of the EPA enforcement provisions emphasizes the relative enforcement roles of EPA and states in particular statu t e ~While
. ~ ~ this history sheds little direct light on how Congress intended
the preclusions to be applied, it does make clear that it intended the preclusions to achieve in the enforcement arena the federalist balances it
struck in the different statutes.76
C. Citizen Enforcement Provisions and Their Preclusions

All but one of the major statutes provide for citizen e n f ~ r c e m e n t ~ ~
(CAA S) 304,78CWA S) 505,79RCRA S) 7002,80CERCLA 5 310,8' TSCA

69TSCA, 15 U.S.C. $5 2615 & 2647 (2000).
70 CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)(3) & (4) (2000) (enforcement against federally developed
requirements).
7 1 Id. 5 7413(a)(2) (enforcement against state developed requirements).
72 SDWA, 42 U.S.C. $5 300g-3(a) & 300h-2(a) (2000).
73 CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1319(g) (2000).
74 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. 5 136w-1(a) (2000).
75 For an articulation of the roles of the federal and state governments in enforcement
HISin the CAA, see S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 21-22 (1970), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE
TORY OF THE CLEANAIR ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1970 (hereinafter "CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY"),at 401, 421-22; and in CWA, see S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73-74 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,3735-39.
76 Id.
77 See supra note 50.
78 42 U.S.C. 5 7604 (2000).
79 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000).
42 U.S.C. 5 6972 (2000).
Id. 5 9659 (2000).
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4 105(g),84and EPKRA $ 326).85 They
authorize citizens to sue EPA for failing to perform a duty mandated by
the statute (a statutory mandamus action) and to sue violating members
of the regulated public. While all three elements of the preclusion apply
to citizen suits against members of the regulated public, only the first two
apply to citizen mandamus actions against EPA. All of the statutes authorize
courts to issue injunctions requiring members of the regulated public to
comply with statutory requirements and most, but not all, authorize courts to
assess civil penalties against the violators.86 RCRA authorizes citizen
suits to abate imminent and substantial endangerments, akin to a statutory common law of public nuisance action,87and authorizes citizen enforcement for some violations in which EPA lacks authority to enforce.88
While the statutes provide a narrower range of remedies to citizens than
to EPA, the difference results almost entirely from the administrative and
criminal enforcement mechanisms granted to EPA and not to citizens:
enforcement mechanisms that, by their very nature, are available only to
the government.
$ 20,82 SDWA 4 1419,8WPRSA

1. Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisiorzs

The citizen suit provisions of the various environmental statutes are
modeled on CAA 5 304.89Indeed, the citizen suit provisions in the differ15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000).
42 U.S.C. 9: 300j-8 (2000).
84 33 U.S.C. 9 1415(g) (2000).
8542U.S.C. 11046 (2000).
86 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1365(a) (2000). See also MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1415(g)(l)
Q
' (g)(4) (2000).
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 3: 6972(a)(l)(B) (2000).
"RCRA 7002(a)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000) authorizes citizens to enforce against violations of this "act," i.e., all of RCRA. This includes violations of Subchapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter D as enacted), encouraging states to establish programs to control the disposal of non-hazardous solid waste to meet EPA established standards. See Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997). EPA lacks such authority
except in limited circumstances. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 6945(c)(2)(A) (2000). EPA's general
enforcement authority in 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000), extends only to violations of
Subchapter 111 (as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted) of RCRA.
8942 U.S.C. 7604 (2000). Both the House and Senate Reports on the CWA, for example, acknowledge the provision's origin in the CAA. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(2000) is "modeled on the provision enacted in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,"
S. REP.NO. 92-414, at 79 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745. The section
"closely follows the concepts utilized i n section 304 of the Clean Air Act." H. REP. NO.
92-91 1, at 133 (1972), reprinted in CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 753, 820 (1973). Indeed, they are so alike that the Senate Report on the CWA's citizen suit provision follows
the Senate Report on the CAA's citizen suit provision almost paragraph by paragraph and
word for word. Compare S. REP. NO. 91 - 1 196, at 36-39 (1970), reprinted CAA LEGISLAT I V E HISTORY,
at 401, 436-39 (1974) with S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1971), reprinted
in 2 CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 1415, 1497-1500 (1973). This is particularly significant
because the provision in the CAA originated in the Senate bill, with no counterpart in the
House bill. H.R. CONF.REP. NO. 91-1783, at 55 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5374,5388.
R3
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ent statutes are so nearly alike that courts commonly interpret one of them
by comparing and contrasting its wording with the wordings of others
and by using legislative history and precedent from the others.90 Section
304 of the CAA contains the preclusion device with notice, delay, and
bar elements in forms followed closely by the citizen suit provisions in
the other statutes. It provides that:
No action may be commenced. . .

. . . prior to 6 0 days after plaintiff has given notice of the violation [to EPA, the state and the violator] . . . or
if [EPA or the state] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order [sought
to be enforced by the citizen]. . . .9'
Under the notice and delay elements, citizens must give the government
the first opportunity to sue in court.92Under the bar element, citizens may
not sue if the government has filed an action to require compliance and is
diligently prosecuting it. If the federal government takes such a preclusive action in federal court, however, a citizen may intervene as a matter
of right.93The citizen suit provisions in the other statutes share these fea90See Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. at 615 (treating the CAA and RCRA citizen
suit provisions alike); Gwaltney of Smithfield. Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., inc., 484
U.S. 49, 57 (1987) (comparing wording of CWA provisions to citizen suit provisions of
several other statutes); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1987),
aff'd 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (comparing the citizen suit provisions of the CAA and RCRA);
Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (employing CAA
citizen suit provision legislative history to interpret CWA citizen suit provision); NRDC v.
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 702 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (employing CAA citizen suit provision
legislative history to interpret CWA citizen suit provision); Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier,
755 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990) (interpreting SDWA citizen suit provision); SPIRG of
N.J.. Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc. 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1534 (D.N.J. 1984), crff'd
759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1983). United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d
968, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1982) (comparing the wording of citizen suit sections in the CAA,
CWA, and RCRA).
" CAA Q 304, 42 U.S.C. 1 7604(b)(l) (2000).
92 A few variations on the notice and delay provision should be noted. All of the statutes require that citizens give notice to EPA before suing it for failure to perform a mandatory duty. Although most of the statutes require a sixty-day post-notice delay before a
citizen may file suit against a violating polluter, RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(b)(2)(A) (2000),
requires citizens to give EPA a ninety-day post-notice delay before they may file a suit to
abate an imminent and substantial endangerment. On the other hand, many of the statutes
do not require a post-notice delay period before citizens may sue for particular violations,
often associated with hazardous substances, although prior notice must still be given.
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 16972(b)(2) (2000). for instance, requires prior notice but no delay
period for citizens filing complaints alleging violations of Subchapter I11 (as encoded,
Subchapter C as enacted), regulating the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste.
See also CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 1365(b) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(b) (2000).
9'See CAA, 42 U.S.C. ji 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). Most of the citizen suit provisions, like
CAA Q 304, 42 U.S.C. Q 7604 (2000), allow "any person" to intervene. CWA, 33 U.S.C.
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tures; indeed, the "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting" language in the bar element is identical in most of them.94
There are, however, four variations among the bar elements of the
preclusion device in the citizen suit provisions. First, the citizen suit provisions of statutes not envisioning a state implementation role do not bar
citizen suits because of a state action.y5Second, several of the citizen suit
provisions bar citizen suits when EPA has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a criminal action.96Third, some citizen suit provisions bar
citizen suits if EPA has commenced assessing an administrative penalty9'
or has commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an
administrative penalty.98Finally, RCRA bars some citizen suits if EPA or
states have commenced one of a variety of judicial or administrative remedial actions under either RCRA or CERCLA.99
CERCLA § 113(h)'0° precludes citizen suits challenging that a
CERCLA remedial action violates the statute, as long as the remedial action
"is [yet] to be undertaken." But this precludes an action for judicial review of final EPA actions, rather than an action for enforcement against
violations by the regulated public. It is also a postponement of judicial review rather than a preclusion of it. Thus it is not the sort of preclusion
addressed in this Article. It does demonstrate, however, that when Congress intends to include a different sort of preclusion, it does so explicitly, not inferentially.
This examination of preclusions in citizen suit provisions would be
purely academic if citizens rarely used the provisions. While this Article
cites more than one hundred twenty-five reported decisions in citizen suit
cases, reliable statistics on the number of citizen suits filed are hard to
develop. The first empirical evaluation of the conduct and results of citiQ 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. Q 300j-8(b)(l)(B) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
Q 6972(b)(l) (2000). EPCKRA 9: 326(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9: 11046(h)(2) (2000), however,
qualifies those who may intervene, and TSCA 9: 20(b)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. Q 26 19(b)(l)(B)
(2000). allows only those parties to intervene who have given notice of citizen suit before
the government filed suit.
94 Except as noted in the text below, it is identical in the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1365(b)(l)(B)
(2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. (i 6972(b)(l)(B) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. (i 300j-8(b)(l)(B)
(2000); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 5 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000); and EPCKRA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 11046(e)
(2000).
95See,e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. (i 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000); EPCKRA, 42 U.S.C. (i I1046(e)
(2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1415(g)(2) (2000).
96See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(b)(l)(B)
(2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. (i 1415(g)(l)(D) (2000). See also Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. 9: 1540(g)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).
97 See, e.g., MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 9: 1415(g)(2)(C) (2000). See also ESA, 16 U.S.C.
9: 1540(g)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
98See,e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 9: 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000); EPCRKA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 11046(e)
(2000). The CWA includes a bar on EPA and citizen suits for penalties when EPA or a state
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting the assessment of an administrative penalty
or has assessed and collected such a penalty. 33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g)(6) (2000).
99 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 9: 6972(b)(2) (2000).
loo 42 U.S.C. (i 96 13(h) (2000).
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Zen suits noted that no-one kept comprehensive files of citizen suits, making
it difficult or impossible to compile complete statistics on them.I0' Based
primarily on interviews, the study determined that up to 100 citizen suits
a year were filed in the early 1980s. Congress subsequently amended the
citizen suit provisions of some of the statutes, requiring that citizen
plaintiffs serve EPA and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") with copies
of complaints and proposed settlements, making it easier to compile statistics on them. A recent survey of citizen suits based on copies of complaints on file with the DOJ concluded that citizen suit filings averaged
less than fifty cases a year from 1987 to 2000.102That is inherently an
underestimate, however, for only some of the statutes require citizens to
furnish copies of complaints to the government.Io3Indeed, another survey
reported that citizen suit filings averaged over 100 a year over the same
period.lO" In any event enough citizen suits are filed to seriously annoy
the regulated community and to convince the authorizing committee in
the Senate of their value.lo5
2. Legislative History
The legislative history indicates the overriding intent of Congress in
authorizing citizen suits was to provide for both more frequent and effective enforcement and to provide for citizen participation in enforcement. Congress reasoned that citizen enforcement would both prod the
government to enforce and enable others to enforce when the government
failed to d o so. Qualifying that purpose was a desire to assure that citizen
enforcement did not unduly duplicate, disrupt, or conflict with government enforcement or harass violators. Because the citizen suit provisions
are modeled upon CAA 9 304, courts commonly cite the legislative history of that section to determine the legislative intent of citizen suits under subsequently enacted statutes.lo6Examination of the statutory preclusions in citizen suits therefore begins with the legislative history of CAA

ENVTL.LAW INST.,AN ANALYSIS
OF CITIZENENFORCEMENT
UNDEREPA-ADMINISTATUTES,
11- l to 7 (1984).
'02 Pamela H.Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL.L. REV. 1, 156 (2002).
Io3 Compare CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(c)(3) (2000), and CWA, 33 U.S.C. (i 1365(c)(3)
(2000) (both requiring such measures), with RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972 (2000), and
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 5 9659 (2000) (not requiring so).
I M James R. May. Norv More than Ever: Trends in Environmer~talCitizen Suits at 30,
I0 WIDENER
L. REV. 1, 24 tbl. 4 (2003).
' 0 5 A later Senate Committee Report commented: "Citizen suits are a proven enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intended to both spur and supplement to government
actions. They have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance gains. In the past
two years, the number of citizen suits to enforce [CWA] permits has surged so that such
suits now constitute a substantial portion of all enforcement under this Act." S. REP. NO.
99-50, at 28 (1985).
'"See supra notes 89-90.
STERED
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5 304 and proceeds to the legislative histories of citizen suit provisions in
other statutes.
This is particularly significant because the provision in the CAA originated in the Senate bill, with no counterpart in the House bill.Io7The legislative history of the citizen suit provision, therefore, is largely, but not
entirely, contained in the evolution of the section in successive drafts of
the Senate bill, in the Senate debates, Senate Committee Report, and the
Conference Committee Report. The history does not appear particularly
contentious, but the CAA was enacted during days when Congress was
marked by comparative civility. The early 1970s were an era of bipartisanship on environmental legislation, and efforts were made on both sides of
the aisle to promote such ~ p i r i t . ' "Both
~
chambers considered the citizen
suit provision an expansion into the enforcement arena of the opportunities for citizen participation that characterized the revitalized environmental l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ' ~ ~
The sponsors of the bill and proponents of the citizen suit provision,
mostly Democrats, justified it as an antidote to previously unambitious
enforcement by the executive branch and states. "Government initiative in
seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations . . . should motivate governmental . . . enforcement and abatement proceeding^.""^ This, of course,
impugned the environmental bona fides of the administration, which was
Republican at the time. In an apparent effort to promote bipartisanship,"'
the sponsors changed their emphasis: "I think it is too much to presume
that, however well staffed or well intentioned these enforcement agencies, they will be able to monitor the potential violations" of all the requirements of the statute, making citizen suits a default enforcement mechalo'

H.R. CONF.REP. NO. 91-1783, at 55 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374,

5388.
Io8 Senator Scott, a Republican, heralded the CAA as representing "the highest form of
non partisan political cooperation." 116 CONG.REC. 33,101 (1970). reprinted in CAA
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY.
at 223, 349 (1974).
'@The Senate Report stated the CAA citizen suit provision "would provide citizen
participation in the enforcement of standards and regulations under this Act." S. REP. NO.
91-1 196, at 36 (1970). reprinted in CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,at 401, 436 (1974).
Senator Muskie, the chief sponsor of the legislation commented, "the bill extended the
concept of public participation to the enforcement process." 116 CONG.REC.42,382 (1970).
Senator Cooper commented, "The committee bill also breaks new ground in extending
public participation, an essential element throughout the act. to enforcement proceedings."
116 CONG.REC. 33,l 17 (1970). This is echoed in the House Report on CWA $ 505, in
which the public participation provisions of the statute are described as being prompted by
public frustration at feeling excluded from the administrative process in earlier pollution
control regulation. See CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
at 753. 821.
HISTORY,
at
S. REP. NO. 9 1 - 1 196, at 37 (1 970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
40 1, 436-47 ( 1974).
" I Senator Hruska included in the record a memorandum from his staff that complained bitterly that "[nlever before in the history of the United States has the Congress
proceeded on the assumption that the Executive Branch will not carry out the Congressional mandate." 1 16 CONG.REC.32,925 (1970).
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nism when the government lacks the resources to enforce."* Despite this
changing emphasis, it is clear throughout the legislative history that a major
goal of the provision was to encourage government enforcement.Il3 Under either rationale, the chief purpose of the provision was to provide a
new enforcement tool, in the hopes of more and better enforcement overall.Il4 Indeed, the Senate Reports for both the CAA and CWA emphasized
that in bringing such actions "citizens would be performing a public service.)9115
Opponents of CAA 5 304 were generally restrained. They did speculate
that plaintiffs would bring vexatious lawsuits against industry to get attorney fee awards and that multiple citizen suits against EPA would dissipate agency resources and divert its attention from its appointed tasks.Il6
But they worried more about "burdening the [already overcrowded] courts
with a large number of lawsuit^.""^ Reflecting these concerns, the Conference Committee strengthened the preclusion by extending the delay
period from thirty to sixty days and adding the bar element, and amended
the attorney fee provision to allow an award to defendants as well as
plaintiffs, when appropriate.Ils
Congress intended citizen suits as a goad to government enforcement.
The very purpose of the notice requirement was to "prod" or "trigger"

116 CONG.REC. 32,927 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). Senator Hart concurred:
"[The] Government simply is not equipped to take court action against the numerous violations of legislation of this type which are likely to occur . . . we will find very likely
noncompliance which in number or degree are far beyond the capacity of the Government
to respond to." Id. at 33,104. Senator Hart later noted, "The burden on the Department of
Justice is so great that the agency cannot respond to it." Id. at 33,105.
"'That was the case with the original Senate bill, which required only thirty days
prior notice and had no enforcement bar if the government did commence suit. S. 4358,
91st Cong. (1970). The Senate Report accompanying this bill stated that "[a]uthorizing.
citizens to bring suits . . . should motivate governmental agencies . . . to bring enforcement
and abatement proceedings." S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 36-37 (1970), reprinted in CAA
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 401, 436-37 (1974). The thirty-day notice requirement was intended to "further encourage and provide for agency enforcement" by giving the government
agency "an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." Id. at 37, 437. And it was the rationale for expanding the required notice to sixty days and imposing a bar on citizen suits
if the government did enforce within that period. "[Tlo further encourage and provide for
agency enforcement, the Committee has added" the notice and delay requirement. Id.
Senator Muskie commented that the notice might "trigger" administrative action. 116
CONG.REC. 32,927 (1 970). Senator Hart commented that the notice would have the "effect
of prodding" government enforcement. Id. at 33,104.
""Citizens can be a useful instrument for detecting violations and bringing them to
the attention of the enforcement agencies and courts alike." 116 CONG.REC. 32,927 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Muskie). "Although the Senate did not advocate these suits as the best
way to achieve enforcement, it was clear that they should be an effective tool." Id. at
42,382.
S. REP. NO. 9 1 - 1 196, at 38 (1 970). reprinted in CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,at 401,
438 (1974); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 81 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747.
' I 6 116 CONG.REC. 32,924 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
' I 7 Id.
' I 8 See legislative history cited strpra in note 113.
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government enf~rcement."~
But for some violations, although the provisions require citizens to give notice, they do not require a delay period
before citizens may file their complaint^.'^^ Under those circumstances,
the citizen suit notice is not likely to prod government enforcement.
The legislative history also emphasizes that not all government enforcement actions will bar a citizen suit. "[Ilf the citizen believed efforts
initiated by the agency to be inadequate, the citizen might choose to file
the action . . . [I]f the court viewed the agency action as inadequate, it
would have jurisdiction to consider the citizen action notwithstanding the
pending agency action."lZ1If an agency does commence enforcement actions during the delay period, it "must prosecute them in good faith and
with deliberate speed . . . or the citizen is free to initiate his
This indicates congressional intent that the preclusions not eliminate all
successive enforcement by citizens.'23Finally, at least one citizen suit provision authorizes citizens to enforce against violations that the federal government has no authority to enforce against.lz4
The legislative history of CWA 3 505 is similar to that of the CAA.
Indeed, the Senate CWA Report commentary followed the Senate CAA
Report almost paragraph-by-paragraph and line-by-line.'25It added, "[ilt
is the Committee's intent that . . . citizens should be unconstrained to bring
these actions, and that the courts should not hesitate to consider them."'26
The legislative history of the CWA provision also anointed a citizen en-

'I9 See supra note 1 13. The delay between the citizen's notice and when the citizen can
file suit should give the government enforcer "an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." S. REP.NO. 91-1 196, at 36 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 401,
436 (1974).
I2O See supra notes 27-28.
I2l S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at
401, 437 (1074). It can be argucd this is not a good mirror of legislative intent because it
was written before the Conference Committee added the bar element to the preclusion in
CAA Q 304,42 U.S.C. Q 7604 (2000). But the same language appears in the Senate Report
on CWA Q 505, see infra note 125, accompanying a Senate bill that included the bar, making it reflective of the Senate's view, with or without the bar.
Iz2 S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 65 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at
401,465 (1974).
lZ3 Successive enforcement actions are contemplated in several situations: if the government action was commenced after the citizen suit; if the government action is not being
diligently prosecuted; and if, under some statutes, the government action is not in court.
124RCRA Q 7002(a)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. Q 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000), gives citizens authority
to enforce against violations of any standard, prohibition, or requirement of the statute,
including standards, prohibitions, and requirements of RCRA Subchapter IV (as encoded,
Subchapter D as enacted) regulating disposal of non-hazardous solid waste. RCRA Q 3008,
42 U.S.C. Q 6928 (2000), authorizes EPA to enforce against violations of Subchapter 111
(as encoded, Subchapter C as enacted), regulating hazardous waste disposal, but only limited power to enforce Subchapter IV (as encoded, Subchapter D as enacted). 42 U.S.C.
Q 6945(c)(2) (2000).
lZ5 Compare S. REP. NO. 9 1 - 1 196, at 36-39 (1 970). reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 401, 436-39 (1974), with S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79-82 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3744-47.
126S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 78 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3743.

Heinonline - -

28

Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.

423 2004

424

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 28

forcer as a "private attorney general," believing that the citizen suit provision "provides an open door for those who have legitimate interests in
the courts, and encourages more meaningful participation in the administrative p r o c e ~ s e s . " lThere
~~
is some evidence in the legislative history
that Congress was aware that the citizen suit provisions were enacted
against a backdrop of common law preclusions and intended the statutory
and some common law preclusions to apply in an integrated fashion.'28
Others have commented that the legislative history of the provisions
is in conflict, on the one hand expansive, favoring citizen enforcement,
and on the other hand restrictive, fearing it.I2' But the legislative history
is more complex. It suggests Congress did not have a single intent in enacting the citizen suit provisions, but that it intended the provisions to
serve several purposes. One clear purpose was to be a vehicle for citizen
participation in government, with broader goals of providing transparency and openness in government, in turn promoting public ownership of
and trust in government. Another was to assure compliance with environmental statutes by encouraging government enforcement and providing
default enforcers when the government chose not to enforce or lacked the
resources to do so. Indeed, Congress came to see citizen suits as an effective
tool in that regard, one performing a substantial role in the total enforcement effort. It admonished courts to be receptive to citizen suits, recognizing that citizen enforcers performed a public service. Qualifying these
purposes was the congressional desire that citizen suits not unduly duplicate, interfere or conflict with government actions or unduly harass violators.
Congress reconciled any conflict between its desire to promote citizen enforcement and its desire that citizen suits not unduly duplicate, interfere, or conflict with government actions in the preclusion device. Courts"
elevation of the qualification that citizen suits not unduly duplicate, interfere, or conflict with government actions from its status as a limited con-

I2'H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 134 (1972). reprinted in 1 CWA LEC~SLATIVE
HISTORY,at
753, 821 (1973).
Commenting on the citizen suit provision, Rep. Reuss and ten other congressmen
observed,
We are confident that the courts would be alert to invoke the doctrine of laches in
the rare case where a group, despite ample notice and opportunity to prepare and
participate in adequate administrative proceedings, nevertheless deliberately stayed
out of those proceedings and immediately endeavored to use the judicial process
for purposes of delay. The bill need and should not limit the right of all citizens
and groups to obtain judicial relief, merely in order to deal with this remote
problem, if it, indeed, exists.
Id. at 409, 878.
129 Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Administrative Discretion: When
J. 3,
Should Government Enforcement Bar a Citizen Suit?, NAT'L ENVTL.ENFORCEMENT
4-6 (1995).
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gressional afterthought to a dominant intent ignores the very purpose of
the provisions.

D. An Anomaly: CWA $309(g)
Congress added 9 309(g)I3Oto the CWA in 1987, authorizing EPA to
assess administrative penalties against violators of the statute. It was one
of three amendments intended to strengthen the EPA enforcement provision.l3I The authority was a limited one, however. Whereas CWA § 309(d)132
authorizes courts to assess penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation
per day with no upper limit on the total penalty, 9 309(g) authorizes EPA
to assess total penalties of only $25,000 or $125,000, regardless of how
many violations or days of violations are charged, depending on the formality of the administrative process EPA uses.133To prevent duplicative
penalties for the same violations, Congress included a variation of the preclusion device, providing that "any violation . . . shall not be the subject
of a civil penalty action" by EPA or a citizen if
(i) . . . [EPA] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action under this subsection,
(ii) . . . a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action under a State law comparable to this subsection, or
(iii) . . . [EPA or a State] has issued a final order . . . and the
violator has paid a penalty under this subsection, or such comparable State law . . .
The preclusion does not apply, however, if a citizen files an enforcement
action before commencement of "an action under [§ 309(g)17' or serves a
notice of violation prior to that time and commences a citizen suit less than
120 days
The subsection contains a version of the preclusion device found in
EPA and citizen enforcement provisions throughout the statutes. Many of
the terms it uses in the bar element are identical to terms used in the other
provisions, such as "is diligently pro~ecuting."'~~
But the context in which it

33 U.S.C. 3 13 19(g) (2000).
Water Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, $5 312-14, 5 309, 101 Stat. 7, 42-46 (1987).
The amendment also increased the amounts of civil penalties courts may assess and added
a new and severe criminal sanction for knowing violations placing people in danger of serious
injury.
33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (2000).
Is3CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) & (g) (2000).
'"Id. 5 1319(g)(6)(A). EPA may assess penalties using informal proceedings, with a
cap of $25,000, or using formal APA proceedings, with a cap of $125,000.
Is5 Id. 5 13 19(g)(6)(B).
136 Compare CWA, 33 U.S.C. $5 1319(g)(6)(A)(i) & (ii) (2000), with CWA, 33 U.S.C.
5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000).
IsO
13'
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uses those terms calls for somewhat different interpretation. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has suggested that wording in 309(g) that differs from
wording in the citizen suit sections warrants a different interpretati~n.'~'
One important difference is that while the citizen suit sections couple "is
diligently prosecuting" with "to require compliance," CWA 309(g) does
not. This difference is not surprising, for the citizen suit provisions authorize
courts to issue compliance injunctions, while § 309(g) authorizes EPA only
to assess modest penalties.
The legislative history of 309(g) emphasizes that EPA is to use the
administrative penalty authority for minor violations not warranting serious enforcement
It recounts that Congress built explicit citizen
participation authorities into the § 309(g) penalty assessment process, including intervention and judicial review, to assure that EPA did not misuse
the p r o v i ~ i o n .Congress's
'~~
fear of misuse was not that EPA would assess
excessive penalties, but that it would assess minor penalties for serious
violations more appropriate for injunctive relief and large penalties.14"
The legislative history indicated the purpose of the !j 309(g) preclusion was
to prevent the assessment of duplicative penalties for the same violation,
with no mention of preserving the government's authority to enforce without
the hindrance of a simultaneous citizen suit.14' That is in great contrast to
the purpose of the preclusion in the citizen suit provisions, enunciated in
their legislative history, to preserve the government's authority to do just
that.142The very different purposes served by the preclusion in CWA
5 309(g) and in the citizen suit sections suggests that they should be interpreted somewhat differently and that interpretations of the § 309(g) preclusion not be applied uncritically to the preclusions in the citizen suit sections.

There is considerable literature on citizen suits, with pioneering efforts dating back to the m i d - 1 9 8 0 ~ Some
. ~ ~ ~ of the more recent literature
Authorizing citizens to sue those alleged to "be in violation" in CWA 5 505(a)(l),
33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(1) (2000), suggests violations must be ongoing to support 'a citizen suit,
while authorizing EPA to assess penalties against a person who "has violated" in CWA
5 309(g)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(l) (2000) "explicitly targets wholly past violations."
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 4 9 , 5 0 (1987).
S. REP. NO. 99-50, (1985).
Id. at 26-27.
I4O Id. TWOthirds of the Report's discussion of 3 309(g) is devoted to this concern.
I 4 l Id. at 28.
14? See supra Part I.B.2.
I4'See generally Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits under Federal Environmental Laws,34 BUFF.L.
REV.833 (1985); Jeffrey G . Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Law,
(pts. 1-3), 13 ENVTL.L. REP. 10,309 (1983), 14 ENVTL.L. REP. 10,062 (1984). 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,407 (1984). Treatises on environmental law commonly devote considerable
attention to citizen suits, e.g., WILLIAMH. RODGERS,ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: HAZARDOUS
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focuses on the statutory bars to citizen suits generally, although much of
it focuses on the statutory bars in CWA $8 309(g) and 505.14+' None of it
attempts a unified interpretation of the preclusions in citizen suit provisions, much less an integrated interpretation of the preclusions in the citizen suit and EPA enforcement provisions. None of it notices the theme and
variations nature of the preclusion device, which underlies the unified
integrated interpretation advocated in this Article.
A cursory reading of the bar element suggests that it raises a single
legal question: what is diligent prosecution? A careful reading of the element, however, reveals that it raises five major issues: (1) What government entities may act to bar a citizen suit? (2) What government actions
may bar a citizen suit? (3) When must the government commence an action to bar a citizen suit? (4) How diligently must the government prosecute an action to bar a citizen suit? (5) What citizen suits may a government action bar? Each of these questions raises subsidiary issues.
The provisions answer most of these questions directly and explicitly. Indeed, Congress did a remarkably good job drafting the citizen suit
sections and their preclusion provisions. The provisions specify the government entities that may act to bar citizen suits, the government actions
that may bar citizen suits, and that the government must commence one
of those actions before the citizen commences suit for the government
action to bar the citizen suit. They don't define "diligently prosecuting,"
but they illuminate its meaning by linking it to compliance. Finally, they
specify that government actions may bar citizen suits to the extent both
WASTESA N D SUBSTANCES
(West, 2003 update). There have been at least two treatises on
citizen suits. MICHAELAXLINE,ENVIRONMENTAL
CITIZENSUITS(3d ed. 1993); JEFFREY
G. MILLER& ENVTL.L. INST.,CITIZENSUITS:PRIVATEENFORCEMENT
OF FEDERAL
POLLUTION CONTROL
LAWS(1987).
I4"See generally Peter A. Appel, The Diligent Prosecution Bar to Citizen Suits: The
Search for Adequate Representation, 10 WIDENERL. REV. 91 (2003); Matthew D. Zinn,
Policing Environmental Regulatoiy Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits,
21 STAN.ENVTL.L.J. 81 (2002) (giving a particularly good theoretical analysis of citizen
suits as an antidote to the capture of government enforcement by regulated industry);
Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKEENVT'LL. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001) (questioning the value of citizen suits);
Barry S. Neuman & Jeffrey A. Knight, When Are Clean Water Act Citizen Suits Precluded
by Government Enforcement Actions?, 30 ENVTL.L. REP. 10,111 (2000); Derek Dickinson, Note, Is "Diligent Prosecution of an Action in a Court" Required to Preempt Citizen
Suits Under the Major Federal Environmental Statutes?, 38 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1545
(1997); Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen Suits: Impacts on Permitting and Agency
& ENV'T, Spring 1997, at 20; Heather L. Maples, ReformEnforcement, NAT. RESOURCES
ing Judicial Interpretation of the Diligent Prosecution Bar: Ensuring an Effective Citizen
Role in Achieving the Goals of the Clean Water Act, 16 VA. ENVTL.L.J. 195 (1996); Steven
Russo, States, Citizens, and the Clean Water Act: State Administrative Enforcement and
the Diligent Prosecution Defense, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL.L.J. 21 1 (1995); Randall S. Schipper,
Note, Administrative Preclusion of Environmental Citizen Suits, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 163;
Cindi Ann Solomon, Note, "Lenient" Penalty Is Strong Evidence that a State Enforcement
Agency's Prosecution Is Nor "Diligent" for Purposes of Section 505 of the Clean Water
Act, 4 S.C. ENVTL.L.J. 58 (1995). See also Snook, supra note 129, at 3; Hodas, supra note
36, at 1627-32.
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actions seek compliance with the same requirements. Thus the plain language of the provisions anticipated and answered the issues arising under
the preclusions, except one, and it gave guidance on that issue. Congress's
use of the preclusion device with many nuanced variations in both the
citizen and EPA enforcement provisions strongly reinforces that Congress
meant the words it used in each variation of it to carry its own particular
meaning. Most courts interpret the provisions in accordance with their
plain language, but some depart greatly from it.
Some violators argue that the possibility of a subsequent citizen suit
makes it impossible for an agency to settle an enforcement action with a
violator, unless the settlement precludes citizens from suing.'45That argument is empirically unsound, for violators settle cases daily with federal and state enforcers without knowing whether citizen plaintiffs will
subsequently file suits. The argument presupposes that citizen enforcement threatens violators as much as government enforcement, which is
not the case. When citizens take action against a violator, they can seek
only civil penalties and an injunction. When the government takes action
against a violator, it too can seek civil penalties and an injunction, but it
can take many other actions, including inspecting the violator frequently
and intrusively; revoking or denying permits or making them subject to
difficult conditions; criminally prosecuting the violator, its officers, and
employees; and barring the violator from government contracts. To believe that violators will not reach administrative and civil settlement with
the government because of possible action by citizens is naive in light of the
draconian powers the government has over violators who do not settle.
The latter argument implies that the resolution of a citizen suit may
detract from the benefits the government achieved from resolving its own
enforcement action. This could be true if the resolution of the citizen suit
displaced the resolution of the government action, but citizen suit resolution does not do so. Both the government and citizen suit resolve its action by collecting a penalty, and the penalties remain in the Treasury.
Thus, if the citizen suit is resolved by the assessment of a penalty, there
is simply another deposit into the Treasury, which is doubly enriched. If
the government resolved its action by an order for compliance, there is
little left for a court to do in a citizen suit other than to enforce the government's resolution. If the government resolved its action by an order
for something less than compliance, however, the court in a citizen suit
must order compliance. This may take from the violator the benefits of
the resolution of the government's action against it, but it takes no such
benefits from the government.
In summary, one court considering the contention concluded:

- -

145

See Snook, supra note 129, at 11; Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 144, at 25.
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To contend that citizen suits undermine agency enforcement
policy is . . . ultimately misleading. Unquestionably, such suits
may disturb the course of agency action. But the agency nevertheless remains free to adhere to its own view of the appropriate
enforcement policy by continuing to press for an informal resolution and devoting its enforcement resources to other matters.
This should hardly be viewed as some sort of deprivation for the
agency, since it will usually result from the agency's own determination that the steps necessary to retain enforcement control are not worth the resources required.146
A. What Government Entities May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit?
The provisions may bar citizen suits if the "Administrator or State" has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting various enforcement actions.
The first issue is what they mean by the "Administrator" and the "State."
While the answers appear obvious (Congress meant EPA and each of the
fifty states) the reasons for the answers may not be.
1. What "Administrator" May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit?
The provisions may bar citizen suits when the Administrator has commenced and is diligently prosecuting enforcement actions, usually civil
actions and occasionally criminal actions. The statutes define "Administrator" to be the Administrator of EPA.147But the general law is that the
Attorney General represents the United States in court.148Therefore the Administrator does not initiate civil or criminal actions in court, but refers
actions to the Attorney General, who may file suit on behalf of the United
States; indeed, the statutes provide so e~plicit1y.l~~
While a particular environmental statute may authorize EPA attorneys to bring an action if the
Attorney General declines to do so,I5O the author is aware of no instance
in which they have done so. This practice and the congressional intent that
the practice effectuates is emphasized by subsequent legislative history.
Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 9 2602(1) (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1251(d) (2000); MPRSA, 33
U.S.C. 9 1402(a) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 9 300f(7) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 9 6903(1)
(2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7602(a) (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9 9601(2) (2000); EPCRKA,
42 U.S.C. 9 11049(1) (2000).
148 "Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all
litigation to which the United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a party." 28 U.S.C.
9 5 19 (2000).
149TSCA,15 U.S.C. 9 2615(a)(4) (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1366 (2000); MPRSA, 33
U.S.C. 9 1415(d) (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 9 300j-9(f) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7605
(2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9 9622(d)(l)(A) (2000).
Is0CWA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1366 (2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 9 1415(d) (2000); SDWA, 42
U.S.C. 9 300j-9(f) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7605 (2000).
14'
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The House passed a bill in 1977 to amend the CAA, adding a provision
that would have granted EPA independent litigation authority. The accompanying House Report detailed a litany of EPA complaints about its
representation by the DOJ to justify the proposal.Is1 The DOJ quickly negotiated and entered into a memorandum of understanding with EPA governing their relationship and the Department's accountability for EPA
case referrals. As a result, Congress dropped the proposal from the
arnendment~.'~~
A formal plain meaning interpretation of the citizen suit preclusions
limits the preclusion to those cases in which the Administrator or EPA
attorneys commence an action. That reading of the provision, however,
robs the preclusion of any application to judicial enforcement actions commenced by the federal government under the statutes, for the Attorney
General and attorneys from the DOJ commence all such actions. Of course,
statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to all parts of them, not to
rob them of meaning.'53Interpreting the provisions to include judicial actions brought by the Administrator or at his request solves this problem.
While this may not be the rigidly formal reading of the statute, it is consistent with its plain meaning and with the intent of Congress. To the extent that it departs from the literal wording, the departure is justified to
avoid the absurd result of effectively eliminating its application to federal
enforcement action in court. Although defendants in EPA enforcement
actions have raised the issue,Is4 the author is unaware of any citizen suit
decision in which the issue has been raised.
'

2. What "State " May Act To Bar a Citizen Suit?
The meaning of "State" is not an academic issue, but has arisen in
several contexts. The apparently straightforward issues are whether municipalities and Indian tribes are "States" whose enforcement actions may
bar citizen suits. A more complicated issue is whether a state lacking an
approved program under the statute being enforced is a state whose enforcement actions may bar citizen suits.
l S 1 H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 332-36 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1411-15.
l S 2 The Conference Report accompanying the amendments outlines the memorandum
of understanding, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-564, at 173-76 (1977) reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N., 1502, 1554-57. The memorandum is referenced in CAA § 305(b), 33 U.S.C.
5 1365(b) (2000).
15'See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29, at 324 n.13. (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759, 778 (1988); S. Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498,510 n.22 (1986)).
Is4 Most courts have rejected the contention that the Attorney General cannot initiate
enforcement actions under the statutes. United States v. REAG 730 F. Supp. 482 (D. Conn.
1989); See United States v. Zimmer Paper Prods., 733 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Ind. 1989);
United States v. Packaging Corp. of America, 1982 WL 2123 (W.D. Mich). See also FED.
R. CIV. P. 17(a). Contra United States v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 92
(E.D. Mo. 1980).
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a. States, Municipalities, and Indian Tribes
Because municipal agencies often exercise their own enforcement
authority over pollution control requirements, defendants in citizen suits
have argued that municipal enforcement actions bar citizen suits to the
same extent that state enforcement actions bar them. This argument has
some appeal. Municipalities are creatures of states and states may invest
them with some of the attributes of state authority. Municipal authorities
may have a role to play in the enforcement of some of the pollution control
statute^.'^^ Successive citizen actions have as much potential to interfere
with municipal enforcement actions as they have to interfere with state
actions.
But both the statutory and plain meanings of "State" and "municipality" are different. The statutes commonly define "person" to include both
a "State" and a "rnuni~ipality."'~~
They also define "State," however, and
those definitions do not include "m~nicipality."'~~
Many of them define
"m~nicipality."~~~
These definitions establish that Congress understood that
states and municipalities were different entities and did not intend its use
of "State" to include a municipality. The words also have different meanings
in common usage. A state is "one of the constituent units of a nation having
a federal government," while a "municipality" is "a primarily urban political unit having corporate status and usual powers of self-go~ernment."'~~
Further, states are components of our federalist constitutional system,
while municipalities are not.160
The statutes treat states and municipalities differently as a structural
matter as well, regarding states as regulators in EPA's stead and municipalities as members of the public to be regulated by EPA or states in its
stead. Under the CWA, for instance, EPA, or states with EPA-approved
programs. issue permits to industrial and municipal pollution ~ o u r c e s . ' ~ '
155 In the CWA, for example, municipalities are expected to develop and implement
programs to regulate discharges by industry into municipal sewage treatment systems. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b)(8) (2000).
Is6 See id. 5 1362(5).
CWA 5 502(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(3) (2000), for instance defines "State" as "a State,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands . . . [and
other trust territories]." See also SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 5 300f(13) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
5 6904(31) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7602(d) (2000).
IssCWA 5 502(4), 33 U.S.C. 5 1362(4) (2000), for instance, provides that "'municipality' means a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, association, or other public body
created by or pursuant to State law . . . ." See also SDWA, 42 U.S.C. 5 300f(10) (2000);
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 6903(13) (2000); and CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7602(f) (2000).
159 WEBSTER'S
SEVENTH
NEWCOLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
855, 557 (1999).
I W Thus, a plaintiff state cannot claim a defendant city is a state for purposes of invoking the Court's original jurisdiction for suits between states in Article 111 of the Constitution. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Court declined to exercise its
original jurisdiction over suits between states when Illinois sued Milwaukee to abate its
pollution of Lake Michigan, because Milwaukee is a municipality not a state.
16' CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (2000).
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Although municipalities are expected to establish their own regulatory
programs governing industrial discharge into sewage treatment systems,
the requirements for those municipal programs are established in permits
issued by EPA or states in its stead.162Nevertheless, some defendants in
citizen suits enforcing requirements on industrial discharges into municipal sewage treatment systems have argued that enforcement actions by
the municipalities barred the citizen suits. Courts have rightly rejected all
of these arguments on plain meaning grounds, without much a n a 1 y ~ i s . l ~ ~
Defendants also have argued that actions by Indian tribes enforcing
environmental statutes have the same preclusive effect as enforcement
actions taken by states. As a definitional matter, this proposition appears
dubious, for the statutes do not include "Indian tribe" within their definitions
of "State."'* Some define "Indian tribe," emphasizing that where the statute
provides that a "state" enforcement action may bar a citizen suit, it does
not mean an Indian tribe action may do
Other statutes define "municipality" to include an "Indian tribe," with the same r e ~ u 1 t . lBecause
~~
the definition of "State" does not include a municipality, as discussed
above, it does not include an Indian tribe either. The one court to consider
the issue, however, held to the contrary under the CWA because CWA
5 518(e)I6' authorizes EPA to treat Indian tribes meeting specified criteria
as states for particular purposes,'68 as do provisions in other statutes regarding EPA's treatment of Indian tribes.'69 The court relied heavily on
correspondence from EPA treating the tribes' action as a state action.170
Id. Q Q 1317(b) & 1342(b)(8) (2000). See also EPA, General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Source of Pollution, 40 CFR Q Q 403.1 & 403.4 (2004).
163 See, e.g., Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017,
1022 (2d Cir. 1993); Ohio PIRG v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 635,638-39 (S.D.
Ohio 1996); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, 1996
WL 1670982, at *4-*5. (S.D. Ohio) (not deciding whether a city was a state, but holding
that a city's action could not bar a citizen suit under CWA Q 309(g), 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g),
because the city had no provision for public participation in enforcement); Ill. PIRG, Inc.
v. PMC Specialties Group, 835 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1993); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v.
Top Notch Metal Finishing Co., 1987 WL 44393, at *3 (D.N.J.); N.Y. PIRG, Inc., v. Limco
Mfg. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). See also City of Heath v. Ashland Oil
Co., 834 F. Supp. 971, 976-77 (S.D. Ohio 1993), and City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials &
Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (both examining a similar question under
CERCLA and precedent under that statute). But see Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991) (dicta).
See provisions cited supra in notes 156-1 59.
See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. Q 7602(r) (2000).
166CWA,33 U.S.C. Q 1342(4) (2000). See also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q 6903(13) (2000).
Because a municipality is a "person" who may be sued under the citizen suit provisions, an
Indian tribe is also a person who may be sued under them. This definition therefore waives
whatever immunity a tribe may have to suit by citizens for CWA violations. Atl. States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 827 F. Supp. 608 (D. Ariz. 1993).
167 33 U.S.C. Q 1377(e) (2000).
Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244-45 (N.D.N.Y.
2001).
'69 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7601 (d) (2000).
Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 2 4 5 4 6 n. 14.
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The court, however, failed to consider the counterargument, the fact that
Congress specifically stated that tribes are to be treated as states for some
purposes, implying that it did not intend that tribes be treated as states
when it omitted reference to tribes. The treatment of tribes in the statutory definitions strengthens this argument. The court considered neither
of these factors, and presumably it would have reached a different conclusion had it done so. The relationship of Indian tribes to states is a
complicated one, including consideration of the treaties under which
various tribes were accorded their reservations; as a result, the topic is
beyond the scope of this Article.

b. States with Unapproved Programs
A potentially more common issue is whether actions brought by states
without programs approved by EPA to implement a statute may bar citizen suits under that statute. For instance, will action by a state without an
approved permit program under the CWA bar a citizen suit to enforce a
water pollution permit issued by EPA? Neither the statutory definition
nor the plain meaning of "state" is limited to a state with an approved
program, suggesting that enforcement actions by states having or lacking
EPA-approved programs can bar citizen suits. But the structures of the
statutes suggest that enforcement actions by states lacking EPA-approved
programs should not bar citizen suits. The citizen suit provisions of statutes contemplating federal rather than state implementation provide merely
that federal actions preclude citizen suits.'" Only statutes contemplating
implementation by EPA or states with EPA-approved programs provide
that federal or state actions may preclude citizen suits.'72The latter statutes often provide different constraints on EPA enforcement when it has
approved a state program instead of implementing the program itself.'73
These differences in constraints on EPA enforcement suggest that the
preclusion triggered by state enforcement should occur only when a state
is implementing an approved program. This limitation on the preclusion
makes policy sense: when a state agrees to assume the laboring oar in implementing and enforcing a federal program, the state has a stake in the
federal program. States not implementing an EPA-approved program, however, have no such stake. It is understandable that an action by EPA or a
state with an EPA-approved program may preclude a citizen suit. But why

I 7 l See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 9 2619(b)(l)(B) (2000).
172See,e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000).
l i 3 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 1342(h) (2000) (authorizing EPA to seek a judicial ban on

new sewer hookups with municipal sewage treatment systems that are not in compliance
with their CWA permits). The authority is unconstrained in states where EPA is administering the permit program, but in states with approved programs, EPA may use the authority only if it determines that the state has not taken "appropriate" action with regard to the
permit. Id.

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 433 2004

434

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 28

would Congress provide that an action by a state may preclude a citizen
suit when the state is not implementing an approved program, not assuming the laboring oar in the federal program, not having a stake in the
federal program, and, therefore, lacking a motivation to undercut the federal program?
Allowing actions by unapproved states to preclude citizen suits and
perhaps EPA enforcement as well appears counter to the structure and policy
' ~ ~ one
of the statutes, and could do violence to their i m p l e m e n t a t i ~ n . The
time this question was raised in the legislative history of any of the statutes, it was taken as a given that only actions by states with approved
programs could preclude further enforcement. Senator John Chaffee, a chief
sponsor of the CWA amendments of 1987, which added CWA § 309(g),
commented in the Senate debates that the preclusion in 309(g) "clearly
applies only in cases where the state in question has been authorized under
section 402 to implement the relevant permit program."'75 The issue apSuch an interpretation of the citizen suit provisions, of course, would not preclude
EPA from enforcement unless EPA enforcement provisions contain a similar preclusion, as
some do. Under CWA 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000), for instance, a state action
bars both EPA and citizen action. Under some courts' interpretation of that provision, a
state may, by assessing a small penalty against a violator, bar EPA and citizens from seeking a court order requiring the violator to comply. N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v.
Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). Thus a state could effectively insulate all
violators within its boundaries from compliance with federal pollution control requirements
simply by assessing small penalties against all of them. States with approved programs
would not be expected to do so because they have a stake in the programs and EPA could
withdraw its approval of their programs should they commence such activities. See, e.g.,
CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1342(d)(2) (2000). States without approved programs, however, have no
stake in them and may be motivated to undercut them. If so, EPA has no recourse against
them. This issue under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g) (2000), will be addressed further in
Part Two.
133 CONG.REC. 1264 (1987). He elaborated:
A single discharge may be a violation of both State and Federal law and a State is
entitled to enforce its own law. However, only if a State has received authorization
under section 402 to implement a particular permitting program can it prosecute a
violation of Federal law. Thus, even if a non-authorized State takes action under
State law against a person who is responsible for a discharge which also constitutes a violation of the Federal permit, the State action cannot be addressed to the
Federal violation, for the State has no authority over the Federal permit limitation
or condition in question. In such case, the authority to seek civil penalties for
violation of the Federal law under subsections 309(d) or 31 l(b) or section 505
would be unaffected by the State action, notwithstanding paragraph 309(g)(6).
Senator Chaffee's statement ignores the possibility of the State enforcing federal law
in a citizen suit. The statutes generally define "person" to include a state, see, e . g . , CWA,
33 U.S.C. 1362(5) (2000), and the citizen suit provisions generally authorize a "person"
to bring suit, see, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7604(a) (2000). CWA 505(a), however, authorizes a "citizen" to enforce, but it defines "citizens" to be a "person." 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(2000). States may bring citizen suits under such statutes. See Dep't of Energy v. Ohio,
503 U.S. at 607 (1992); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Co., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980); Massachusetts v. U.S.V.A., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir.
1976). But see United States v. City of Hopewell, 508 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980). States
cannot bring citizen suits under statutes not defining "person" to include states. Warren
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pears to have been raised in court only once and then it was not considered because it was raised for the first time on appeal in an amicus brief.I7'j
The wording and structures of the statutes and absence of relevant legislative history suggest that Congress simply did not think about whether
actions by states, both with and without approved programs, could preclude citizen suits. They also suggest that, had it done so, it would have
limited preclusions to actions by states with approved programs. But because the statutory and plain English meanings of "State" clearly include
all fifty states, "State" should be interpreted to include all states, regardless of whether they have approved programs. Moreover, Congress clearly
knows how to limit provisions to states with approved programs when it
so desires, as it did in the provision authorizing EPA enforcement after
notice to such states in the CWA.'" This issue can, and should, be addressed in a simple amendment to the citizen suit provisions, defining
"State" for the purposes of the provision to mean states with an approved
program under the particular statute.
B. What Government Actions May Bar a Citizen Suit?

Each of the citizen suit provisions specifies particular government
actions that will preclude a citizen suit. They range from a simple "civil
action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance" in
the CAA'78to a laundry list of differing federal and state actions in RCRA.'79
The first issue is whether the provisions should be interpreted to
limit government actions that may bar a citizen suit to those specified in
the particular provision. So understood, the question almost answers itself. The most obvious and best interpretation is the plain meaning of the
County v. North Carc!ina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. i9S I j.
Senator Chaffee's statement also ignores the possibility of the State's enforcing federal law in state court as the supreme law of the land. See Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc.
v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that
RCRA may be enforced in state court because, under the Supremacy Clause, it is the law
of the land) (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990)).
Senator Chaffee's use of "notwithstanding paragraph 309(g)(6)" at the end of the quoted
language may be unavailing, for even committee reports cannot "trump a textual plain
meaning" of the statute itself. See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29, at 325.
" V c i t u a t e , 949 F.2d at 556 n.3. In a variant to this issue, when citizens of state A
brought a RCRA citizen suit against a polluter in state A, the defendant sought to preclude
the suit based on a pending action against it by state B. The court noted that the RCRA
citizen suit provision did not define "State" and proceeded to a disguised prrrens patriae
analysis concluding that, since state B was not suing on behalf 'of the citizens of state A,
they were free to proceed. Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus., 1993 WL 134861 (N.D.
Ohio), remanded on orher grounds, 9 F.3d 1174 (6th Cir. 1993). The court failed to note, however, that RCRA defines "State" generally to include all states. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3 l) (2000).
The Court's interpretation of the statute is in derogation of the plain meaning of that
definition.
33 U.S.C. 13 19(a)(l) (2000).
'7842U.S.C. 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000).
42 U.S.C. Q § 6972(b)(2)(B) & (C) (2000).
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clause, augmented by the expressio unius canon of interpretation.Is0 The
provisions state exactly what Congress intended: the listed government
actions and only the listed government actions bar citizen suits. This is
reinforced by the theme and variations nature of the preclusion device.
The fact that Congress listed different types of actions as potential bars
to citizen suits in the different provisions reinforces the conclusion that it
intended the government actions it listed in a particular statute, and no
others, to bar a citizen suit under that s t a t ~ t e . ' As
~ ' discussed below, most
courts agree, although there is a significant division among them on the
interpretation of CWA 9 309(g).
The second issue is the meaning of the limitation on government actions that may bar a citizen suit to government actions that "require compliance" with the statutory requirements the citizen plaintiff seeks to enforce. Again, the plain meaning and expressio unius canons suggest that
the limitation means exactly what it says. Such an interpretation also serves
the statutory goal of protecting the environment through full compliance
with the statute's requirements. Surprisingly, courts have not often focused
on the meaning and significance of the condition.
1. When the Statute Provides that Particular Government Actions
May Bar a Citizen Suit, May Other Government Actions Bar It?

To ask the question is to answer it in the negative. The issue arises in
two contexts: where the provision lists only court actions as precluding
citizen suits and where the provision lists a variety of government actions
as precluding citizen suits.
a. Where the Statute Provides that Only Court Actions May Bar a
Citizen Suit
The plain meaning of such statutory provisions is that only a judicial
action by the government may bar a citizen suit. A "court" is commonly
understood to be a judicial, not an administrative tribunal. At the federal
level, that means an Article I11 court. Neither the environmental statutes
nor the Administrative Procedure ActIs2 refer to administrative tribunals
as courts. EPA named its appellate tribunal the Environmental Appeals
Board, not the Environmental Appeals Court. Nothing in the citizen suit
provisions or their legislative history indicates Congress intended to depart from this pattern of limiting the meaning of "court" to include only
See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29, at 323 n.1 (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling
Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992) and United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988)).
I 8 l See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. 491 U.S. 701 (1989); and Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
490 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1989)). See also discussion, supra note 29.
5 U.S.C. $ 3 551-559,701-706 (2000).
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judicial tribunals. To the contrary, Congress underscored its intention that
"court" mean an Article I11 court in several ways.
First, in some provisions it authorized citizens to enforce against violation of "an order issued by the Administrator," or a state, which could refer
only to an administrative order.183TO bar citizen enforcement of an administrative compliance order because the government had issued that compliance order prior to the filing of the citizen's complaint would be circular
and render meaningless the authorization for the citizen to enforce the
order. Second, in other provisions it precluded citizen suits when the government took either judicial or administrative actions. In RCRA, it precluded citizen suits because of an action in "court" in one subparagraph
and because of various administrative actions in two other subparagraphs.lS4
In the CWA it precluded citizen suits because of an action in "court" in
5 505 and because of particular administrative penalty actions in § 309(g).
By referring to both judicial and administrative enforcement actions
in the same provisions or in different preclusions in the same statute,
Congress indicated that it knew they were different types of actions, knew
how to describe each, and meant its references to each as discrete types
of actions. It indicated the same intent by providing in some statutes that
only judicial actions could bar a citizen suit, while providing in other statutes that judicial or administrative actions could bar a citizen suit.Ig5Moreover, in some provisions it precluded citizen suits when the government
has commenced a "civil or criminal action in a
Criminal actions,
of course, are prosecuted only in Article I11 courts, never in administrative tribunals.
All but two of the more than thirty courts asked to rule that an administrative tribunal is a "court" for the purposes of the preclusion have
refused to do ~ 0 . ' ~
Although
'
they have come to the same conclusion, they
have done so for different reasons. The most obvious and best approach
is that the plain meaning of "court" is an Article I11 court or its state
equivalent. Almost all courts beyond the Third Circuit have adopted this
interpretation. The Third Circuit, however, reasoned that an administrative tribunal might be invested with sufficient quasi-judicial powers to
make it a court for this purpose. But its departure from the plain meaning
Is3See,e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. 9 7604(a)(l)(B) (2000).
Is4 Compare RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
6972(b)(l)(B) (2000), with id. $5 (b)(2)(B) & (C).
Is5 Compare CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). with TSCA, 42 U.S.C. § 2619(b)
(1 )(B) (2000).
Is6See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(l)(B)
(2000); and MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 14 15(g)(2)(D) (2000).
Is7See Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 n.161 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), which stands alone among the more than thirty decisions cited in this subsection on
the issue, except for the bizarre decision in SURCCO v. PRASA, 157 F. Supp. 2d 160
(D.P.R. 2000). Gardeski is discussed infra in notes 200-203 and accompanying text. The
decision is no longer good precedent, following a subsequent ruling contra in the Second
Circuit, Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985). Note 198,
infra, addresses SURCCO.

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 437 2004

438

Harvard Environmerztal Law Review

[Vol. 28

of the statute has not led it to different results, for the Circuit has never
found that an administrative tribunal has sufficient quasi-judicial powers
to make it a court. Indeed, following the Third Circuit's analysis, it is
difficult to imagine how an administrative body could ever be considered
a court. In any event, the circuit may subsequently have repudiated its
reasoning in favor of a plain English i n t e r ~ r e t a t i 0 n . l ~ ~
In Baughman v. Bradford Coal, Inc., the Third Circuit acknowledged
that "court" usually denotes only judicial tribunals, not administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. But it commented that "court" could
be interpreted to incorporate administrative tribunals if "necessary to
achieve the statutory goals."'89 The court never explained when interpreting
"court" to include administrative tribunals was necessary to achieve statutory goals. Instead, it enunciated a two-part test to determine if an administrative tribunal had sufficient quasi-judicial powers to be the functional equivalent of a court. First, the tribunal must possess the power to
achieve all of the remedies that EPA could ask a court to exercise under
the statute at issue, here the CAA. Second, the tribunal's procedures must
be similar to judicial procedures, including a provision for intervention
by citizens. It found a state agency's authority deficient in both respects,
as it lacked authority to enjoin violations and had authority to assess penalties of only one tenth the amount that federal courts could assess under the
CAA. While it could grant citizen intervention at its discretion, citizens
had no intervention by right in its proceedings.
The Third Circuit revisited the issue in Projjitt v. Comm'rs, Twp. of
Brisr01'~~
and SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc.'" in
which it held that EPA was not a court when it issued a compliance order
under CWA $ 309(a). The trial court in Fritzsche based its ruling that EPA
was not a court on the lack of procedures for citizen intervention in EPA's
administrative compliance order proceedings. The Third Circuit commented
that lack of citizen intervention was not the sole criterion for making the
determination, but rather part of a "dual inquiry."
The first question to be answered is whether the coercive powers
that the administrative agency possesses compel compliance with
effluent limitations (to determine whether the agency has "the
power to accord relief which is the substantial equivalent to that
available to the EPA in federal court"). The second inquiry concerns the procedural similarities the agency proceeding might have
to a suit in federal court (to determine, among other things,

188 See infra note 195 and accompanying text discussing SUIT
Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars
USA, Inc., 26 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1994).
Is9 Baughman, 592 F.2d at 2 17.
I9O 754 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985).
I9l 759 F.2d 1 13 1 (3d Cir. 1983).
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whether citizens have a right to intervene in the agency proceeding).192
The Third Circuit agreed with the lower court that EPA was not a court for
several reasons: EPA lacked authority under 8 309(a) to assess penalties;lg3
EPA's compliance order was not self-enforcing, for EPA had to seek judicial enforcement if its order was not obeyed; EPA's order issuance procedures lacked any similarity to judicial procedures; and EPA's procedures
under § 309(a) did not provide citizens a right of intervention. Indeed,
EPA had refused the citizen plaintiffs in the case the opportunity to intervene in its proceedings. Of course, by its very nature an administrative
agency order is never self-enforcing, for agencies have no powers of
contempt. If the respondent does not obey an administrative order, the
agency must seek judicial enforcement. It is therefore difficult to imagine
how an administrative body could ever be held to be a court under the
Baughman approach, as elaborated by Fritzsche.
The Third Circuit later addressed the issue of whether a state administrative agency could be considered a state court for purposes of removing a case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In Sun Buick,
Inc. v. Saab Cars USA, I ~ c . , the
' ~ ~court was clearly uncomfortable applying
its "functional equivalent" doctrine in that context. Examining its precedents under the environmental statutes, it commented, "[wle need not
decide the validity of the dictum in these cases" (emphasis added).Ig5It concluded with regard to them "[elven ifwe were still inclined to follow Baughman's application of the "functional" test for purposes of permitting maintenance of a private citizen enforcement suit in environmental litigation,
the removal context is sufficiently distinct to make the cases distinguishable."Ig6It continued to determine that the state agency involved did not
have sufficient judicial powers to make it a court for purposes of the removal statute, much as it had in Baughman, Proffitt v. Bristol, and Fritzsche.
The court strongly questioned the viability of these precedents but noted
that it would take an en banc court to jettison them.
Some district courts have followed Baughman, although none had the
advantage of considering the effect of Sun Buick on the continued viability of Baughman. All but one found that the administrative agencies whose
actions were invoked to preclude a citizen suit lacked sufficient quasi-

192Fritzsche,

759 F.2d at 1137.
33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a). Frirzsche was decided before Congress gave EPA administrative penalty assessment authority in CWA 5 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g) (2000). This
would not appear to affect the court's holding, because penalty assessment was but one of
the factors it considered, and EPA continues to lack penalty assessment authority in CWA
5 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 (1319)(a) (2000), the provision at issue.
194 26 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1994).
195 Id. at 1264.
I W Id.
'91
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judicial powers to be the functional equivalents of court^.'^' Another bizarre opinion reached the same result but for other reasons.'98The exception was the first decision to consider the issue following Baughman.
Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone C O . 'held
~ ~ that New York's air pollution agency was a court. The opinion was based, in part, on a finding that
the New York agency had substantially more power than the Pennsylvania agency the Third Circuit had considered in its opinion. But the court
19' The exception was Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), discussed immediately infra. Other district courts held the agencies at
issue not to be courts, following a Baughman analysis. See, e.g., Ill. PIRG, Inc. v. PMC
Specialties Group, 835 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that a municipal sewer agency
was not a court under the CWA, because it could not enforce its orders except by resort to
court, it did not give citizens the right to intervene, and it had no power to issue injunctions); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Rice, 774 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding an EPA administrative order on consent with Air Force no bar to citizen suit because EPA lacked power
to enjoin violations and the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a) (2000), requires no citizen participation in the issuance of compliance orders); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F.
Supp. 1525 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995);
Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D.
Ind. 1990) (holding that under CWA 5 505, the Indiana Department of Environmental
Management was not a court, because it lacked power to enforce its penalty assessments);
PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 WL 66178 (D.N.J.) (holding that New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was not a court because it lacked injunctive
power, power to enforce its orders, public notice of administrative enforcement, and public
intervention); Wiconisco Creek Watershed v. Kocher Coal Co., 641 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa.
1986) (holding that Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection was not a court
because it lacked the requisite judicial procedures, including citizen intervention); Sierra
Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that, under CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365, the Maryland environment agency
was not a court because it lacked power to enforce its compliance orders); SPIRG of N.J.,
Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D.N.J. 1985); SPIRG of N.J., Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C.
5 1319(a) administrative order was not an action in court); Brewer v. City of Bristol, 577 F.
Supp. 519 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that Baughman test was assumed to apply under
CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365, but that no factual basis had been established whereby to
rule on issue); and Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 830 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
198 SURCCO V. PRASA, 157 F. S u p p 2d 160, 169 (D.P.R. 2000), held that an EPA
compliance order under CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a), was the action of a court
because "EPA by its very nature belongs to that class of typical o r traditional agencies
endowed with adjudicative powers." Of course, EPA has adjudicative powers; Congress
explicitly gave it such powers under CWA 5 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g) (2000). But the
court in SURCCO didn't consider whether the powers under which EPA acted were adjudicative powers, and, if so, whether Congress intended EPA adjudicative actions to bar a citizen
suit. Indeed, the court did not even identify the authority under which EPA had acted. It
appeared to act under CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a) (2000), granting EPA authority
to issue compliance orders. If so, the court failed to note that EPA actions under 5 309(a)
are accomplished with absolutely no adjudication. Instead the court relied on a First Circuit decision under CWA 5 309(g), reasoning that the issue wasn't one of the wording of
the statute, but whether the government had taken an enforcement action to remedy the
same violations, making a citizen action duplicative. N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc.
v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991). Because CWA 5 309(g) does not
limit the preclusion on citizen suits to actions in court, Scituate did not consider the question before the SURCCO court, making the Scituate holding inapposite. The only apposite
part of the Scituate statement relied upon was that the wording of the statute is not important, a dubious proposition.
'99501F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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essentially made a policy choice motivated by its view of what best served
the purpose of the CAA, the first part of the Baughman test, which the
Third Circuit had neglected to explain in its opinion. The Gardeski court
began by mischaracterizing a fragment of the Senate Report that the purpose of citizen suits "was only to 'motivate governmental agencies charged
with responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement pro~eedings."'~~~
The Report language, however, contains no "only" and not the slightest hint
that the Committee's only purpose in authorizing citizen suits was to
prompt government e n f ~ r c e m e n t . ~The
~ ' court considered the preclusive
effect of a state consent administrative order imposing an expeditious
schedule for compliance negotiated shortly after the State agency became
aware of the violations. The court concluded, not illogically from its
premise, that "[tlo require an agency to commence any form of proceeding
would be senseless where the agency has already succeeded in obtaining
the respondent's agreement to comply with the law in some enforceable
form."202Moreover, "[tlo hold that the CAA requires agencies to commence a court suit in all cases, in order to retain enforcement control,
would be inconsistent with the statutory purpose as well as Congress's desire that the states be primarily responsible for enforcing the
But
it went on to hold that although the initial consent order was diligent
prosecution, the state's subsequent failure to enforce against immediate
and continued violation of the compliance order was not diligent prosecution. Indeed, the decision contains one of the best analyses of what constitutes diligent prosecution.
The opinion appears reasoned in its evenhandedness. But its holding
that an administrative agency can be a court is based on the false premise
that the sole congressional purpose of the citizen suit provision was to
prompt government enforcement. This false premise caused the court to
disregard the plain meaning of the statute and the complex nature of congressional intent in authorizing citizen suits. The court's misperception of
congressional intent was caused by its mischaracterization of the legislative history. The court began an unfortunate tradition, followed all the
way to the Supreme Court, of misstating legislative history to justify disregard of the wording of the citizen suit provision^.^^ Any characterization of the legislative history to indicate that Congress had a sole intent
when enacting the citizen suit provisions is a misunderstanding at best
2w501 F. Supp at 1159 (emphasis added). The text of the Report was "Government
initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing
citizens to bring suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental agencies
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings." S. REP.
No. 91-1 196, at 36-37 (1970). reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 401, 4 3 6 3 7
(1974).
See supra the discussion of the legislative history of citizen suits in subsection I.B.2.
202 Gardeski, 501 F. Supp. at 1166.
'03 Id. at 1 163.
2w See infra notes 424-428.
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and a mischaracterization at worst. Congress had more than one purpose
in mind when it conceived citizen suits and it had more than one policy
consideration when it placed limitations on citizen suits.?05 Those purposes and policies were both complementary and conflicting, requiring
Congress to craft compromises in the provision and its language. Under
these circumstances, Congress's intent is more likely to be found in the
language it used in the statute than in assumptions based on one of its
multiple goals.
The Second Circuit was the next court of appeals to consider the issue. It flatly rejected the Baughman analysis. It found that CWA § 505206
used "court" "unambiguously and without qualification," therefore making
it "inappropriate to expand this language to include administrative enforcement actions."207In addition to its plain English reading of the statute, it could find no legislative history indicating that Congress intended
to include administrative agencies as courts. Finally, it noted that Congress had barred citizen suits under other statutes because of both judicial
and administrative enforcement actions, e.g., TSCA, MPRSA, and RCRA.208
Because the citizen suit provisions in the environmental statutes are
closely related and Congress clearly knew how to specify that administrative enforcement precluded citizen suits under other environmental statutes, its failure to specify them in CWA § 505 indicated its intent that
administrative enforcement not preclude citizen suits under that provi~ i o nAll
. ~other
~ ~ courts of appeal considering the issue have followed Consol. Rail, specifically rejecting Baughman for the same reasons the Second Circuit rejected
Many district courts in the Second Circuit and
beyond have followed Consol. Rail and rejected B a ~ g h m a n . ~Congress
"
205 See the discussion of the legislative history of citizen suits, supra at Part I.B.2, particularly the last paragraph.
'06 33 U.S.C. Q: 1365 (2000).
'07 Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 5 7 , 6 2 (2d Cir. 1985).
'08 Of course, this applies only to citizen suits against violations of RCRA, not citizen
suits to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment.
'09 Friends of the Earth, 768 F.2d at 63. The Court itself has interpreted CWA Q: 505,
33 U.S.C. Q: 1365, in part by comparing it to citizen suit provisions in other environmental
statutes. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987).
210SeeTexans United for a Safe Econ. Educ. Fund v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp.,
207 F.3d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 2000); Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (holding that language of CWA Q: 505 is "plain and unambiguous"); PMC,
Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1998); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992)
(holding that an administrative "Assurance of Discontinuance" was not an action in court
even though it was filed in court); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517 (9th
Cir. 1987).
"'See Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (CWA and RCRA); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry
Bosma Dairy, 2001 WL 1704240, at *5 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (CWA) (reaching the result of
Consol. Rail and rejecting the result of Baughman, without citing them); Orange Env't,
Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ill. PIRG, lnc. v.
PMC Specialties Group, 835 F. Supp. 1070, 1075-76 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that a mu-
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subsequently amended CWA 5 505(a)?" to cross reference the 5 309(g) bar
on citizen suits for administratively assessed penalties under specific circumstances, reinforcing its intent that "court" in 8 505 does not include
administrative agencies.?I3If it had meant "court" in 5 505 to include administrative agencies, it would have had no need to add this crossreference.?14
The approach of the majority of the circuits is clearly correct. It is
faithful to the plain wording of the provisions and is faithful to their structures. It also made policy sense for Congress to limit the activation of bars
against citizen suits to government actions in court rather than to administrative actions. When Congress developed and enacted the citizen suit provisions, Congress and the public were skeptical of administrative action
as lacking transparency and being ineffective.?15Court actions, however,
are taken in public and are transparent. Even settlements of EPA's civil
judicial actions are subject to a public notice and comment procedure.?16
While administrative agencies frequently issue administrative orders that
do not require compliance,217when federal courts find a defendant in violation of the statutes, they must order it to comply.218

nicipal agency is not a court under the CWA); Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc.,
834 F. Supp. 953, 955-57 (W.D. Ky. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir.
1995) (holding that RCRA "court" action in 9: 7002(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9: 6972(b)(l)(B)
(2000), does not include administrative action because 5 7002(b)(2)(B) & (C) specifically
provide that administrative actions bar citizen suits); City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials &
Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (RCRA 5 7002); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v.
Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1538 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd in part on other grollnds, 50
F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 822 F. Supp. 174,
183-84 (D.N.J. 1992) (CWA 5 505); Proffitt v. Borough of Morrisville, 716 F. Supp. 837,
841 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1990); Lykins v. Westinghouse, 715 F.
Supp. 1357, 1358-59 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (CWA 5 505); McCregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill,
Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401, 1407 (N.D. Ohio 1987). aff'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding, without discussion, that state action in court barred RCRA 5 7002(a)(l)(A)
action); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 603, 61 1 n.2 (D.
Minn. 1988); Mumford Cove Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392, 396 (D.
Conn. 1986) (CWA 5 505); Md. Waste Coalition v. SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474, 148081 (D. Md. 1985) (CAA 5 304); and SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985). See also PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Top Notch Metal Finishing Co.,
1987 WL 44393, at *3 (D.N.J. 1987) (following Georgia-Pacific and holding that negotiation about a violation with an administrative agency is not an action in court).
2 1 2 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000).
*"CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000), begins with a reference to 5 309(g)(6), 33
U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(6), which, in turn, provides that particular administrative penalty assessments bar citizen suits.
? I 4 Of course, it might have added the cross-reference to countermand Consol. Rail and
its progeny. But, although the legislative history of 5 309(g), 9 1319(g) (2000), is quite
detailed, it makes no mention of such an intent. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
a5See legislative history cited s~rpranotes 109 & 1 10.
216 DOJ, Consent ~ u d ~ m e nin
t s kctions to Enjoin Discharges of Pollution, 28 C.F.R.
6 50.7 (2004).
"7 See it&
cases cited in notes 338 & 349 and accompanying text.
"8 See infra cases cited in notes 129 & 354 and accompanying text.
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b. Where the Statute Provides that Several Government Actions May
Bar a Citizen Suit
When a statute precludes a citizen suit because the government has
commenced one of several listed enforcement actions, does the statute
also preclude it because the government has commenced an unlisted enforcement action? The plain meaning of such a statutory provision is that
only one of the listed actions by the government may bar a citizen suit.
The issue arises primarily under RCRA. While RCRA2I9citizen suits to
enforce against violations of the statute are barred only by a government
action in court, RCRA citizen suits to abate an imminent and substantial
endangerment are barred by seven specified federal and state judicial and
administrative enforcement and remedial actions under both RCRA and
CERCLA.220Thus, state administrative enforcement actions may not bar
a citizen suit against a violation of RCRA under 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(a)(l)(A)
(2000), but may bar a citizen suit to abate an endangerment under 42 U.S.C.
9 6972(a)(l)(B) (2000).221When defendants have argued that citizen suits
to abate endangerments were barred by other government enforcement and
remedial actions under RCRA or CERCLA, courts have followed the Consol. Rail line of reasoning and have quickly rejected those arguments. For
instance, in Coalitionfor Health Concern v. LWD, Inc.222defendants claimed
that an EPA administrative order under RCRA 8 3008(h)223requiring defendants to determine the nature and extent of hazardous waste releases
from a facility, barred a citizen suit against defendants to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment caused by the releases. An action under 42 U.S.C 5 6928(h) (2000) was not on the list of specified actions
barring citizen suits, although EPA could have used several of the listed
actions to order the same study. In rejecting the claimed bar, the court
reasoned that "[wlhen Congress explicitly enumerates exceptions to a
statutory provision, a court cannot infer additional exceptions without
evidence of contrary legislative intent."224It could find no such intent in

42 U.S.C. 5 6972(b)(l)(A) (2000).
Id. at 5 6972(b)(2)(B) & (C).
22' See N. Cal. River Watch v. Humboldt Petroleum, Inc., 2000 WL 1639524 (N.D. Cal.).
222 834 F. Supp 953 (W.D. Ky. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir.
1995).
223 42 U.S.C. 9 6928(h) (2000).
224 Coalition for Health Concern, 834 F. Supp. at 957.
219

220
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the statute or its history.225Other courts considering the issue under RCRA
have come to the same conclusion.226

2. Must the Government Action Require Compliance To Bar a
Citizen Suit, and When Do Government Actions
Require Compliance?
Congress augmented EPA's enforcement authorities and created the
backstop citizen suit authority to improve compliance with the environmental statutes. Consistent with this objective, it is provided that for a
government action to bar a citizen suit, the government action must be
commenced and diligently prosecuted "to require c~mpliance."~~'
The plain
meaning of the term is to coerce the defendant to cease violating the requirement being enforced. Non-coercive actions cajoling compliance or
assessing modest penalties are not actions that require compliance. When
' 2 5 Id. The court observed the government actions Congress specified to bar a citizen
suit seeking abatement of an endangerment all required the government to find that such an
endangerment existed. It distinguished a RCRA 3008(h) action as requiring no such
finding. Indeed, it noted that the legislative history of 3008(h) indicated the provision
was to enable EPA to implement corrective action on RCRA interim status facilities, a
power that EPA previously had only with regard to permitted facilities and that the provision did not alter the statute as to EPA's imminent and substantial endangerment authority.
226 See, e.g., Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1574 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a government action listed as barring RCRA citizen suit
under 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(l)(B) did not bar suit under 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(l)(A)); Mejdreck V.Lockformer Co., 2002 WL 1838141 (N.D. Ill.) (holding that RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(C),
42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(2)(C) (2000), preclusion by a state suit under RCRA does not apply to
a suit brought by a state under a similar state statute); Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that RCRA
7002(b)(2)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C)(i) (2000), bars citizen suits to abate endangerlxents if the state brings a citizen suit in court to do the same); Briggs & Stratton Corp.
v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1375 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that state
action under a state statute that "would not necessarily be in compliance with RCRA" does
not bar citizen suit); Gilroy Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners and Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that state action does not bar citizen suit where section specifies
that an EPA action bars suit); A-C Reorg. Trust v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 968 F.
Supp. 423, 430 (E.D. Wisc. 1997); lnterfaith Cmty. Org. v. Allied Signal Inc., 928 F. Supp.
1339, 1346-48 (D. N.J. 1996); Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33, 41 (D.
Me. 1994); Orange Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1026-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ohio 1987),
aff'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that specified federal and state
actions under CERCLA bar citizen suit under RCRA 5 7002(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9 6972(a)
(l)(B)); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding
that remedial funds spent by third parties do not bar citizen suit where section specifies
that EPA expenditure of remedial funds bars suit); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617
F. Supp. 1531 (D. Pa. 1985). See also Davies v. Nat'l Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990,
997 (D. Kan. 1997) (abstaining from exercising jurisdiction to allow state completion of
investigation and development of plan to remediate releases of hazardous waste, but noting
that "when Congress has set forth the conditions under which state or administrative actions
will preclude a federal claim, as it did in [42 U.S.C.] 6972(a)(l)(B), a federal district court
must be cautious about refusing to exercise jurisdiction when those conditions are not
present lest it frustrate Congress's scheme for vindicating important federal interests").
?"See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000).
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Congress intended non-coercive actions to bar successive enforcement, it
did not include the "to require compliance" language in the statute, i.e.,
in CWA 5 309(g).'28 This difference emphasizes the significance of the
"to require compliance" language in those statutes where it appears and
highlights the unique nature of 5 309(g), which authorizes only modest
penalties that are not enough, in many cases, to deter violations.
The legislative history affirms that Congress deliberately used the term
"to require compliance." The House and Senate Reports accompanying
the CAA and CWA citizen suit provisions stated that commencement and
diligent prosecution of "abatement actions" by the government would preclude citizen suits.229Indeed, the Senate CAA bill, containing the prototype citizen suit provision,230required prior notice by the citizen to "afford [the government the opportunity] . . . to initiate enforcement proceedings . . . to abate such alleged ~ i o l a t i o n . " ~"Abate"
~'
is defined as "to
put an end to."232The plain meaning of "abate" and "abatement" in the
legislative history is the cessation of the violation. The Senate Report accompanying this language made it clear that the citizen plaintiff and, ultimately, the court were to make a judgment whether a government action
met this test:
[I]f the citizen believed efforts initiated by the agency to be inadequate, the citizen might choose to file the action. In such case,
the courts would be expected to consider the petition against the
background of the agency action and could determine that such
action would be adequate to justify suspension, dismissal, or consolidation of the citizen petition. On the other hand, if the court
viewed the agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to consider the citizen action notwithstanding any pending
agency
The legislative history equated the adequacy or inadequacy of the government action with its capability of compelling compliance. The Conference Committee changed the language of the Senate bill requiring the
government "to initiate enforcement proceeding . . . to abate such alleged
33 U.S.C. 8 1319(g) (2000).
H.R. CONF.REP.NO. 91-1783, at 56 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374,
5388 ("If an abatement action is pending . . ."); S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 37 (1972). reHISTORY,
at 401, 437 (1974) ("if the agency had not initiprinted in I CAA LEGISLATIVE
ated abatement proceedings . . ."); H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1 , at 133 (1972), reprinted in 1
CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 753, 820 (1973) ("If an abatement action is pending and is
being diligently pursued . . ."); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746 ("if the agency had not initiated abatement proceedings. . .").
230 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
231 S. 4358, 91st Cong. 5 304(b) (1970).
n2WEBSTER'S
SEVENTH
NEWCOLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
1 (1999).
233 S. REP. NO. 91 -1 196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at
401, 437 (1974).
228

229
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violation"234to the language of the enacted provision requiring the government to have "commenced and [be] diligently prosecuting . . . action
. . . to require compliance."235As discussed above, Congress's reference
to abating a violation meant compelling compliance with the statute. The
statute's final language was more elegant than the earlier Senate text from
which it was derived, but the Senate Report explains both.236The legislative
history also demonstrates Congress's intent that the trial court determine
that a government action is adequate (i.e., whether the government action
is one capable of and calculated to require compliance) before i t can bar
a citizen suit.
The Supreme Court in Gwaltney of Snzithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc. seized on the present tense in another subsection of CWA
9 505, as a justification for holding that the section authorized citizen
suits only to address continuing violations.237It found additional support
for its conclusion by noting that the provisions "specifically provide that
citizen suits are barred only if the Administrator or State has commenced
an action 'to require compliance.' This language supports the conclusion
that the precluded citizen suit is also an action for compliance, rather
than an action solely for civil penalties for past, nonrecurring violations."238
The Seventh Circuit cited similar language in RCRA 9 7002239to support
its holding that an EPA suit to abate violations barred a citizen suit to
abate the same violations, although directed against different defendants.240
What government actions "require compliance" and, as a result, may
preclude a citizen suit? Clearly, an injunction against a continuing violation is a coercive act and, therefore, may preclude a citizen suit. The Supreme Court reminds us in laid la^^^' that penalties also may be used to
coerce compliance. To coerce compliance and deter violations, a penalty
must recover from a violator more than the economic benefit it has realized from the violations; in Laidlaw because the penalty agreed upon be-

'"S. 4358, 91st Cong. § 304(a)(3) (1970).
235CAA 304(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. Q: 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000). as it was enacted and is
worded today.
236 The Senate Report accompanying the Senate CWA bill contains the same language
as the Senate Report accompanying the Senate CAA bill. Cornpare S. REP. NO. 91-1 196, at
37 (1970), reprinted in I CAA L E G I ~ L A T I V EHISTORY,
at 401, 437 (1974), with S. REP. N O .
92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3744-47. Since the language
contained in the Senate CWA bill is the same as the language contained in the CAA Conference Committee bill, the quoted language from the Senate Report explains both versions
equally.
*"See 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). The Court was interpreting the "alleged to be in violation" present tense in CWA Q: 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
38 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60 n.3 (quoting 33 U.S.C. $1365(b)(l)(B)) (emphasis added).
239 42 U.S.C. 9 6972 (2000).
240 Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1323 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("Notice that this statute refers to an action to 'require compliance with such
permit [or] regulation'-not an action against the private party's chosen adversary, but an
action to require compliance" (quoting 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(l)(B) (2000)).
"' 528 U.S. 167, 185-87 (2000).
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tween the defendant and the state was insufficient to do so, it did not preclude a citizen
Generally, if a government action is not a traditionally
recognized coercive device, it probably is not one to require compliance.
To preclude a citizen suit, a government action must not only be capable of requiring compliance, it must be calculated to do so. Although
the Court in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo reminds us that there may be
several forms of injunction that can lead to compliance, not all injunctions will do so.243The Second Circuit implicitly recognized this in remanding a citizen suit case for the district court to determine whether the
defendant's settlement of a government enforcement action "caused the
violations alleged by [plaintiff] to cease and eliminated any realistic
prospect of their recurrence."244If so, the citizen suit was to be dismissed,
if not, it was to go forward. The decision was therefore based on mootness, but it required the trial court on remand to determine not only whether
the state's settlement rendered the citizen suit moot, but also whether the
settlement was complied with and whether it covered all of the types of
violations alleged by the citizen
Other courts have held that administrative orders do not bar citizen suits unless they purport to and do, in
fact, prevent the continuance of violations alleged in the citizen suits.246
States may use a common enforcement mechanism, such as an administrative compliance order, not to coerce compliance, but as a means of extending a compliance date. Mere compliance extensions do not coerce compliance, even though they are contained in compliance orders."' Of
course, it may not be clear from the face of an order whether the state intends to compel compliance or merely extend a compliance date. Some
courts may be hostile to such an inquiry.248

242 Id. at 186 n.2, citing district court opinion, U.S. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Servs., Inc., 890
F. Supp. 470,49 1-94,497-98 (D.S.C. 1995).
243 456 U.S. 305 (1982). The Court held that the district court was not mandated to issue an injunction requiring the Navy to cease discharging practice bombs into the waters of
the United States without a CWA permit, but could instead order the Navy to apply for a
permit. It concluded that the CWA provided several means for a court to assure compliance. "An injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance." Id. at 314. "Rather
than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for any and all statutory violations, the
[CWA] permits the district court to order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt
compliance with the Act. That relief can include, but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessation." Id. at 320.
244 Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1991).
245 Id.
246 See N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 1998 WL 886645, at *3
(N.D. Cal.); Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572, 1578-79 (N.D. Ga.
1995); Love v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832,843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
247 Culbertson, 9 13 F. Supp. at 1579.
248 Indeed, one court suggested that a citizen plaintiff's argument that an administrative
compliance order was merely a compliance date extension came close to warranting a Rule
11 sanction. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1186, 1188
(N.D. Ala. 1988).
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C. When Must the Government Commence an Action To Bar a Citizen Suit?
The citizen suit provisions typically provide that no citizen suit may
be "commenced" if the government "has commenced" and is diligently
prosecuting an enforcement action. Congress's use of "has commenced"
raises the related issues of when the government action must be commenced
to be preclusive and what constitutes commencement of a government
action. Because the provisions use the term "commenced" describing government and citizen actions in the same sentence, the word must have the
same meaning with regard to both. That "commenced" has the same meaning in both uses is not only consistent with the plain meaning canon of construction, it follows from the canon to "interpret the same or similar terms in
a statute the same way."249The fact that Congress used the past tense of
the same verb in all versions of the preclusion device reinforces this conclusion.

I . Must the Governnzent Commence an Action Prior to a Citizen
Suit To Bar It?
The uses of the present or future "may be commenced," the past tense
"has commenced," and the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" in the
same paragraph suggest that Congress used the different tenses purposefully and intended the temporal meanings they convey. No citizen suit "may
be commenced7' if the government "has commenced7' and "is diligently
prosecuting" an action. Thus the government must have commenced its action before the citizen suit is commenced in order to preclude the citizen
suit. The Court held in Gwaltney that Congress used differences between
present and past tenses in citizen suit provisions deliberately and that
courts should accord significance to those differences.250This literal interpretation of "has commenced" is consonant with the Court's notion in
Gwaltney that the purpose of the notice and delay elements of the preclusion device is to give the government the first chance to enforce, and allow citizens to enforce when the government fails to do so,25'a notion that is
consistent with legislative history.252Most courts have had little trouble in
holding that a government enforcement action will preclude only subsequently commenced citizen
Interpreting "has commenced," based
249 See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29, at 324 (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 84
(1990) and United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 366 (1988)).
"OGwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57-59
(1987). The Court concluded that Congress used the present tense "is in violation" in CWA
3 505 advisedly, for when it wished to refer to past acts, as it did in RCRA 3 7002, it knew
how to do so by using the past tense "has contributed." Id. at 57 n.2.
15'SeeFrilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 836 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
"'See discussion of legislative history, Part 1.8.2, supra.
2 5 3 T h uin
~ Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 215 (D.
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on its tense, to mean the government action was previously filed implies
that "is diligently prosecuting," which follows one word later, also should
be interpreted, based on its tense, to mean a presently pending government prosecution. This present tense meaning of "is diligently prosecuting" has a significance not fully recognized by the case law, as discussed
infra in Part 1I.D. 1.
It follows from this interpretation that once a citizen suit is commenced,
the subsequent commencement of a government enforcement action does
not activate the statutory preclusion. That subsequent commencement of
a government action does not activate the statutory preclusion is consistent with the general rule that, once jurisdiction is properly invoked, it is
not ousted by subsequent events, although Congress can provide to the
contrary.254It is also supported by the plain meaning and expressio ~inius
canons of statutory interpretation; by specifying that an action the government has commenced and is diligently prosecuting may bar a citizen
Conn. 1985), the court held that the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B), "[oln its face . . .
does not apply to a case in which the state did not take enforcement action until after the
citizen suit was filed." Indeed, it found the language of the statute to be "unambiguous." Id.
at 216. Courts have had no trouble drawing a bright line in this regard. "The fact that DEC
filed its complaint in state court less than one half hour after plaintiffs filed their complaint
in this Court does not change the fact that plaintiff's suit was filed first." Long Island
Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. City Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 27 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383
(E.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235,
2 4 3 4 4 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Conn. Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. The Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp.
1397, 1402-03 (D. Conn. 1987). In Chesapeake Bcry Foundcrtion v. Atnerican Recove?
Co., 769 F.2d 207, 208 (4th Cir. 1985), the court held that a citizen action was not preempted by state action commenced three and a half hours later. The court commented that
"the verb tenses used in subsection [33 U.S.C. 5 13651 (b)(l)(B) and the scheme of the
statute demonstrate that the bar was not intended to apply unless the government files suit
first." Id. at 208. It noted further that courts had other mechanisms to avoid duplicative
litigation. See Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373
(M.D. Ga. 2001); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356,
1374 (M.D. Ga. 1998); Pirgim Pub. Interest Lobby v. Dow Chem. Co.. 1996 WL 903838,
at *6-*7 (W.D. Mich.) (stating that state filed two days later); Westfarm Assocs. Ltd.
P'ship v. Int'l Fabricare Inst., 1992 WL 315188, at *3 (D. Md.) (holding that state's intent
to enforce is not enough to bar citizen suit); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp.,
894 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that state action must be "pending"
when citizen suit is filed to bar suit); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525,
1538-39 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995); Mass.
PIRG, Inc. v. ICI Americas, 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Mass. 199 1) (holding that federal
and state actions filed after citizen suit didn't bar it under the CWA, 42 U.S.C. (I 13 19(g));
PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Yates Indus., 757 F. Supp. 438, 4 4 4 4 5 (D.N.J. 1991); Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1987); Brewer v.
City of Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519, 527-28 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that a citizen suit
was not barred under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365, by subsequently filed state enforcement
action). See also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1147
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding without discussion that an earlier state suit bars CWA and RCRA
citizen suits).
'54 Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K. N. Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). See Acme
Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1237, 1 2 4 4 4 8 (E.D. Wisc. 1995) (holding
after considerable analysis that the issuance of a CERCLA 3 106 administrative order didn't
divest it of jurisdiction over a previously commenced citizen suit for abatement of an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. Q: 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2000)).
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suit, the provision implies that an action that has not yet commenced or
has concluded will not bar a citizen
Congress did not provide to
the contrary by using the past tense "has commenced" in the preclusion
provision, and neither the structure of the statute nor the legislative history contain any hint that Congress intended a subsequently filed government action to oust the court's jurisdiction over a pending citizen suit.256
Indeed, the preclusion device only bars the citizen from commencing an
action, not from prosecuting an action once it has properly commenced.257
Several decisions have held that subsequently filed government actions
do not bar the filing or continuance of citizen suits, but they do not illuminate the issue
The defendant i n one case acknowledged that a subsequently filed
government enforcement action did not automatically oust the court from
jurisdiction to hear a previously filed citizen suit, but made a more subtle
suggestion based on the Court's description in Gwultney of citizen suits
as purely secondary.259The defendant argued that the court should determine whether to dismiss a citizen suit by evaluating "on a case-by-case basis, whether permitting a properly filed citizen suit to go forward would
serve the underlying objectives of the Act in light of the subsequently
filed government action."260The court commented that the citizen suit at
issue indeed had served its statutory purpose by prompting diligent government enforcement and that the continuance of the citizen suit frustrated judicial economy and was needlessly burdensome to the defendant.*'j' But it held that it had no statutory authority on which to dismiss

See ESKRIDGE,
supra note 29.
256SeeAcrne Printing Ink, 881 F. Supp. at 1237. Indeed, the opinion also noted that
Justice Scalia argued, in his concurrence in Gwaltney, that "commencing" and "maintaining" an action are different concepts and that Congress used the "commencement" concept
advisedly in CWA 5 505. Id. at 1247 (citing 484 U.S. at 68).
'57The Old Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist., 51 F. Supp. 2d
1 109, 1 1 13 (D. Colo. 1999).
' 5 R See Am. Recovery C o . , 769 F.2d at 208-09; The Old Titner, 5 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1 109
(holding that state administrative penalty assessment commenced after filing a CWA citizen suit complaint does not bar citizen suit under CWA (i 309(g)(6)(ii), 33 U.S.C.
$ 1319(g)(6)(ii));Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 380; Briggs & Stratton, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1356; Glazer, 894 F. Supp. at 1035; NRDC, Inc. v. Loewengart &
Co., 776 F. Supp. 996 (M.D. Pa. 1991); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Yates Indus., 757 F. Supp.
438 (D.N.J. 1991); Sierra Club v. United States Dept. of Energy, 734 F. Supp. 946, 951 (D.
Colo. 1990); Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding
that entry of a consent decree settling the government's case did not bar continuation of the
citizen suit when the citizen plaintiffs refused to agree to the decree); Job Plating, 623 F.
Supp. at 215-16; and Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1132 (D. Md.
1985), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that state enforcement action commenced after commencement of CWA citizen suit does not bar citizen suit under the CWA
(i 505(b), 33 U.S.C. 9: 1365(b)). See also Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
259 Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 603, 609 (D.
Minn. 1988).
2W Id. at 614.
26' Id. at 613.
'55

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 451 2004

Harvard Environmeiztal Law Review

452

[Vol. 28

it.2b2The court did warn, however, that it would deny plaintiff any attorneys fees if plaintiff pursued purely duplicative litigation.263

2. When Does the Governnzerzt Conzmence an Action?
While the statutes do not define "commenced," FEDERALRULESOF
CIVILPROCEDURE
3 provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint with the court." Courts have readily adopted this definition of
"commenced" in the citizen suit provision.264The Senate Report accompanying the CWA citizen suit provision suggests that this is what Congress
intended: "The time between notice and filing of the action should give
the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged
violation."265 When Congress provided in 1987 that penalty assessments
would bar citizen suits for penalties under the CWA, it exempted from
the bar citizen suits that had "been filed prior" to the commencement of
the penalty
In a similar vein, EPA's Consolidated Rules of Practice
provide that administrative penalty proceedings within EPA's jurisdiction
are commenced when EPA files a complaint with the Regional Hearing
Clerk.267Because the statutes do not suggest interpreting "commenced7'
otherwise, the term should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
and EPA's rules for administrative
FEDERALRULESOF CIVILPROCEDURE
procedures.
One court suggested that for purposes of uniformity, federal rather
than state law should govern the meaning of "commenced."268 Of course,
the commencement of federal actions is determined by federal law, primarily the rules of civil procedure and EPA regulations. To the extent
that Congress drafted the statutes to preclude citizen suits because of the
commencement of a state action, however, Congress implicitly accepted
non-uniformity to the extent that state civil and administrative procedures
vary in minor ways from their federal counterparts. The provisions authorize
citizens to enforce against a violation, but not if the government already
has commenced an action against the same violator. Because the verb "commenced" is used twice in the same sentence, the word should be interpreted similarly in both contexts. Citizen suits cannot be commenced by

Id.
263 Id.
264 See Clorox Co. v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 125 (N.D. 111. 1994).
S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 80 (1971), reprirlted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745 (emphasis added).
CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 1319(g)(6)(B)(i) & (ii) (2000).
267 EPA, Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties and the Revocation/Termination or Suspension of Permits, Prehearing Procedures, 40 C.F.R. Q 22.13 (2004).
268 Conn. Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. The Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 n.8 (D.
Conn. 1987). The court also examined the state law governing when suit was commenced
and found it to the be same as federal law.
262
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the statutorily required notice of violation to the governments and the
violator. Congress intended that notice to enable the governments to preclude the citizen suit by commencing government enforcement action first,
but the government could not do so if the citizen suit is commenced by
the notice.269If "commencement" has the same meaning both times it is used
in the same paragraph, it must mean the filing of a complaint by the state
rather than a preliminary notice or action. Not surprisingly, most courts
considering the question have held that actions short of filing complaints
do not constitute commencement of enforcement actions,270and that the
actual filing of an administrative complaint or the issuance of an administrative order does commence an enforcement action, provided that the
other requirements of the preclusion bar are met.27'

269 "The time between notice and filing of the action should give the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 80
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745 (discussing CWA 505, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365).
270See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that writing a letter does not commence an action in court); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on orher grounds, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992)
(holding that filing of an "Assurance of Discontinuance" in court did not constitute commencing an action in court under RCRA 7002, 42 U.S.C. 6972); Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 2001 WL 1704240, at *6-*7 (E.D. Wash. 2001)
(holding that notice of violation does not commence a CWA 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g),
penalty action); NRDC v. NVF Co., 1998 WL 372299, at "1 I (D. Del. 1998) (holding that
state and federal monitoring of defendant's activities and discussions with defendant do
not constitute commencement of an action under CWA 309(g)); Molokai Chamber of
Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1405 (D. Hawaii 1995) (holding
that notice that the state might commence an administrative penalty assessment did not
"commence" an action under CWA 309(g): "The commencement of an action for penalties is not signaled by a letter stating that penalties may be sought under a separate statutory section, particularly where, as here, the DOH has taken no further steps toward the
imposition of penalties."). See also Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Int'l Fabricare Inst.,
1992 WL 315188 (D. Md. 1992) (holding that state's intention to enforce does not constitute commencement of an action); Tobyhanna Conservation Ass'n v. County Place Waste
Treatment Co., 734 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that an unsigned letter
setting up compliance meeting with state does not commence a CWA § 309(g) penalty
action); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 603, 61 1 n.2 (D.
Minn. 1988); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 81 7 F. Supp. 1 164, 1 173
(D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a letter accompanying an inspection report notifying defendant
that it was in violation and that an enforcement action might be commenced if it did not
come into compliance did not commence a government enforcement action). Bur see Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1329 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (apparently
holding that a state agency can commence an action by informal means, such as entering
into negotiations or orally telling a violator to submit corrective plans).
2 7 1 See Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that issuance of administrative penalty order by consent commenced action for purposes of CWA 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)); Sierra Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F.
Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that administrative order on consent commenced
action for purposes of CWA 9 309(g)); Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (S.D.
Cal. 1991); PIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 WL 66178 at *5 (D.N.J.) (holding that state oversight of site remediation was not commencement of a CWA § 309(g) penalty action).
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The question of when a citizen suit or a government action is commenced becomes complicated when the citizen first files a complaint alleging a claim not requiring prior notice and later amends the complaint
to allege a claim requiring prior notice. For instance, a citizen might file
a public or private nuisance suit to enjoin pollution, an action not requiring
prior notice, and amend the complaint to add citizen suit claims requiring
prior notice. Both the policy behind the prior notice requirement and the
lead to the conclusion
logic of the FEDERAL
RULESOF CIVILPROCEDURE
that the action requiring prior notice was commenced with the filing of the
amended complaint, not the initial complaint. The primary policy behind
the prior notice, delay, and bar provision is to allow the government to
assume its enforcement responsibility against the violation unencumbered
by another's pending enforcement action.272If filing the initial complaint
constituted commencement of the amended action, the citizen would not
have given notice of the violation of the statute and the government
would not have had the opportunity to enforce against the violation unencumbered by the citizen suit. Only by giving the requisite notice and
observing the requisite delay period before filing the amended complaint
is this goal accomplished. The pendency of the initial suit against the defendant on another matter does not deprive the government of its opportunity
to enforce against the violation unencumbered by another's enforcement
action,277for the government is free to initiate an action once it receives
notice of the citizen's intent to amend the complaint. Moreover, as noted
above, under Rule 3, an action is commenced when filed.274The cause of
action against the violation requiring prior notice does not exist until the
amended complaint is filed, making it difficult to argue it is commenced
before that time. Finally, "once amended, the initial action is no longer
before the
thereby making it impossible for it to have been commenced earlier. Not surprisingly, most courts considering this issue and
its variants hold that the action against a violation requiring prior notice,

See supra Part I.C.2.
Of course, there is a spectrum of situations in which the citizen suit case may become increasingly intrusive on the government's ability to conduct its action against the
violation requiring prior notice unencumbered by the initial case. If a citizen filed suit
against a defendant for breach of an employment contract, served notice of its intent to
amend its complaint to include a citizen suit count for violation of the CWA, and EPA
brought suit on the CWA violation within the delay period, the citizen would be barred from
filing the amended complaint and EPA could prosecute its action entirely unencumbered by
the pending breach of contract case. If the initial case concerned breach of a contract to
construct the treatment facility that was needed to comply with the CWA, the two cases
would overlap, but EPA's ability to pursue its action on the violations would be unencumbered. If the initial case was a common law nuisance action for damages caused by the
violating discharge, the two cases would overlap even more, but EPA's ability to pursue its
action on the violations would still be unencumbered.
'74 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
275 Clorox Co. v. Chromium Corp., 158 F.R.D. 120, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
272

273
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first alleged in an amended complaint, is commenced when the amended
complaint is filed.276
Other courts came to a different conclusion, on the basis that FEDERAL RULESOF CIVILPROCEDURE
15(c) provides an amended complaint
relates back to the original complaint if the Rule's requirements are met.
They did so, however, to preserve citizen suits when a potentially barring
government action was commenced after the initial citizen suit complaint
was filed, but before an amended citizen suit complaint was filed.277The
Court's use of the "relation back" provision of Rule 15(c) to allow plaintiffs to amend properly filed complaints to add citizen suit counts without
the otherwise required prior notice is novel. The purpose of the Rule is to
integrate the operation of statutes of limitation with the amended complaints, as acknowledged by the court that first adopted this "relation back"
theory.278Allowing citizen suit plaintiffs to amend properly filed complaints
to include previously unnoticed citizen suit counts wrongfully deprives
the government of the opportunity to receive notice of the newly complained
of violations and to commence an action on them, unencumbered by a
citizen suit. If notice is required before commencement of the complaint,
the initial citizen suit could continue unaffected by any government action on the initially complained of violations.
The situation may appear more complicated when the original complaint alleges violation of requirement A , requiring prior notice, and the
amended complaint alleges either subsequent violations of requirement A
or violations of requirement B, both requiring prior notice. These allegations could reflect either violations of requirement A continuing after the
complaint is filed or violations of requirement B during discovery. As to
the added allegations of violations, however, the situation is not different
from when the original complaint contained no allegation subject to the
notice, delay, and bar provision. The government did not receive notice
of these violations before the initial complaint was filed and therefore will
not have an opportunity to take action against them unencumbered by a
276 See id. at 122 (stating that initial complaint apparently alleged no violation requiring prior notice); City of Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971, 983-84 (S.D. Ohio
1993) (stating that initial complaint contained CERCLA claims, and amended complaint
contained RCRA claims); Zands, 779 F. Supp. at 1254 (stating'that RCRA claims were
first included in amended complaint); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 627-28 (D. Md. 1987) (stating that notice sent before complaint filed
suffices for later violations of the same nature cited in the notice); Sierra Club v. Simkins
Indus., 617 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-1 126 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988).
17'See Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 (E.D. Wisc. 1995)
(using "relation back" theory to sustain citizen suit RCRA counts added in amended complaint filed after government CERCLA action). See also A-C Reorg. Trust v. E.1. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 968 F. Supp. 423,432 (E.D. Wisc. 1997).
278AcmePrinting Ink, 881 F. Supp. at 1246 n.6. The Advisory Committee Notes for
the 1966 Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) commented, "Relation back is intimately
connected with the policy of the statute of limitations." FED. R. CIV. P. 15, Advisory
Comm. Notes (1960). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. at 627-28 (stating that
relation back is for purpose of applying the statutes of limitations).
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citizen suit unless the citizen gives notice before filing the amended complaint. It is less prejudicial to the government's unencumbered enforcement ability, however, not to give notice of filing an amended complaint
if the new violations are of the same requirement as alleged in the initial
complaint, for which prior notice was given. Because the citizen suit provisions typically grant authority to sue only for ongoing violations, it is reasonable for the government to know when it received the citizen's notice
before the citizen filed her complaint, that the violations were alleged to
ongoing at the time the complaint was filed and continued thereafter.279
The pre-complaint notice of violations of particular requirements, therefore, effectively gave the government notice of post-complaint violations
of the same requirements and the ability to enforce against them unencumbered by a citizen suit. The better practice would be for citizen plaintiffs to
further alleviate prejudice to the government's unencumbered enforcement
ability regarding these subsequent violations of the same requirements by
including allegations of continuing and future violations of the requirement the pre-complaint notice.

D. How Diligently Must the Government Prosecute an Action in Order
To Bar a Citizen Suit?
The statutes do not define the phrase "diligently prosecuting," perhaps
because prosecution is an activity for which courts have far more experience than Congress; the statutes focus instead on how much deference
should be accorded to prosecutorial choices.280The phrase raises two interpretive questions. Must the prosecution be ongoiilg to bar a citizen suit?
What is diligent prosecution?
A word of caution is necessary before delving into judicial interpretation of the phrase. Many of the decisions interpreting it do so in the
context of CWA 5 309(g). While the preclusions in citizen suit provisions
apply when the government "is diligently prosecuting . . . to require compliance," the preclusion in 5 309(g) lacks the second phrase. That is not surprising, since even the most diligent prosecution of 5 309(g) will yield
only modest penalties and will not result in a compliance order. That is decidedly not the case under EPA's other enforcement authorities or under
the citizen suit provisions. Using them, diligent prosecution can yield
enormous penalties and injunctions for costly compliance.
Defendants in CWA citizen suit cases, stymied by limitations on the
use of preclusion under CWA 5 505 have sought to transform the preclu279 The Court held that allegations of continuing violations are required to establish jurisdiction for a citizen suit under CWA g 505, 33 U.S.C. g 1365 (2000), and similarly worded
provisions. Gwaltney o f Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 4 8 4 U.S. 4 9 (1987).
The concurring opinion suggested there would be no continuing injury to support standing
and defeat mootness without a continuing violation.
280 See discussion infra in Part II.D.2.b.
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sion under CWA § 309(g) from a narrow one preventing only duplicative
penalties for the same violation, to a broad one precluding citizen enforcement if the government has taken virtually any administrative action.
Many courts have accepted this reasoning and fail to observe that distinction, freely drawing from 5 309(g) "diligently prosecuting" precedent
when interpreting citizen suit preclusions. Even courts sympathetic to
citizen suits are swayed by N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town
of S c i t ~ a t e ,and
~ ~ ' its progeny, approaching "diligently prosecuting" issues
as if they were prosecutorial discretion issues and ignoring the wording
and intent of the statute. Because the decisions are already a jumble,
mixing "diligently prosecuting" decisions under 9 309(g) and citizen suit
provisions as if there were no difference between the two, this Article examines decisions interpreting "diligently prosecuting" under both the
citizen suit provisions and CWA 5 309(g). But it marks 5 309(g) cases in
the footnotes in bold to indicate how those decisions have influenced the
state of "diligently prosecuting" law.

I. Must the Goverrzment Prosecution Be Ongoing To Bar a
Citizen Suit?
The environmental statutes bar citizen suits if the government "has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" an action "to require compliance" (emphasis added). As discussed above, almost all courts considering the issue have held that Congress's use of the past tense "has commenced" was deliberate, and therefore is significant and should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning. "Has commenced," in the
past tense, is separated by one word from "is . . . prosecuting," in the present tense. The separation of the two verbs by a single word and the juxtaposition of their tenses in the same sub-paragraph, suggest the tense
difference was deliberate and that the government's prosecution must be
ongoing to bar to a citizen suit. This interpretation is supported by the
plain meaning and expressio unius canons of interpretation; by specifying
that continuing prosecutions may be preclusive, the provisions imply that
concluded prosecutions cannot be.282"TO require compliance" reinforces
this conclusion, for it suggests that a preclusive government action is one
in which compliance is yet to be achieved and hence that a concluded
government action is not preclusive, for a concluded government action
should have led to compliance. Modifying "is . . . prosecuting" with "diligently" adds to the strength of this interpretation. "Diligent7' means "characterized by steady, earnest, and energetic application and effort."283Asking
whether a prosecution is diligent inquires more into the energy put into an

949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991).
See ESKRIDGE
and discussion, supra note 29, at 323, 327.
283 WEBSTER'S
SEVENTH
NEWCOLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
233 (1 999).
28'

282

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 457 2004

45 8

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 28

ongoing process than into the results or success of a concluded process;
once the case is concluded, no more energy is put into the prosecution of
the case. Although energy may be devoted to monitor compliance with an
injunctive order, that is not "prosecution" of the case.
The structure of the CWA suggests that Congress intentionally used
the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" in the citizen suit provision.
When Congress added 5 309(g) to the CWA in 1987, it barred successive
EPA and citizen actions for penalties when EPA or a state "is diligently
prosecuting" a 5 309(g) penalty action and also when one of them "has
issued" a final penalty order and the violator "has p a i d a penalty.284This
juxtaposition of tenses in a similar context re-emphasizes that Congress
knows the difference between ongoing and completed actions, that it used
different verb tenses deliberately, and that it meant the differences to have
meaning. This re-emphasis is underscored by congressional knowledge of
the linkage between $5 309(g) and 505, for Congress cross-referenced
each section in the other. When it amended 5 505 to cross reference the
preclusion in § 309(g), it did not disturb the juxtaposed tenses in 5 505(b),
indicating its intent to let the meaning of the different tenses stand.
The legislative history underlines the deliberate nature of the congressional choice to use the present tense in the preclusion provisions. The
CAA Conference Committee Report and the House CWA Report both stated
that a citizen suit is barred if a government "abatement action is pending
The Senate CAA and CWA Reports
and is being diligently
both contain similar language,286reinforcing that the legislative intent
that the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" was to denote current
prosecution. The Senate Report demonstrated the same approach in stating that government agencies must prosecute enforcement actions "in
good faith and with deliberate speed . . . or the citizen is free-to initiate

284CWA,33 U.S.C. 9 1319(g)(6)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). Indeed, Congress intentionally changed tenses in the subsection to implement its policy objectives. In the initial version of the Senate bill, S. 2652, 97th Cong. 9 8 (1982), and the final version of the
House bill, H.R. 8, 99th Cong. § 24 (1985), it provided EPA with authority to commence a
penalty proceeding against a person who "is in violation" of the CWA (emphasis added).
But, in the enacted version, it authorized EPA to assess penalties only against a person who
"has violated" the statute. 33 U.S.C. 9 1319(g)(l)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The reason
for the change in tenses was to prevent EPA from assessing paltry penalties against continuing violations warranting injunctions or substantial penalties. Congress was aware of
tense differences and used tenses advisedly.
285 H.R. CONF.REP. NO. 91-1783 at 56 (1970). reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374,
5388 (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 92-911 at 133 (1972), reprinted in 1 CWA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
at 753, 820 (1973).
"[l]f the court viewed the agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to
consider the citizen action notwithstanding any pending agency action." S. REP. NO. 911196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at 401, 437 (1974) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746
(emphasis added).
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his action."2s7Again, the question of whether a particular prosecution is diligent requires the assessment of an ongoing rather than a concluded process.
Application of the preclusions only when there is an ongoing government prosecution makes sense as a matter of policy, for the likelihood
of disruption and conflict from successive prosecution is greatest when
two enforcement actions for prospective relief are proceeding simultaneously. Once the government's action is concluded, the potential for disruption and conflict in judicial proceedings is over. The likelihood that
resolution of successive citizen suits will disrupt or conflict with the resolutions of earlier government actions is minimal for several reasons discussed above.288
Not surprisingly, courts routinely have interpreted the citizen suit provisions in general and their preclusion bar elements in particular to give
meaning to the tenses Congress used in them.289Many of them note that
the Supreme Court in Gwaltney based its decision that CWA $ 505 conferred no jurisdiction for a citizen suit to enforce against wholly past violations on the present tense "alleged to be in violation" in $ 505(a)(l). The
Court's primary interpretation of the phrase was its plain meaning:
The most natural reading of "to be in violation7' is a requirement
that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past
polluter will continue to pollute in the future. Congress could
have phrased its requirement in language that looked to the past
("to have violated"), but it did not choose this readily available
option . . . . [Tlhe prospective orientation of that phrase could
not have escaped Congress's attention . . . . [Clongress has demonstrated in yet other statutory provisions that it knows how to
avoid this prospective implication by using language that explicitly targets wholly past violations.290
The Court's admonition to give meaning to the tenses used in
$ 505(a)'s limitation on citizen enforcement authorityz9' hardly can be
disregarded in interpreting $ 505(b)'s limitation on that a~thority.?~'
Almost all of the many courts considering the "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting" language have reasoned that Congress's use of the past
tense "has prosecuted" was deliberate, is significant and should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning to hold that only government
REP. NO. 91-1 196, at 65 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
at
4 0 1 , 4 6 5 (1974).
See supra text between notes 145 & 146.
289 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
290 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987).
291 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000).
292 id. 5 l365(b).
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actions filed before citizen suits will bar them.293Similarly, all but one of
the few courts considering the language have reasoned that Congress's
use of the present tense "is prosecuting" was deliberate, is significant, and
should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning to hold that
only government actions ongoing at the time citizens suits are filed will bar
them.294
The district court ruling in laid la^,^^^ is in some ways a schizophrenic
decision. It allowed a citizen suit to continue in the face of the defendant's entry into a consent decree with the state assessing a civil penalty
in excess of $400,000. It is a landmark decision for holding that a state
action was not diligently prosecuted to bar a citizen suit because the penalty amount in the state action was not sufficient under the circumstances.296
But the court rejected the easier, plain meaning approach of holding that
the state action did not bar the citizen suit because the state action was
concluded; the state was no longer "prosecuting" its action, diligently or
not. Indeed, the decision is the only one to holding that Congress's use of
"prosecuting" does not mean the state action must be continuing to bar a
citizen suit. The court doubted that Congress intended the meanings of
the tenses it used, for doing so would allow the citizen suit preclusion
erected by an ongoing diligently prosecuted government action to dissolve
once a diligently prosecuted government action was concluded, thus allowing citizens to evade preclusion simply by waiting until the government's action concluded, a result the court considered senseless.297The
court failed to note that its own conclusion also led to a senseless result:
why would Congress authorize citizens to file suit when the government
already had commenced an action but was not diligently prosecuting it,
but later bar the citizens from concluding their action because the government had concluded its action in a non-diligent and unsatisfactory manner? The most likely answer to these two questions is that Congress intended an ongoing government action to bar citizen suits only if the government is diligently prosecuting the action and for a settled government
action to bar citizen suits only if the government settled for an injunction
requiring compliance or a penalty adequate to provide deterrence.
See supra decisions cited in Part 1I.C. I; see supra note 253 and accompanying text.
See Citizens for a Better Env't-Cat. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal. 83 F.3d 1 111, 1118
(9th Cir. 1996); Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94 F.3d 514, 516 (9th Cir.
1996); A-C Reorg. Trust v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 968 F. Supp. 423, 429-30
(E.D. Wisc. 1997); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 103438 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604, RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972); PlRG of N.J.,
Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943 (D.N.J. 1991) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g));
Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365); Conn. Fund for the Env't v. L & W Indus., Inc., 63 1 F.
Supp. 1289 (D.Conn. 1986) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C.Q 1365). But see Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995).
295 890 F. Supp 470 (D.S.C. 1995).
296 See infra notes 334-335 and accompanying text.
297 See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 485.
293

294
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The court admitted that its decision was contrary to the plain meaning
of the statutory language. It did not examine the legislative history, discussed above, that supports the plain meaning of the statutory language.298
The only justification the court gave for its decision was that it thought
an opposite result was s e n s e l e ~ sHowever,
.~~
In light of Gwaltney, the opposite result is supported by the policy reasons examined above. Congress
was more concerned with avoiding conflict between two ongoing court
proceedings than with avoiding conflicting resolutions of two enforcement actions. Successive citizen suits have only a small chance of interfering with the results the government obtained in a concluded action.
Moreover, if successive citizen suits interfere with the ability of violators
to carry out their obligations under concluded government actions, courts
may apply a variety of common law doctrines to prevent the ~onflict.~""
Indeed, the district court in Laidlaw noted that if the statutory bar ceased
when the government action was concluded, duplicative suits might still
be avoided under the doctrine of res judicata; but the court could not consider res judicata in the case, because the defendant had not plead it as a
defense and both parties agreed it did not apply.30' Congressional awareness of common law preclusion^^^' to prevent disruptive successive suits
could explain why Congress used the present tense "is . . . prosecuting."
But that would lead to the question, why would Congress intend that citizen suits be allowed to proceed while the government pursued its action
without diligence, only to be barred by common law preclusions once the
government concluded its action in an equally unsatisfactory manner?
Congress could not have intended that result. In any event, the court's interpretation was dicta, because the court found the government's prosecution had not been diligent in settling for too small a penalty, and therefore did not preclude a citizen suit.303
See supra notes 285-287, and accompanying text.
See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 485-86.
3wSee, e.g., United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). The relationship between statutory and common law preclusions in citizen suits is beyond the scope of
this Article, although the author intends to address it subsequently. The question of whether
the statutory preclusions occupy the field and preempt the common law preclusions is a
complex one, only now beginning to be addressed. See supra note 18. The theme and
variations in the statutory preclusions have not been recognized by commentators and may
indicate a congressional intent to occupy the field to a greater extent than recognized by
them.
301 Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 485 n.7. Indeed, the court asked the parties to brief the issue, raising two intriguing questions: Why did the court ask the parties to brief the issue when
the defendant had not plead res judicata as a defense under FED. R. Crv. P. 8(c), and why
did defendant argue the state order it had gone to considerable trouble to get didn't support
res judicata?
30'The Senate CAA and CWA Reports both commented that if courts found government
enforcement adequate, they could suspend, dismiss or consolidate the citizen suit, evidently referring to stays, abstention, res judicata, and the other common law preclusions.
HISTORY,at 401, 437
S. REP. NO. 9 1- 1 196, at 37 (1970), reprinted in 1 CAA LEGISLATIVE
(1974); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinred in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746.
303 See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 49 1-98.
298

299
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Few courts have addressed whether the present tense of "is . . . prosecuting" means the preclusion no longer operates once a prosecution ends.
Perhaps citizen plaintiffs have not made the argument, either because they
did not think o f it or because they did not want to raise it, fearing res judicata or issue preclusion defenses would follow.
Assuming- that "is diligently prosecuting7' requires an ongoing government prosecution to bar a citizen suit, what is an "ongoing prosecution"?
The obvious answer is that an ongoing prosecution is an action commenced
by filing a complaint and not yet concluded by a dispositive ruling, decision on the merits, or court-entered consent decree (or, under some statutes,
courts' administrative analogues) and not on appeal. The difficult question
is whether an action that has been concluded by an order is still ongoing
when the order contains a schedule requiring the defendant to perform
actions in the future. If the court has issued an injunction or approved a
negotiated consent decree requiring compliance in accordance with a
schedule, it is tempting to say the action is still pending and the citizen is
barred from suing if the prosecutor is diligently monitoring compliance
with the order and seeking to enforce it when the defendant fails to do so.
Indeed, many,304but not
courts considering the matter have so held.
The minority view, however, has more merit. Monitoring compliance with a
decree is not action in court. When the prosecutor seeks the court's help
to enforce the decree, he really is enforcing against a violation of the
court's order in a contempt proceeding, not against a violation of the statute in an enforcement action; that prosecution has been completed.'06 Indeed, Congress recognized the distinction by authorizing citizen enforcement against violations of both the statute and orders enforcing the statute.307The issue becomes considerably murkier when the order is adminis- -

3ar For instance, when a twenty-page consent decree established, in detail, work to be
performed and standards to be met by the work, the state agency's monitoring of compliance with the work schedule was held to be continuing and diligent prosecution in City of
Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio 1993). See also Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City of Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D.
Md. 2000) (late compliance of consent decree held diligent
prosecution under CWA
p 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 i3iwg)).
'05See PIRG of N.J.. Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corn.. 1990 WL 66178 (D.N.J.) (holdingthat state participation in committee overseeing implementation of remedial action by
defendant under a stipulation ending administrative enforcement was not diligent prosecution under CWA 5 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g)); SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific, Corp.
615 F. Supp. 1419 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that post-consent decree administrative surveillance does not constitute action in court that would bar a citizen suit); Love v. N.Y. Dept.
of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
'"See Conn. Fund for the Env't v. L & W Indus., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Conn.
1986) (commenting that modification of a consent decree was not evidence of diligent
prosecution).
307 The citizen suit provisions generally authorize suit against violation of the statute or
an order enforcing the statute. CWA, 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(a)(l)(B) (2000), for instance, authorizes suit against violation of a standard or limitation under the statute or "an order issued
by [EPA or the state] with respect to such a standard or limitation." RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
5 6972(a)(l)(A) (2000), authorizes citizen suits against violation of an "order which has be-
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trative rather than judicial, and was reached by agreement rather than as a
result of administrative process. The typical pattern of administrative action
in which the issue arises is the issuance of an administrative compliance
order by consent, followed by several extensions of the compliance date
at the request of the violator, all without any administrative adjudication.
As "prosecuting" denotes an ongoing adjudication, this pattern of administrative behavior does not fit it. The authorization of citizens to enforce agency orders complicates this issue further.30s

2. What Is Diligent Prosecution?
The determination of whether prosecution is diligent, i.e., whether it
represents a "steady, earnest and energetic application and effort,"309is
largely a factual inquiry, hence one generally not considered on a motion
to dismiss.310But the standard is one of federal law.31'As discussed above,
the use of the present tense "is diligently prosecuting" suggests that a
prosecution must be ongoing, rather than completed, in order to bar a citizen
suit. Courts often fail to distinguish between prosecution that is ongoing,
prosecution that is seeking compliance with an order requiring future action,
and prosecution that has been completely resolved. As a result, their decisions are often muddy with regard to whether they are analyzing expediency of process or effectiveness of results.312
come effective" under RCRA, which has been held to authorize citizen enforcement of
administrative and judicial orders. See O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807.
815 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1988). But see Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 91 3 F. Supp. 1572,
1582-83 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding, without explanation, that CWA Q 309(g), 33 U.S.C.
Q 1319(g), bars citizens from enforcing against violations of administrative compliance
orders).
O X See, e.g., CW.4, 33 U.S.C. Q 1305(f) (2000).
' 0 9 See supra note 283.
)I0Bare allegation of a lack of diligent prosecution by the plaintiff will survive a motion to dismiss. The defendant, however, usually will develop facts establishing diligent
prosecution for a determination in either a motion for summary judgment or at trial. See,
e.g., Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251, 256
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1037
(E.D. Tex. 1995); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 1990 WL 52745, at *I4 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
'I1 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp.
470, 486 n.8 (D.S.C. 1995).
"'A recent decision collecting and summarizing much of the decisional law on what
is "diligent" prosecution exemplifies this:
Prosecutions under the CWA and CAA are heavily presumed "diligent." This presumption arises from a variety of policy considerations: deference to state (and
federal) decision-making and enforcement authority, protection of litigants' interest in the finality of their cases, preservation of the incentives that polluters might
have to settle charges with state or federal authorities, and recognition of the limited and interstitial role that citizen suits occupy in the overall enforcement regime. Thus citizens mere unhappiness with an enforcement action (or its settlement terms) does not authorize them to bring a separate lawsuit.
But neither are prosecutions ipso facto "diligent." Indeed, the same courts that
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a. In Continuing Prosecutions

Only one decision has considered in any detail the diligence of an
This paucity of decisions probaongoing prosecution of a civil
bly reflects the fact that most government enforcement actions are administrative rather than judicial3l4 and that most judicial actions are settled rather than litigated on the merits. The decision contains only the
barest outline of two continuing government actions, one of which had been
pending for two years before the plaintiffs filed their citizen suit. To determine whether prosecution was diligent, the court examined the docket
of the government enforcement case. The state had obtained an interlocutory
order in the action and moved for contempt when the defendants did not
comply with it. The defendants then filed for bankruptcy, complicating
the government's action. As reported, it does not appear that the government was moving either swiftly or with unusually glacial speed. In holding
that the prosecution was diligent, the court commented, "[a] rocket docket
New York does not have, but the Congress must have been aware that
state court actions, throughout the nation, are often a slower paced version of justice than that to which federal district courts aspire."315
Only one other decision considers diligent prosecution in a government action still pending when the citizen suit was filed, but it adds nothing
to the analysis.316The real question here is whether the government is moving steadily, with reasonable speed, energy, effectiveness and professionprofess deference toward state and federal enforcement decisions have nevertheless decided for themselves whether the claims at issue were diligently prosecuted
The cases speak of various indicia of diligence. These include whether the government required (or at least sought) compliance with the specific standard, limitation, or order invoked by the citizen suit; whether the government was monitoring
the polluter's activities or otherwise enforcing the permits at issue after settlement
with the polluter and up to the time of the citizen suit; the possibility that the citizen-alleged violations will continue notwithstanding the polluter's settlement with
the government; and the severity of any penalties compared to (a) the polluter's
economic benefits in not complying with the law or (b) the penalties imposed for
similar violations in the state.
Citizens Legal Envtl. Action Network v. Premium Std. Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 220464, at
* 12-* 13 (W.D. Mo.) (internal citations omitted).
While this summary is useful, it does not begin to ask whether there is a difference
between diligence analyses for ongoing and concluded prosecutions. Moreover, it wrongfully assumes that issues relating to other parts of the preclusion provisions are diligence
issues. For instance, whether the action or remedy pursued by the government was one
capable of requiring compliance is a related, but separate issue.
3'3HudsonRiverkeeper Fund, 917 F. Supp. at251.
' I 4 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
' I 5 Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, 917 F. Supp. at 256.
3 1 6 In Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 63 1 F. Supp. 129 1, 1293-94 (D.
Conn. 1986), the government action was pending in state court when the citizen suit was
filed and was settled thereafter. The court examined the settlement to make its diligent
prosecution determination.
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alism to secure compliance, a question that courts are in a uniquely experienced position to determine. The court's examination of the docket in
the chief case is an appropriate and objective means of making that determination. A state court examining the federal decisions concluded that
they interpreted "is diligently prosecuting7'to mean "the degree to which the
government remained involved in the case after commencing the action
rather than its motives or resolution of all the problems at a particular
site."3"
b. In Completed Prosecutions and Continuing Enforcement of Orders

Most decisions considering the diligence of prosecutions do so in the
context of completed prosecutions or the continuing enforcement of orders. They rarely examine the energy and effort the prosecutors put into such
actions, but instead examine the results that the prosecutors achieved. Perhaps these courts are cognizant that the diligent prosecution bar does not
apply to concluded prosecutions and are anticipating the argument that a
common law or other statutory bar to a citizen suit may apply, holding that
Congress's intent was that no bar applies to a settled prosecution that does
not assure compliance with the statute being enforced.
Many courts err by applying deference to the prosecutors' decisions
in guises not suggested by the wording of the preclusion provisions: by
requiring the plaintiff adequately to plead lack of diligent prosecution in
his complaint;318placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove that government
action is not diligent;319proclaiming the burden to be a heavy one;320
giving great deference to prosecutorial decisions;321creating a presumption of diligence;322noting that compromise is expected in settling
37 State v. Indiana Waste Sys., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181, 189 (Ind. App. 1992) (interpreting
"does not diligently pursue" in the state's citizen suit provision, IND.CODE5 C13-6-1-1).
H a s e e ,e.g., City of Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971, 981-82 (S.D. Ohio
1993).
9I' See, e.g., Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City of Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554 (D. Md. 2000) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g));
Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1334 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (interpreting CWA, 33 U.S.C. Q 13 19(g)); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 487 (D.S.C. 1995); Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington
Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 173, 183 (D. Conn. 199 1 ); Contract Plating Co., 63 1 F. Supp. at
1293. Contra, Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 182 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
"Osee, e.g., Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp.at 487.
' I ' See, e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320,
1324 (7th Cir. 1992); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d
552, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1991); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235,
247 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group, 115 F. Supp. 2d at
554; Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1147 (E.D. Ark. 1993);
Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. at 1324; Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 487; Orange Env't, Inc. v.
County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[Tlhe'standard for evaluating the diligence of the state in enforcing its action is a low one which requires due deference to the state's plan of attack . . ."); Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 777 F. Supp. at 185.
'"See, e.g., Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 554;
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cases;323and reiterating that citizen enforcement is secondary to government
enforcement.324Indeed, one court commented that the presumption of
diligence was s o strong that it "will only rarely be a significant factor" in
citizen suit decisions.325Even courts that find government prosecution not
to have been diligent often begin their analysis with such homilies.326On
none of the other issues discussed in this Article do the courts express
nearly as much deference to government enforcers as they do on the diligence of the government's prosecution. While some degree of deference
is due to prosecutorial decisions, blind deference ignores the fact that
Congress authorized citizen suits precisely because government enforcers
were not always diligenP2' and Congress intended courts to hear citizen
suits where government enforcement was not "adequately" prosecuted to
' ~ one court observed, "[c]omplete deference to
require c ~ m p l i a n c e . ~As
agency enforcement strategy, adopted and implemented internally and beyond public control, requires a degree of faith in bureaucratic energy and
effectiveness that would be alien to common experience."329By specifying
that prosecution must be diligent to bar a citizen suit, Congress invited citizens to question the energy and effort of government enforcement, and
directed courts to do so as well.
It should be noted that it is not federal and state prosecutors who are
arguing in these cases that they should be accorded great deference in
their enforcement choices or that citizen suits make it difficult for the government to enforce effectively or to reach settlements with violators. Rather,
it is the violators who are seeking to wrap themselves in the flags of the
enforcers. Indeed, it is the violators whom the government allowed to escape
without timely compliance or payment of a penalty that removed the
economic advantages from the violations. Of course, it is in the violators'

Contract Plating, 63 1 F. Supp. at 1293 (finding a presumption of diligence "absent persuasive evidence that the state has engaged in a pattern of conduct in its prosecution of the
defendant that could be considered dilatory, collusive or otherwise in bad faith.").
3Z3See,e.g., Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 380 (8th Cir.
1994) ("It would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find failure to diligently prosecute
simply because . . . a compromise was reached."); Supporters to Oppose Pollution, 973
F.2d at 1322 (stating that the notice and delay provision requires "a would-be champion to
try negotiation before litigation," an odd comment, since the notice and delay provision does
not require the citizen to negotiate, only to let the government have the first chance to sue).
3 ' 9 e e , e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution, 973 F.2d at 1324.
32S Contract Plating. 631 F. Supp. at 1293.
See, e.g., Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572, 1578-79 (N.D. Ga.
1995); Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 486-87.
327 Congressional skepticism of the diligence of government enforcement is not confined
to the environmental arena. Similar concerns prompted it to enact a citizen suit provision
as part of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 96-129, 93 Stat. 1003
(1979) (now codiJied at 49 U.S.C. §Q: 60101-60128 (2000)). For an example of a citizen
suit augmenting the lackluster federal enforcement of this statute, see Williams Pipe Line
Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minn., 651 F. Supp. 551 (D. Minn. 1987).
328 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
329 Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (1980).
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self-interest to argue that the most lenient enforcer should prevail, and it
is instructive that industry favors enforcement by states.330
The facts in Laidlaw suggest why violators favor enforcement by
states. The defendant had long been in violation of its permit, particularly
for discharges of mercury. After six years, the state began an administra"
the citizen plaintiffs served notice of
tive enforcement a ~ t i o n . ~Once
their intention to sue, the defendant asked the state to file a court action instead of proceeding with its administrative action, for the purpose of barring the citizen suit. When the state said that it had no interest in doing
so, the defendant offered the state the largest penalty it had ever collected
for an environmental violation, drafted a complaint and a consent decree,
walked them through the state offices to obtain the required signatures,
filed the documents on the sixtieth day after the citizen notice and paid
the filing fee.332The state had only filed two judicial actions against violators of the CWA, both at the request of the violators, presumably for the
same reason.333The consent decree did not require the defendant to comply with its CWA permit and assessed a civil penalty that, although large
for the state, was con'siderably less than the economic benefit the defen. ~ ~ ~defendant engineered
dant had enjoyed from its n o n - c ~ m p l i a n c e The
the state court action for no reason other than to bar the citizen suit, apparently assuming correctly that the state would deal with it more leniently
than the federal court would in a citizen suit. This pattern is not new, but
was begun in the 1980s in deliberate efforts to thwart citizen suits.335If

330 Industry spokesmen before a House subcommittee hearing on amendments to the
CWA, including the administrative penalty authority that became CWA 5 309(g), testified
that EPA had no business enforcing against violations of the CWA in states with approved
CWA permit programs. A spokesperson for the Chemical Manufacturers' Association
stated, "CMA urges that the Act be amended to give the states the sole authority to enforce
state issued NPDES perniits." Possible A~nendtnenrsto the Federal !firer Pollrtiiot~Contrul
Act: Hearings Before the Subcorntn. on Woter Res. of the Hortse Cotntn. on Pub. Works and
Transp., 97th Cong. 966 (1982) (statement of Monte Throdahl, Sr. V.P. of Monsanto Chem.
Co.). He further stated that "EPA should not be allowed to bring an enforcement action for
a permit violation occurring in states administering approved programs. States that have
assumed exclusive responsibility for implementation of NPDES program should be given
sole enforcement responsibility." Id. at 987. A spokesperson for the American Paper Institute testified that EPA penalty actions could result in "undercutting state NPDES agency
enforcement efforts. There is no useful purpose to be served by EPA initiating a separate
enforcement action from that already undertaken by a state permitting agency." Id. at 939
(statement of Peter E. Wrist, V.P. for Forest Products, Mead Corp.). Not surprisingly, both
opposed enactment of CWA 5 309(g), as did all other industry spokespeople testifying.
33' See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 475-76.
332 Id. at 478.
333 Id.
Id. at 479-82.
335 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470
(D.S.C. 1995), in which the recipient of a citizen suit notice letter solicited a lawsuit from
the state, drafted the complaint and consent decree, walked the papers through the state
agency, filed the complaint and consent decree, and paid the filing fee, all in an effort to
bar the citizen suit. See also Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping
Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990). for much the same story. In Conn. Fund for the
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such violator-invited enforcement ever results in appropriate enforcement, it is only by accident. If diligence is measured by the state's "steady,
earnest, energetic application and effort,"336there is not diligent prosecution
here, where the state expended no effort at all.
Of the courts examining the diligence of government enforcement, a
scant majority have found it to be diligent, primarily in reliance on the presumptions discussed above.337Others have found it not to be diligent, based
in whole or in part on a variety of factors, including: the government actions
were nothing other than compliance extensions;338the settlement did not
require compliance;339the penalty was not sufficient to deter or recover the
ecommic benefit of n o n - c ~ m p l i a n c ethe
; ~ ~state
~ was merely "monitoring the
~ i t u a t i o n " ; ~procedural
~'
irregularities were suspect;342and the government
Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986), a defendant was able to
avoid a citizen suit for injunctive relief by payment of a $3,500 penalty to the state. See
also Hodas, supra note 36, at 1647-5 1.
336 See supra note 283.
337 See Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Grdup, 973 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir.
1992); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir.
1991); Comfort Lake Ass'n v. Dressel Contracting, 138 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1998); Hudson
Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Orange Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 860 F. Supp. 1003, 1015-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Ark. 1993); City of
Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 97 1 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Conn. Coastal Fishermen's
Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 173, (D. Conn. 1991); Conn. Fund for the
Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986); Gardeski v. Colonial
Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that original consent
order was diligent, but subsequent enforcement of the order was not); Cmty. of Cambridge
Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City of Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. Md.
2000); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
338 See Jones v. City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Dague v.
City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991); Culbertson v. Coats American,
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
339 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470
(D.S.C. 1995); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F.
Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
340 See City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d at 522-23; Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373 n.5 (M.D. Ga. 2001) (holding $5,000 penalty for continuing violation insufficient to block citizen suit under CWA 9 309(g), 33 U.S.C. 3 1319(g),
saying that "such leniency hardly qualifies as 'diligent prosecution"'); Frilling v. Village of
Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that $50,000 penalty was not justified
as adequate, but ruling on other grounds); Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp at 470 (holding $100,000
penalty not enough to recover economic benefit); Universal Tool, 735 F. Supp. at 1404
(holding "lenient" penalty of $10,000 insufficient for hundreds of violations).
341 See N.Y. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n. v. N.Y. City Dept. of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp.
162, 168 (S.D N.Y. 1991) ("It is inconsistent . . . for DOS to argue that we should credit
DEC's diligence while DOS obviously did not feel compelled to comply with DEC's alleged demands."); N. Cal. River Watch v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 1998 WL 886645, at
*3 (N.D. Cal.).
342 See Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 470 (Although defendant's actions did not amount to
collusion, they did weigh against diligent prosecution.). See also Pirgim Pub. Interest
Lobby v. Dow Chem. Co., 1996 WL 903838 (W.D. Mich.); Universal Tool, 735 F. Supp. at
1416 (stating that defendant walked the consent decree through the state's offices in a day
for signature, a "highly unusual" procedure, indicating the state's "willingness to bend its
procedures on [defendant's] behalf.").
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procedures did not allow intervention by interested citizen^.'^' Courts often
reach diametrically opposite conclusions based on virtually the same facts.
For instance, courts consider protracted sagas of administrative enforcement to be diligent or not, based more on the degrees of deference they
are willing to give to enforcement agencies than on the speed with which
the agencies m o ~ e d . Where
'~
one court has characterized state enforcement actions as acts of "a pen pal, not . . . a prose~utor,"'~~
another characterized similarly paced state enforcement as "reasoned cooperative eff o r t ~ . "Indeed,
~ ~ ~ different panels of the same court of appeals have had
starkly different views on the same state actions. One panel called the
enforcement "inadequate," calling ten years an "inordinately long period
of administrative enforcement" and saying that the state had "extended and
waived . . . compliance deadlines of three, possibly four, of its sweet-heart
consent orders."347The other panel felt that the state had merely extended
deadlines "in response to practical difficulties," making clear attempts to
"remedy the problem."348In addition, some courts have not been troubled
by trivial penalties having no deterrent value.349
Courts that preclude citizen suits out of deference to state prosecution simply are ignoring whether the state is diligently prosecuting or has

343 See generally Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 821; Laidlaw, 890 F. Supp. at 470; Gardeski
v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
)M Contrast Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (N.D. Ga.
1995) (CWA, 5 309(g)) (holding that state's actions were mere "extensions of compliance
deadlines"); N.Z Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 162 (CWA, 5 309(g)) (holding that five years of successive state administrative orders yielding few results was not
diligent prosecution); Love v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (No diligent prosecution where violations continued after state ordered defendant to
cease violation and state took no steps to enforce its order); and Gardeski, 501 F. Supp. at
1159 (two years of ineffective follow-up to consent order not diligent prosecution); with
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Ark. 1993); (CWA,
5 309(g)) (stating that a series of consent administrative orders extending date of compliance and assessing small civil penalties were diligent prosecution), and Jones v. City of
Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410,413-14 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd en banc, 224 F.3d at 518 (same).
3JS N. Z Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 168.
346Ark.Wildlife Fed'n, 842 F. Supp. at 1149. See also Conn. Fund for the Env't v.
Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986).
347 City of Lakeland, 224 F.3d at 522.
348 City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d at 414.
349 See Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 842 F. Supp. at 1142-43, aff'd 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994)
(assessing $1,000, with additional $500 penalties in each of three amendments extending
the compliance date, waiving $50,000 and $120,000 due in stipulated penalties for violations of consent orders); Cmty. of Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmty. Dev. Group v. City
of Cambridge, 115 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (D. Md. 2000) (CWA, 5 309(g)) (assessing $1,500,
noting that although the penalty amount was "minimal," "economic benefit analysis . . . has
limited relevance when applied to the municipality"); Contract Plating, 631 F. Supp. at
1292-94 (assessing $3,500 for 71 admitted violations and no injunction to comply). With
regard to the contention in Cambridge Envtl. Health and Cmfy. Dev. Group that significant
penalties are inappropriate against cities, see Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unltd. v.
New York City, 244 F. Supp. 2d 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (assessing a $5.75 million penalty against
the City for an interbasin transfer of waste from one river to a more pristine river without a
CWA permit).
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diligently prosecuted an action to achieve compliance. If the diligent prosecution bar applies to concluded prosecutions, the question is not how
much deference courts should give to enforcement agencies, but whether
the enforcement agencies diligently prosecuted the concluded action to
seek compliance. When the state enforcement agency has issued an order
that does not require compliance, has assessed a penalty that is insufficient
to deter continuing violations, or has engaged in a series of actions to
enforce an order that have not resulted in compliance over a protracted
period of time, it cannot be said that the state diligently sought compliance. If the prosecutor pursues a case to a decision on the merits, a judge
or jury will make the ultimate decision. All that can be asked of the prosecutor in that case is that she present her case to the decision-maker with
diligence, i.e., moving steadily, with reasonable speed, energy, effectiveness and professionalism to secure compliance. Even if she prosecutes the
case with diligence, the third party decision makers may not require strict
compliance.350But if the prosecutor settles the case, she is the decisionmaker. Her actions in negotiating and agreeing to the settlement are then
capable of a more exacting diligence analysis. If she agrees to a settlement that does not achieve compliance or agrees to a penalty that is too
small to deter violations, her agreement hardly can be an action diligently
pursuing compliance. Thus when a prosecution is ongoing, the prosecutor's
pleadings and discovery actions reveal whether she is diligently prosecuting
to require compliance, thereby ending the violations of which the citizen
complains. But when the prosecution ends in a settlement, we can and
should look to the prosecutor's action agreeing to the terms of the settlement
to determine if she prosecuted the case diligently to require compliance.
This evaluation of the government's settlement is an exercise with
which federal court judges are familiar in another guise: reviewing consent decrees to determine whether to enter them. In that exercise courts look
both at the negotiation process and to the results of the process. As to the
process, they ask whether the negotiation was arm's length and fair.35'As
to the results, they ask if they are reasonable and fair.352In the case of a
350 AS Judge Easterbrook commented in Supporters ro Oppose Pollurion, Inc. v. Heritage
Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1992), when the prosecution ends in a judgment after
a trial on the merits, a citizen suit is

appropriate only when the agency loses its suit and the private litigant insists that
the agency had not tried hard enough. RCRA permits a follow-on private suit if
the public suit was not prosecuted diligently. But if the agency prevails in all respects, that is the end; § 6972(b)(l)(B) does not authorize a collateral attack on
the agency's strategy or tactics.
35'SeeStotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 51 (6th Cir. 1982; United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067 (C.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v.
Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp.
. - 83, 85-86 (D. Alaska 1977). See also infra cases cited in
notes 352 & 353.
352 See Sierra Club v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990);
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decree resolving a statutory enforcement action, they ask whether the
decree "adequately protects the public interest and is in accord with the
dictates of C~ngress."~"The diligence review accords considerable deference to the prosecutor in how her settlement achieves compliance, much as
an appeals court accords considerable deference to how a trial court's injunction requires compliance in cases enforcing against statutory violations. But just as the trial court may not issue an injunction for less than
c o m p l i a n ~ e , 'so
~ ~ too the prosecutor may not settle for less than complia n ~ e . ~ ~ ~
Some courts have asked whether a diligent prosecution review of the
government's settlement is an unpermitted collateral attack on the underlying ~ e t t l e m e n t ; ~it' ~is not.357A diligent prosecution review of the government's settlement in a citizen suit does not threaten to overturn the settlement, since the court's findings regarding the settlement do not affect the
settlement. The only question is whether a citizen suit may go forward. If
the settlement did not require compliance with the statute in a reasonable
time and manner or payment of a penalty sufficient to deter continuing violations, the prosecutor did not enter into an agreement for compliance and a
court should not have entered it under the established standard of review.
The citizen then should be free to undertake an action seelung compliance.
Courts often include in the diligent prosecution analysis the question
of whether the settlement was a collusive one, presuming the government
would not take part in such a settlement. Although collusive settlements
do not represent diligent prosecution and therefore should not bar citizen
suits, non-collusive settlements are not necessarily diligently prosecuted.

Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 11 17, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sfotts, 679
F.2d at 552-54; United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 61 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1994); Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Kerchikan, 430 F. Supp. at 84-85. For a
more recent decision reviewing and applying these standards, see United States v. District
of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 42 (D.D.C. 1996).
353 Gorsuch, 718 F.2d at 1 1 17 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 167 F.
Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (N.D. Ind. 2001); Coca-Cola, 673 F. Supp. at 1556; United States v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 960 F. Supp. 298, 299 (N.D. Ga. 1996); United States v. Seymour
Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (C.D. Ind. 1982); Kerchikan, 430 F. Supp. at 86.
354 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1 982).
355 See generally Andrew B. Loewenstein, Note, Judicial Review and rhe Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 351 (2001), (arguing that while separation of
powers doctrine generally limits judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, this does not
apply when Congress establishes a statutory standard governing prosecutorial conduct). In
the citizen suit provision, Congress established a standard for when government action
precludes citizen suits and courts should apply the congressional standard.
356ComfortLake Ass'n v. Dressel Contracting, 138 F.3d 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1998) at
356, and Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1994).
jS7 A collateral attack on an EPA enforcement action would take the form of an action
seeking judicial review of a final agency administrative action, using the arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion standard of review from the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. Q 706 (2000). Such an action would seek to set aside or remand the agency action.
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While none of the settlements discussed in the decisions appear collusive,
several of them do not appear to have been at arm's length, an inquiry courts
make when reviewing a consent decree. Although the lack of an arm'slength negotiation may be insufficient to decide the government action
was not diligently prosecuted (after all, the violator might find it in his interests to capitulate fully at any time), it should prompt a heightened inquiry
into the settlement's fairness, reasonableness, faithfulness to the public
interest, and faithfulness to the statute.
Here the analysis turns to whether the prosecutor was diligent in entering the particular settlement, and this question is an inquiry into what the
prosecutor was willing to settle for, rather than a collateral attack on the settlement. The inquiry is whether the results were fair, reasonable, and faithful
to the public interest and to the statute being enforced.358This inquiry is
paramount in settlements of actions enforcing statutes. If the results were
insufficient, the settlement still stands and the state still gets what it thought
sufficient, but the citizen is free to seek results more faithful to the statute
being enforced.
Courts at times also include in the diligent prosecution analysis the
question of whether the underlying proceeding afforded citizens full rights
of p a r t i ~ i p a t i o n Such
. ~ ~ ~ participation turns on the details of procedural
law, however, and not the energy of the prosecutor and, therefore, is not
part of diligence. Moreover, while CWA 3 309(g) requires citizen participation for the government action to bar a citizen suit, the citizen suit preclusions do
But the question is pertinent in another respect. Citizen
See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
359See,e.g., Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 840-42 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
The court correctly noted that to have EPA approve a state program for issuing permits under
the CWA, EPA regulations require the state to have procedures for citizen participation in
enforcement, one option for which is intervention in state enforcement actions. The other
option is a set of three specific measures, including agreement by the state not to oppose
the permissive intervention by citizens as authorized by state law. The second option, however, does not require that the state authorize permissive intervention. EPA, State Water
Program Requirements for Enforcement, 40 CFR 3 123.27(d) (2004). But see NRDC v.
EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that EPA told the court that it interpreted the
regulation to require state permission to intervene). In any event, neither the CWA nor
EPA's regulations provide that states must authorize intervention by citizens before state
actions may bar citizen suits. And if a state's law does not conform to 40 CFR 5 123.27(d),
the CWA provides a remedy to citizens; an action for withdrawal of EPA's approval of the
state program. 42 U.S.C. 3 1342(c) (2000); see Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, 556 F.2d
1282 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting a citizen suit against EPA to require it to withdraw approval
of a state program, and suggesting that the proper procedure was for the citizens to petition
EPA to withdraw approval and seek judicial review of EPA's action if it refused to do so).
In a converse situation, the court in United States v. Encycleflexas, Inc., 1999 WL
33446875 (S.D. Tex.), held that citizens had no right to intervene in an EPA enforcement
action under the CWA and RCRA to oppose a proposed consent decree, because they did
not establish that EPA failed to diligently prosecute the case. The decision was wrong,
however, because the citizen suit sections bar citizen suits if EPA is diligently prosecuting
an action, but provide for citizen intervention in the same diligently pursued actions that
bar their suits.
3M The citizen suit provisions authorize citizens to intervene in EPA enforcement actions
358
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participation in enforcement encourages transparency, assuring that the
government conducts its enforcement business in an arms-length manner.361If there has been no citizen participation in the underlying government action or settlement negotiations, or if the government has refused
such participation or the government's procedures do not accord citizen
full rights of participation, the settlement has not been or could not have
been held up to public scrutiny to assure that it is fair, just, and faithful to
the public interest and to the statute being enforced. This lack of earlier
public scrutiny suggests that courts should give heightened scrutiny to
settlements entered into without public participation.

E. What Citizen Suits May a Government Action Bar?
The major issue here is whether a government action bars a citizen
suit only for the common violations that the two actions seek to abate. For
the government action to bar a citizen suit, the government action must
seek "to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order" (emphasis added).362"[Tlhe standard, limitation, or order" to which this section refers is the standard, limitation or order the citizen alleges is violated,
for it is the only prior use of the three nouns in the section.363On its face,
a government action bars citizen suits only for violations they seek to enforce in common. This interpretation is supported by the plain meaning
and expressio unius canons of statutory construction;364by specifying that
the government action precludes a citizen suit only for the violations of
the standard, limitation or order that they both allege and seek to abate, the
in court. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000). They do not authorize citizens
to intervene in state actions. Indeed, "under general principles of federalism and state sovereignty, Congress likely would have no authority directly to provide citizens the right to
intervene in state-court enforcement actions." Friecds of the Earth, lac. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470, 487 n.10 (D.S.C. 1995). But Congress could provide
that only state actions in which citizens can intervene may preclude a citizen suit under
federal law. Indeed, it has done so in the CWA: administrative penalty assessments by EPA
under CWA 309(g) or by a state under a state provision "comparable" to that subsection
may bar a citizen suit for penalties. 33 U.S.C. 8 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) (2000). Because 309(g)(4)
requires public notice of proposed penalty assessments and authorizes citizen intervention
in EPA assessment proceedings, state provisions must also require public notice and authorize
citizen intervention to be "comparable" to 309(g). 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(g)(4) (2000). See, e.g.,
NRDC v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. 97, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
Absent a specific requirement for a state to provide for citizen intervention before
state actions may bar citizen suits, it is difficult to understand how such a requirement can
be justified on the basis of diligent prosecution. It has nothing to do with the energy and
effectiveness of the state in prosecuting the suit. It does, of course, have a good deal to do
with the transparency of the state's process, which is an important goal of citizen participation. The lack of such process may well justify giving special scrutiny to a state settlement, but the lack of intervention alone cannot signify a lack of diligent prosecution, except under CWA § 309(g).
See supra note 109.
362 CAA, 42 U.S.C.
7604(b)(l)(B) (2000).
363 42 U.S.C.$ 7604(a)(l) (2000).
3M See ESKRIDGE
supra note 29, at 323.
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provision implies that the government action does not preclude a citizen
suit against other violations. That result is consistent with the policy of
the provision; the notice and the delay period were intended to enable the
government to have an opportunity to enforce against the violations of the
standard, limitation or order alleged by the citizen, unencumbered by a citizen suit. Where the government has enforced against some, but not all of
such violations alleged by the citizen, it has foregone its opportunity to
foreclose the citizen from enforcing against the violations the government
chose to ignore. Most, but not all courts considering the issue have so
held.365
A similar issue arises when the defendant in a citizen suit under one
statute argues that a government action under another statute bars the citizen
suit. Such government actions generally are not brought to require compliance with the same standards the citizen is enforcing against and should
not bar the citizen
although there are decisions to the contrary.367
Another variant is whether a citizen suit may go forward when both the

365 See Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 2001 WL
1704240, at *6-*7 (E.D. Wash. 2001); Berry v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d
1150, 1155-58 (D. Kan. 2000); Citizens Legal Envt'l Action Network v. Premium Std.
Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 220464 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 836 (holding that
citizen suits are "barred only if the State commences a civil action to require compliance
with the same standard . . . referenced in the plaintiff's 60-day notice.") (emphasis in
original); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Montgomery County N. Reduction Plant, 1996
WL 1670982, at *5-*6 (S.D. Ohio) (holding that state air pollution enforcement action is
not a bar to CWA citizen suit); Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp.
1029, 1036-37 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp.
1140, 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (finding opposite in the specific case but assuming that each
violation not charged by state would be subject to enforcement); Hudson River Fishermen's Assn. v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp. 1044, 1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); PIRG
of N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 WL 66178 at *4 (D.N.J.) (holding that defendant
must establish state action for "identical claims" a citizen suit alleges); Md. Waste Coalition v. SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474, 1484 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that CAA Q 304, 42
U.S.C. Q 7604, bars a citizen suit where a previously filed government enforcement action
seeks compliance "with the same standards at the same emission sources," although the
two actions were based on violations on different dates); Love v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Contrn Atl. States Legal Found., Inc.
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (holding that administrative order requiring future action covered prospective violations under CWA Q 309(g), 33
U.S.C. Q 1319(g)); Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291,
1293-94 (D. Conn. 1986).
See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 137374 (M.D. Ga. 1998); Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v. Vulcan Materials Co., 964
F. Supp. 1448, 1451-52 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that EPA CERCLA action does not bar a
RCRA citizens suit); Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33 (D. Me. 1994) (holding that state suit to enforce its hazardous waste law does not bar CWA citizen suit); Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n, 686 F. Supp at 105 1-53 (holding that federal enforcement of
Refuse Act consent decree requiring proper operation and closure of landfill did not require compliance with CWA prohibition of addition of leachate through point source to
navigable water without a permit).
367 See generally United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1 188 (8th Cir. 1994); Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Assocs., 917 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Sierra
Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1994).
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citizen suit and the government action seek to enforce the same requirement,
but the actions allege violations of the requirement at different times. Courts
generally hold that the citizen suit may proceed on continuing violations
not enforced against by the government action,368although that does not
follow from the statutory language that speaks of the statutory requirements
violated, rather than the occasions on which they were violated.36g
To determine which violations a government enforcement action bars
from a subsequent citizen suit, a comparison of the citizen suit sixty-day
notice and complaint with the complaint in the government action is req ~ i r e d . ~Of
~ Ocourse, as discussed above,37' where the government's action
has concluded, there is no continuing government prosecution to bar a citizen suit. Courts that disregard this aspect of the bar must determine the
scope of the bar by considering the violations dealt with by the consent decree. This determination is complicated when the government has settled
its action and the violations cited in its complaint are not the same as the
violations cited in the consent agreement or order.372Where the consent
decree orders compliance with requirements or penalizes violations not
alleged in the government's complaint, the general doctrine that the claims
adjudicated in a consent decree rather than the allegations of the underlying complaint define the extent of the adjudication presents few probl e m ~But
. ~ when
~ ~ the consent order contains a release that goes well beyond the violations cited in the complaint, without redressing the additional violations, the doctrine could bar suits against violations never enforced against, contrary to the plain meaning and policy of the provision.
Under these circumstances, most courts have limited the citizen suit bar
to the violations cited in the government's complaint, although on different theories. Some courts hold that no enforcement action had been
commenced against violations not cited in the complaint and that a gen-

368 See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel- Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620 (D.
Md. 1987); Md. Waste Coalition, 616 F. Supp. at 1474; Tyson Foods, 682 F. Supp. at 1186.
See also Love, 529 F. Supp. at 832. But see Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991) (reading Gwaltney to bar citizen suits for penalties the "government elected to forego."). The Kodak court clearly misread Gwaltney,
which held only that citizens could not sue for wholly past violations. The Gwalrney court,
in turn, used an ill-conceived example of the government foregoing penalties in exchange
for the violator installing controls beyond those required by the statute, see infra text accompanying notes 432-438.
369 For example, no citizen may commence suit if the government "has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting a civil action . . . to require compliance with the standard,
lirnirarions, or order." CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
370 See Contract Plating, 631 F. Supp. at 1293.
371 See infra Part 1I.D. 1.
372 Of course, as discussed in Part 1I.D. I, if a government action has been settled in a
consent decree, it is no longer being prosecuted and, under a plain reading of the provisions,
no longer bars a citizen suit.
373 See City of Heath v. Ashland Oil Co., 834 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio 1993); PlRG of
N.J., Inc. v. Witco Chem. Corp., 1990 W L 66178 at *4 (D.N.J.); SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v.
Georgia-Pacific, Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1432 (D.N.J. 1985).
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era1 release in the consent order cannot bar an action that was never
commenced.374Others hold that violations cited in the complaint and within
the terms of a general release in the consent decree, but not redressed in
the consent order, were not subject to an action to require compliance and
therefore are not barred from citizens
A few courts have applied
the bar broadly with little regard to whether the government action sought to
or did require compliance with particular violation^.^'^ This minority holding is not true to the wording3" and congressional intent that the bars
apply only where government actions seek compliance. Clearly, orders that
do not require compliance with requirements or penalize violations thereof,
but instead release them from enforcement, do not seek compliance.
A few courts interpret the consent order as a contract, seeking the
answer to what is barred within the four corners of the document or the
intent of the parties.378Others more properly hold that, although consent
374 Where a government consent decree recited that it resolved "all matters arising out
of facts alleged or which could have been alleged:' the court held that a successive citizen
suit could continue against violations not asserted in the government's complaint, for the
government had not "commenced" an action for violations not mentioned in its complaint.
Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Where
a government consent decree contained a general release, the court in Citizens Legal Envtl.
Action Network v. Premium Std. Farms, Inc., 2000 WL 220464 (W.D. Mo. 2000), limited
the citizen suit bar to violations addressed in the complaint, holding that the state simply
had not enforced against other violations.
375 In the reverse situation, where the state complaint addressed violations of six
effluent limitations on different pollutants, but the consent order only addressed two, the
court in Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 837, held that the bar applied only to violations of the two
limitations, for the inclusion of the other four in the complaint was a "mere formality" and
the state action "as a practical . . . matter" was not brought to require compliance with
them. The court reached this conclusion, in part, because the complaint and the consent
order were filed simultaneously. Id.
376 See Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (D. Or.
1995), rev'd 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that limiting the bar to violations enforced in the government action would "impede the goal of the statute and go against case
law and policy which denies duplicative litigation, and supports agency discretion"); Sierra
Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1481-83 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that
RCRA 5 3008(h), 42 U.S.C. 5 6928(h), order to study contamination and develop remediation plan bars CWA citizen suit for unpermitted discharge); Saboe v. Oregon, 819 F.
Supp. 914, 918 (D. Or. 1993) ("[Clitizens suits are not appropriate simply because the
plaintiff has more claims than were resolved by a prior government enforcement action.");
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (E.D. Ark. 1993)
(holding that a consent order with a release for "all violations occurring up to and including the date of this Order" barred a citizen suit for those violations even though they were
not addressed in the order).
377 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5 7603(b)(l)(B) (2000).
378 See Berry v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that, where an order provided a release for all violations known to EPA, and later recited what violations were known to EPA, the bar was limited to the violations recited).
See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Scherer, 7 F.3d 191, 196 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that "the
instrument must be construed as it is written," quoting U.S. v. Amour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,
682 (1971)). Sinclair Oil Corp. was followed by Neighbors for a Toxic Free Community v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 964 F. Supp. 1448, 1451-52 (D. Colo. 1997), in holding that a release in a consent decree for claims raised in a complaint alleging RCRA and CERCLA
reporting violations did not bar a citizen suit for EPCRKA reporting violations. See also
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orders might preclude suits if interpreted as contracts, this is the wrong inquiry; they are not contracts. Although consent decrees have contractual
aspects, they ultimately are court orders.379While the contractual aspects of
a consent decree may bind the contracting government enforcer not to
enforce further against the violator, whether the decree also bars citizens
from enforcing further against the violator depends on whether the government has diligently prosecuted against the violations the citizen seeks to
enforce.380None of these decisions examined in any depth the nature of
consent decrees and the entering court's duty in reviewing them prior to
entry. The well-established doctrine regarding such nature and duty, however, strongly supports the conclusion that consent decrees should not be
interpreted solely as contracts, at least at the federal
The issue recurs in specific contexts under RCRA. 42 U.S.C. 5 6972
(2000), authorizes actions to enforce the RCRA regulatory program and also
to abate imminent and substantial endangerments arising from solid and
hazardous waste. Defendants often seek to bar citizen suits to abate endangerments because the government has taken an action against violations
of the RCRA regulatory program. Although 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(b)(l)(B)
(2000) bars citizen suits against violations of the RCRA regulatory program if the government has already commenced an action against such violations, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(b)(2)(B) & (C) (2000) do not bar citizen suits to
abate endangerments because of such actions.382
RCRA 5 7002(b)(2)(B)(iv), 42 U.S.C. $6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2000), bars
a citizen suit to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment if EPA
has ordered or obtained a court order requiring responsible parties to remediate a contaminated site and they are proceeding to do so. But RCRA
5 7002(b)(2)(B) adds that the prohibition is effective "only as to the
Georgia-Pacijc, 615 F. Supp. at 1432 (interpreting the scope of the consent decree's coverage on the basis of the decree itself, EPA's complaint, and an internal EPA memorandum).
379 Sinclair Oil Corp., 7 F.3d at 193.
380Citizens Legal Envrl. Action Network v. Premium Std. Farms, Inc., 2000 WL
220464, at * 13 (W.D. Mo.), considered the effect of a very broad release in a consent decree on violations not addressed in the complaint. It held that while the release (extending
to violations arising "out of facts known to the State . . . at the time of execution of this
Consent Judgment") might preclude the state from enforcement against violations not addressed in the complaint as a matter of contract law, it was not diligent prosecution against
those violations to preclude citizen suits, indeed it was not prosecution of them at all.
38' Consent decrees are generally held to be by nature both contracts and judicial orders.
Courts review them to determine if they were: negotiated at arms' length; are fair, reasonable and equitable; do not violate law or public policy; and, in suits enforcing a statute, were
consistent with the goals of Congress. See Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola Corp., 673 F. Supp.
1555, 1557 (M.D. Ha. 1987); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp.
1067, 1080 (C.D.N.Y. 1982); and United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83 (D.
Alaska 1977). States, however, apply state law for entry of consent decrees in state courts,
and state law may be different than federal law. In Indiana, for instance, courts enter consent
decrees absent fraud or lack of consent. State v. Indiana Waste Sys., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181,
186 (Ind. App. 1992).
382SeeN. Cal. River Watch v. Humboldt Petroleum, Inc., 2000 WL 1639524, at. *I
(N.D. Cal.). See supra Part 1I.B. l .b.
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scope and duration" of the order. Attempts by defendants to apply the
Q 7002(b)(2)(B)(iv) bar broadly have been unsuccessful; rather, courts have
applied the bar in accordance with its plain meaning.383"[Tlhe 'scope and
duration' clause manifests Congress's desire to permit citizen suits to be
brought to remedy imminent and substantial dangers which are not being
addressed by existing" government actions.384A citizen suit may be beyond the scope and duration of a CERCLA order if the citizen suit concerns contamination (1) of a different area, (2) by a different pollutant, or
(3) relating back to claims made before the order.38sOf course, citizen suits
within the scope and duration of an EPA remedial order are barred.386
F: Conclusions from Examination of the Preclusion Bar

Defendants have raised five legal issues and a dozen sub-issues to
challenge citizen suits on the basis of the government action bar. Part I1
has examined all of these issues and has concluded that Congress anticipated and addressed them all, except for one: the meaning of "diligently
prosecuting." The plain meaning of the provisions answers the other issues, usually in favor of citizen plaintiffs. The theme and variations nature of the preclusion device Congress used in the different provisions of
the statutes underscores the application of plain meaning. Congress deliberately varied the three elements of the device to express its intent on
how it applies in a particular provision. To ignore its words is to ignore
its intent. Most courts have interpreted the provisions on all these other
issues in accordance with their plain meaning. But some courts have not,
favoring a misguided deference to prosecutorial discretion to adherence

383 See Organic Chem. Site PRP Group v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 755,
764 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (EPA administrative order to remediate contaminated groundwater
does not bar citizen suit to remediate contaminated soil); A-C Reorg. Trust v. E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 968 F. Supp. 423, 430 (E.D. Wisc. 1997) (EPA order under CERCLA
to remediate surface does not bar citizen suit for groundwater remediation); Acme Printing
Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (E.D. Wisc. 1995); Meny v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 182 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 1988 WL
120739, at *I 1 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied, 198 WL 83518 (E.D. Pa.) (EPA
CERCLA order to clean up drinking water supply does not bar citizen suit for surface remediation) (citing specific legislative history); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F.
Supp. 1531, 1539 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that EPA order addressing surface contamination does not bar citizen suit addressing drinking water contamination).
384AcmePrinting Ink, 881 F. Supp. at 1245 (bar applies when dangers addressed by
citizen suit are within scope of EPA order, even though defendants in citizen suit are not
parties to whom EPA order was issued). See also A-C Reorg. Trust, 968 F. Supp. at 431
(administrative order for surface contamination remediation does not bar citizen suit for
subsurface contamination remediation; administrative order for arsenic remediation does
not bar citizen suit for remediation of other hazardous wastes); Coburn, 1988 WL 120739,
at * 12 (administrative order for groundwater remediation does not bar citizen suit for surface remediation).
3ss See A-C Reorg. Trust, 968 F. Supp. at 430.
386 See Keystone Coke Co. v. Pasquale, 1998 WL 341927, at *2 (E.D. Pa.).
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to the statutes enacted by Congress. Their interpretations do violence to
the wording and history of the provisions and should be disregarded.
Although the meaning of diligent prosecution is not as clear as the
meaning of the other questioned words in the provisions, it is modified by
the congressional declaration that a government action must be one for
compliance to bar a citizen suit. Despite Congress's clear direction, the
courts have fractured when determining whether the government is diligently prosecuting an action, with a scant majority asking if the government action was aimed at and effective in securing compliance, and a
large minority seeking only to defer to prosecutorial discretion regardless
of whether the government sought or obtained compliance.
The relative agreement of courts on the other issues and fundamental
disagreement on the "diligently prosecuting" issue is not surprising. The
diligent prosecution issue is the least susceptible to resolution on a plain
meaning basis, as it requires looking a few words ahead in the provision
to the "compliance7' language. It is also an issue on which prosecutorial
discretion is
Courts mainly concerned with deference to prosecutorial discretion thus find it easier to favor previous government action
on the "diligently prosecuting" issue rather than the other issues. Of course,
prosecutorial discretion is not really an issue here because citizen plaintiffs are not seeking judicial review of government action or non-action.
Indeed, the attacks on citizen suits as interfering with prosecutorial discretion are not being raised by prosecutors, but by violators. Part I11 examines why some courts are so motivated by deference to prosecutorial
discretion that they blatantly disregard the words of the statute.

A. Plain Meaning Versus Deference to Prosecutorial Decisions

Much of the litigation over these issues arises not from lack of congressional clarity, but from the desire of defendants to reach results at odds
with congressional language and intent. Judges ignoring the plain meaning of the provisions do so from a desire to protect the government's .(usually the state's) prosecutorial functions and discretion from interference
by successive citizen suits. Significantly, prosecutors do not urge courts
to defer to their discretion or contend that successive citizen suits interfere with the exercise of their discretion. Indeed, when the prosecutors
387 Choice of remedy and agreement to a negotiated settlement are important aspects of
the prosecutorial discretion involved in the "diligently prosecuting" issue. Just as important
to prosecutorial discretion is the decision not to initiate an enforcement action. The clear language of the citizen suit provisions authorizing citizen suits in the absence of government
action, however, has forestalled most courts from deference to government decisions not to
enforce.
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are involved in these disputes, they normally argue in favor of citizen enf o r ~ e m e n t That
. ~ ~ ~violators are the vocal champions of the prosecutor's
prerogatives38yis more than ironic; it poses the question of why violators
champion government prosecutors over citizen enforcers. The apparent answer is that they expect the government, particularly the state, to be a
more lenient enforcer than citizens. Indeed, attorneys representing violators candidly admit as much.3y0
An examination of the arguments that citizen suits interfere and conflict
with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion suggests that they are overblown. Prosecutorial discretion revolves primarily around three decisions:
what violations to prosecute; what enforcement mechanism to use; and what
remedies and sanctions to seek or settle on. These are largely prioritization and resource allocation decisions, for agencies do not have enough
resources to enforce against all violations or to pursue to trial all of the violations they prosecute. Citizen enforcers, of course, augment limited government enforcement resources, providing more enforcement than if the
government enforcers were left to their own devices. This function of citizen suits enhances overall enforcement rather than interfering with government enforcement.
Violators argue that when a citizen gives notice to the agency that it
intends to enforce against a particular violation, the agency is forced to
spend its resources enforcing against that violation, regardless of whether
it is a high or low priority for the a g e n ~ y . ~But
" the filing of a citizen suit
notice does not require the agency to enforce against that violation. If the
violation is a low priority for the agency, it can and should spend its re-

'ansee,e.g., Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 41 1 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
EPA argued that RCRA Subtitle IV open dumping regulations were enforceable by citizens
despite EPA approval of state plan); Citizens for a Better Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., 83 F.3d 1 1 1 1, 11 18 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that EPA agreed with citizens that only
state penalty assessment orders could bar citizen suits under CWA 9 309(g), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556
n.8 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that EPA argued that only states with approved CWA permit
programs can issue orders that may bar citizen suits); SPIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge
& Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that EPA, New Jersey and
New York argued that EPA CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a) compliance order was not
an action in court); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F.
Supp. 470, 474 (D.S.C. 1995) (stating that EPA brief "generally supported citizen enforcer's positions). Similarly, EPA officials have testified before congressional committees
in support of citizen suits. See, e.g., Pending Clean Water Act Legislation: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Env't and Nut. Res. Of the House Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. 212-13 (1994) (statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement, EPA); The Water Qualiry Act of 1994, and Issues Related to Clean Water
Act Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 3948 Before rhe Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't
of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103d Cong. 290 (1994) (statement of
Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA).
389 See supra note 330.
390 See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 144, at 25 ("From the viewpoint of the sources,
agency enforcement is often preferable to citizen suit enforcement.").
2 9 1 See Snook, supra note 129, at 1, 10.
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sources on higher priority violations and allow, as Congress intended, citizens to augment agency resources by enforcing against violations the
agency otherwise would not address. If the violation is a high priority for
the agency, it can and should proceed with its enforcement, but if it does,
its own priorities, not the citizen suit, dictate the agency's use of its resource~.~~~
Violators also argue that the notice of a citizen suit forces the agency
to use judicial rather than administrative enforcement mechanisms, needlessly wasting its resources.393If the agency's goal is to bar a citizen suit,
under some statutes it must commence and diligently prosecute a civil action. But if its goal is compliance, it may proceed with whatever remedy
it believes is appropriate to achieve that objective. The citizen suit does not
stop the agency from proceeding with an administrative order, either before or after a citizen files suit in court. Indeed, if the agency frames an
administrative compliance order with an appropriate remedy, the court is
likely to adopt it or give its terms considerable weight. Of course, if the
agency order does not require compliance, the court should disregard it,
for the court must order c~mpliance.~"
If the court assesses a penalty in a
citizen suit, that does not preclude the agency from assessing a penalty.
Many of the issues regarding the statutory preclusions identified and
discussed above are straightforward, answered by the wording and structure
of the statutes, and engender little controversy in judicial interpretations.
An action brought by the DOJ on behalf of EPA may bar a citizen suit. Municipalities are not states for the purpose of state enforcement actions that
may bar citizen suits. When the statutory preclusions identify particular
government actions as barring citizen suits, they are the only government
actions for which the preclusions bar citizen suits. EPA and citizens
commence enforcement actions by filing complaints.
Two of the issues appear straightforward but are often either overlooked
or ignored: (1) are preclusive government actions limited to actions seeking
compliance, and (2) are preclusive government actions limited to ongoing
government actions? The plain meaning and expressio unius canons of
interpretation, reinforced by the theme and variations nature of the preclusions make it clear that preclusive government actions are limited to ongoing actions seeking compliance. Because there is little case law on these
issues, citizen plaintiffs may be unaware of their importance. Courts that are
unfriendly to citizen suits are content to ignore them.

39' Indeed, after EPA receives notice of a citizen suit, it rarely requests that the DOJ
file an action because it does not reorder its enforcement priorities as a result of such a
notice and generally supports citizen enforcement. Haag, supra note 8.
393 See Snook, supra note 129, at 1, 7; Dickinson, supra note 144, at 1572.
394 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (holding that, when a trial
court finds that defendants violate environmental statutes, the court must require compliance, although it has considerable discretion how to achieve that end).
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Other issues have engendered controversy in judicial interpretation.
What is diligent enforcement? Will a government action against some violations bar a citizen suit on other violations? On these issues judicial interpretations vary widely. It is not unusual for courts to conclude that the government has or has not diligently prosecuted an action on virtually the
same facts. Courts that find diligent prosecution often frame their analyses in terms of deference to prosecutorial discretion. At times this may be
a disguise for hostility to the notion of citizen enforcement or for advancing
states' rights, as most of the purportedly barring actions are state actions.
Courts have held th'at many government actions have been diligently
prosecuted, and therefore bar citizen suits, even though the actions had been
~ h e n hold that such
concluded or did not require c ~ m p l i a n c e . ~ ~ courts
actions bar citizen suits, they entirely ignore the fact that Congress limited the bar against citizen suits to actions that the government "is diligently prosecuting . . . to require compliance." Acknowledging these two
limitations would hamper these courts in reaching their desired level of
deference to prosecutorial discretion. These decisions ground their holdings on the Court's comments in Gwaltney's holding that citizen suits
supplement rather than supplant government enforcement.396Underlying
the attitudes of these courts and of the Court in Gwaltney is the deeprooted deference courts routinely give to the prosecutorial discretion of
the executive branch, finding it difficult to reconcile the citizens' authority to seek judicial remedies for a violation with the prosecutor's discretion not to enforce against the violator or violation or to use administrative
rather than judicial enforcement remedies.397
.
Judicial deference to prosecutorial discretion arises from the doctrine
that actions committed to agency discretion are not subject to judicial review, for there is no law to apply in such re vie^."^ Of course, citizen
suits do not ask courts for judicial review of agency actions or to overturn
them. Citizen suits merely ask courts to find that the agency's actions are
not adequate to bar citizen suits. And there is law to apply to whether the
government actions are adequate to bar citizen suits; the law enunciated
in the citizen suit preclusions (particularly that the actions are for compliance), augmented by the standards of review the courts have developed
to determine whether to enter consent decrees enforcing federal statutes.
The doctrine that actions committed to agency discretion are not subject
to judicial review gathers particular strength when applied to decisions on
See supra discussion and cases cited in Part II.D.2.b.
Virtually every post-Gwaltney preclusion decision cited in this Part One begins its
analysis with a citation to Gwalrney, although that decision did not consider the preclusion
provision in the citizen suit sections. Other commentators have noted this. See Maples,
supra note 144, at 204-05; Dickinson, supra note 144. at 1554; and Snook, supra note
129, at 6.
397 See, e.g., N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552,
556 (1st Cir. 1991). See also supra discussion Part II.D.2.b and decisions cited there.
39R Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 4 10 (1 97 1).
295

396
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whether andlor how to prosecute. The Court in Heckler v. Char~ey'~~
recounted that it had "recognized on several occasions over many years that an
agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or
criminal processes, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion." There the Court considered a challenge to the decision
of the Federal Food and Drug Administration not to enforce against an
alleged violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
The Court
began with the presumption of the Administrative Procedure Act that
final agency actions are subject to judicial review.401But it noted the exception to this presumption when "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law,"402and held that "an agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review" under that exception.403It found agency decisions not to enforce particularly
unsuitable for judicial review.
The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an
agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent
on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested
best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the
agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An
agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of
the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better
equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its p r i ~ r i t i e s . ~ ~ "
The Court cautioned that agency decisions not to enforce were not always immune from judicial review. "[Tlhe decision is only presumptively
unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive
statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its
enforcement p o ~ e r s . " " ~ ~

"470 U.S. 82 I , 83 1 (1985).
5 U.S.C. $5 501-706 (2000). The complaint was filed by convicts on death row seeking
to require the FDA to prevent states from lethal injection by drugs that had not been approved for that purpose by the FDA.
4u' 5 U.S.C. $ 702 (2000).
"oz 5 U.S.C. $ 701(a)(2) (2000).
403 470 U.S. at 832. But see Justice Marshall's concurrence for a spirited disagreement
with the Court's presumption of non-reviewability of decisions not to enforce. Id. at 84055.
4ar Id. at 83 1-32.
405 Id. at 832-33.
4w

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 483 2004

484

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 28

The justification for enforcement discretion enunciated by the Court .
in Chaney applies with equal force to enforcement under the pollution control statutes. Environmental agencies, like the Federal Food and Drug Administration cannot address all violations because their resources are limited, and they must therefore order enforcement priorities in accordance
with their overall policies.
Plaintiffs in some citizen suits have challenged EPA's enforcement discretion directly, seeking judicial orders to require EPA to exercise an allegedly mandatory duty to bring enforcement actions against violators."06
Every court of appeals considering such a suit has held that EPA's enforcement decisions are discretionary, not mandatory, and that, following
Chaney, EPA decisions not to enforce are immune from judicial review.407
Of course, citizen suits against violators do not seek judicial review
of the government's enforcement decisions. They do not seek orders requiring EPA to enforce or requiring it to use enforcement resources in a
manner contrary to its considered judgment. Citizen suits seek only to
enforce against the violator. Rather than demanding that EPA expend its
resources on particular violators, on particular violations, or in a particular
way, citizen enforcers take on the task, enabling EPA to use its resources
as it chooses. Thus the traditional reasons for judicial deference to prosecutorial decisions not to enforce, articulated in Chaney, are inapplicable
to citizen suits against violators. Violators may argue that citizen suits intrude on agency decisions to favor violators by not enforcing against them or
by enforcing against them too leniently. If so, that is an intrusion Congress specifically intended when enacting the citizen suit provisions.
B. The Pernicious Effect of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc.

The tradition of judicial deference to prosecutorial decisions is
strong enough to cause some courts to react negatively when citizens indirectly question the government's enforcement decisions by seeking judicial remedies for a violation that the government decided not to enforce
against, chose to pursue with an administrative remedy, or settled on terms
less favorable to the environment than deemed appropriate by the citiz e n ~ Some
. ~ ~ of~ the Court's dicta in Gwaltney, for example, that citizen
'%See, e.g., K . W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1988).
407See, e.g., id. at 279; DuBois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 9 4 7 4 8 (8th Cir. 1987);
Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949, 955 (3d Cir. 1987); City of
Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 137 1, 1374 (5th Cir. 198 1); State Water Control Bd. v. Train,
559 F.2d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1977); and Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir.
1977). See also SHELDON
M. NOVCIK,THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
5 9.4
(West 2003).
Even courts that allow citizen suits to proceed in the face of a government action
often begin their analysis with professions of deference to prosecutorial discretion. See
supra note 326.
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suits supplement rather than supplant government enforcement, encouraged this negative reaction toward citizen suits.409The holding in Gwaltney, however, stands for the narrow legal proposition that CWA 5 505 and
citizen suit provisions worded like it authorize suit only for violations
that are continuing or are reasonably certain to
The Court's primary reason for this holding was the plain English reading of the statute,
authorizing citizens to sue those who were alleged "to be in violation" of the
~ t a t u t e . ~By
" using the present tense, the Court reasoned, Congress intended to authorize citizen suits for continuing violations and to preclude
citizen suits for wholly past violation^.^'^ This plain meaning interpretation of the provisions, including their verbal tenses, of course, underlies
many of the interpretations of the citizen suit preclusion device suggested
in this Article.
The Court bolstered its primary argument in Gwaltney with the observation that the purpose of requiring prior notice to the violator was to
allow it to avoid citizen suits by coming into ~ompliance.~"
If citizens
could sue for wholly past violations, prior notice would be meaningless,
since the violator could not avoid suit by coming into compliance. While
this argument appears logical, it ignores reality. When a citizen alleges both
present and past violations, the notice serves exactly the purpose proposed by the Court. Even when a citizen alleges only past violations, the
violator benefits from the notice in several ways. For instance, it may try
to avoid suit by convincing the citizen enforcer that the violator acted in
good faith, that the violations were not serious and caused no harm, that
the violator is in the process of complying, and that a citizen suit will
serve no purpose. If the violator fails to persuade the citizen not to sue,
the violator also may commence settlement negotiations to bring about a
quick resolution, sparing itself and the courts the burden of prolonged
litigation. And it should be remembered that prior notice to the violator is
not required for some violations.414The Court's secondary argument also
ignores legislative intent. The legislative history amply demonstrates that
the purpose of the prior notice provision is to allow the government an
opportunity to exercise its enforcement authority, not to allow the violator
to avoid suit by quick ~ o m p l i a n c e .If~ 'the
~ Court had stopped with its secondary argument, although that analysis was flawed, its plain meaning
primary analysis would have been persuasive and sufficient. Its holding

409SeeGwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 6 0
(1987).

Id. at 52.

410

33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(I) (2000).
See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56-59.

411
412

Id. at 59-60.
See supra note 92.
4 1 5 See supra notes 1 10-1 13, 1 16 and accompanying text.
413

414
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would have somewhat narrowed the scope of citizen enforcement, but it
would not have cast a pall over citizen suits in other contexts.416
Not content with its primary and secondary arguments, however, the
Court developed a questionable tertiary argument that has had broad negative impact on citizen suits. The crux of this argument is that citizen suits
are of subordinate importance in the enforcement scheme; they are meant
only "to supplement rather than to supplant governmental a ~ t i o n . " ~Thus
"
the citizen suit provisions should be interpreted not to change "the nature
of the citizen's role from interstitial to potentially intrusive."418The wording
of the Court's peroration is puzzling. "To supplement" means "to add
"To supplant" means "to take the place of."420Of course, citizen suits add
to government enforcement when citizens act in the absence of government
enforcement or when they act to strengthen weak government enforcement. Citizen suits do not replace government enforcement unless citizen
suits bar subsequent government action and nothing in the statutes or case
law suggests they do.4" The citizen suit provisions do not change the role
of citizen enforcers from "interstitial" to "intrusive," the provisions give
citizens a role in enforcement where they had none before.422If it is intrusive for citizens to second-guess government decisions not to enforce,
that is exactly what Congress intended by enacting the provisions. By specifying in the provision that the government could bar a citizen suit against
particular violations by commencing and diligently prosecuting a compliance action, Congress made it clear that the government could not bar
a citizen suit by taking no action against the violations.
The Court's statement that allowing citizens to enforce against wholly
past violations will supplant rather than supplement government enforce4 1 6 Because violations generally must be ongoing or likely to recur to justify the issuance of an injunction, the primary effect of the ruling was on suits maintainable for civil
penalties.
4'7 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
4 1 8 Id. at 61.
4 1 9 WEBSTER'S
SEVENTH
NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
884 (1 999).
420 Id.
43 Indeed, the scant case law on the issue suggests that citizen suits do not bar government enforcement. See People v. Acme Fill Corp. 1997 WL 685254, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (holding that settlement of citizen suit has no res judicara effect of subsequent state
enforcement action).
422 Prior to the enactment of citizen suit authorities, citizens attempted to bring qui ram
actions to enforce against violations of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. $ 407 (2000), a predecessor of the CWA. All such attempts were rejected. See Jacklovich v. Interlake, Inc., 458
F.2d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1972); Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81,
90 (2d Cir. 1972); Gerbing v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Fla. 1971);
Mitchell v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (D.S.C. 1971); Lavagnino v.
Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323, 325 (D. Colo. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman
Soc'y of America v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Enquist v.
Quaker Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347, 349 (D. Neb. 1971); U.S. ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest
Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp.
848, 850 (D. Wisc. 1971); and Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446, 447 (W.D.
Wash. 1970). See also Bucy, supra note 102, at 44 (article on qui ram actions).
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ment is simply a non sequitur. Citizen suits do not supplant government
actions any more for enforcement against past violations than they do for
enforcement against present violations. If the Court's tertiary argument is
puzzling, the support for its argument is more so: a misreading and mischaracterization of legislative history, an illogical deduction from the mischaracterized legislative history, and an illogical
The Court quoted the Senate Report accompanying the enactment of
the CWA in support of its conclusion that citizen suits were of a subordinate nature. "The Senate Report noted, that '[tlhe Committee intends the
great volume of enforcement actions [to] be brought by the State,' and
that citizen suits are proper only 'if the Federal, State, and local agencies
The quoted language
fail to exercise their enforcement resp~nsibilities."'~~~
appears in a discussion of EPA's enforcement authority in CWA 5 309425
not in a discussion of the CWA's citizen suit provision in 9 505.426Read
in its entirety, the meaning of the Senate Report language is quite different than the meaning the Court gives it:
The Committee . . . notes that the [enforcement] authority of the
Federal Government should be used judiciously by the Administrator in those cases deserve [sic] Federal action because of
their national character, scope, or seriousness. The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the
State. It is clear that the Administrator is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather to reserve his authority for the
cases of paramount interest.
It should be noted that if the Federal, State, and local agencies
fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement action under the
citizen suit provisions of section 505.427
The Report language focuses on EPA enforcement, not citizen enforcement. It suggests an expectation that federal enforcement will be restrained,
but that citizen enforcement will be available if government enforcement
is too restrained. It conveys no notion that citizen enforcement is subordinate to government enforcement. Indeed, it contains neither the language
nor the implication that citizen suits are "proper only" under the stated
circumstances the Court asserts.

See infra discussion accompanying notes 432-440.
424Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60
(1987) (emphasis added).
425 33 U.S.C. 9 1319 (2000).
42633U.S.C. 5 1365; S. REP.NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668,3730.
427 Id.
423
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Based entirely on its out of context quote from the Senate Report,
the Court concluded that "[plermitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for
the citizen
If citizen suits are supplementary, their supplementary
nature does not suggest that they are more appropriate againstcontinuing
violations than against wholly past violations, and the Court suggests no
such reason.
If the Court's concern, as it later hints, is that citizen suits can interfere with the government's enforcement action, surely the potential for
such interference is greater for enforcement against continuing violations
than for enforcement against wholly past violations. Ideally, the government will place a priority on abatement of continuing violations, making
the potential for citizen interference more likely in such cases. More importantly, where both suits are for wholly past violations, both enforcers
will be seeking only penalties. If the citizens are successful in recovering
penalties after the government has already done so, the additional penalties do not interfere with government's action. Indeed, the Treasury is doubly enriched.429And the violators will not be inappropriately penalized,
for the statutes direct courts to assess penalties considering several factors, including "such . . . matters as justice may require."430Surely, the
amount of penalties already paid for a violation is such a matter.431But
where continuing violations are at issue, both enforcers will be seeking
abatement injunctions and penalties. There is more potential for citizens
to interfere with the government's action for injunctive relief than for penalties.
The example the Court develops to illustrate its concerns and conclusion is equally illogical. It posits a situation in which a violator agrees
with EPA to install unusually expensive and advanced control equipment
that not only will bring the violator into compliance but will result in its
achieving pollution control well beyond that required by law. In return
for undertaking pollution control beyond that required by law, EPA limits
its enforcement action to an administrative compliance order, agreeing not to
seek penalties. The Court concluded that "[ilf citizens could file suit, months
Gwalmey, 484 U.S. at 60.
The Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. 5 3302(c)(l) (2000), requires that penalties assessed in citizen suit cases be deposited in the U.S. Treasury. Friends of the Earth
v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9152, at *7 n.3 ("The penalties
imposed would be deposited as miscellaneous receipts in the treasury and not be recovered
by the citizen bringing the suit."). See also H.R. REP. NO. 92-91 1, at 133 (1972), reprinted
in 1 CWA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,at 753, 820 (1973).
430See,e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (2000). Although this penalty factor is found
in the EPA enforcement section, the citizen suit section authorizes courts in citizen suits to
assess penalties under it. 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000).
43'SeePIRG of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1 5 3 8 4 1 (D.N.J. 1993),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995), in which plaintiffs argued the
court should take into account penalties the defendant paid to the government when assessing penalties in the citizen suit.
428

429
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or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the Administrator
chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the Act in
the public interest would be curtailed considerably."432There are at least
six problems with the Court's deductions from this hypothetical.
First, by enacting the citizen suit provision, Congress curtailed the
agency's ability to assure a violator that it would not be enforced against.433
The question is whether it curtailed it sufficiently to allow citizen enforcement in the situation posited by the Court.
Second, the Court's hypothetical is a red herring: none of the more than
125 decisions cited in Part One involve a situation similar to the one posited
by the
Third, if the defendant achieved more than the required pollution reduction by spending more than required for mere compliance, it in essence both achieved compliance and paid a penalty to the extent of its extra,
otherwise unrequired expenditure. The court could take that extra expenditure into account as a penalty and another matter "as justice may reto reduce what otherwise would be an appropriate penalty.
Fourth, the citizen's interference with the government's agreement not
to impose penalties is the same, whether the citizen suit and the government's agreement is directed at continuing violations or at wholly past
violations. Why would the government's discretion be curtailed more if
citizens could file suit years later in the case of wholly past violations rather
than weeks later in the case of continuing violations? The example is of
no use in justifying why citizens should be able to enforce against continuing but not against wholly past violations.
Fifth, suppose the hypothetical order and agreement were to forego
penalties in return for the violator coming into compliance at glacial speed
by using an outmoded, cheap, and unreliable control technology. In that
case, the government's action may have abated pollution in the short
term, but it provided neither general nor specific deterrence for continued
compliance. Would it not be in the public interest for citizens to seek penalGwalmey, 484 U.S. at 61.
It left EPA free to decide not to enforce against a particular violation. But it did not
leave EPA free to decide, in the absence of its own enforcement in court, that no one else
could enforce against that violation.
434 The hypothetical is somewhat similar to the concept of "supplemental enforcement
projects" ("SEPs"), environmental improvement projects beyond any requirement of law,
which EPA may agree to accept in lieu of some part of the appropriate penalty. EPA does
so, however, only in consent decrees. See EPA Supplemental Enforcement Projects Policy
(Apr. 10, 1998), ENVT'L L. REP. I Admin. Mat. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35703.
435 The statutes typically include "such other matters as justice may require" as the last
factor that courts are to consider in determining the amount of a penalty to assess. See.
e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d) (2000). Courts recognize they have the ability in assessing
penalties to take into account penalties already paid for the same violations. In Hercules,
830 F. Supp. at 1538-40, defendant sought dismissal of a citizen action seeking duplicative
penalties for the same violations. The plaintiff argued it was entitled to maintain its action
despite the earlier state penalties but assumed the court would take them into account when
it reached its own penalty assessment. Id. at 1538. The court agreed. Id. at 1539-40.
432

433
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ties to assure such deterrence? How would a citizen suit for penalties undo
the compliance achieved by the government action? Or suppose the hypothetical order did not require compliance and imposed no penalties? Because the EPA order in the Court's example required the violator to comply, the example cannot be read to justify deference to a government action
that does not require compliance. To do so would be to misapply the example, as well as to disregard the wording of the bar element436and the policy of the statutes.
Sixth, allowing citizen suits to seek penalties in the Court's hypothetical would not discourage violators from entering into settlements with
EPA for the many reasons discussed above.437Citizens do not often sue to
enforce against violations subject to a settlement with EPA. Few of the cited
cases involve such a suit, and none do so in the situation posited by the
Court. In any event, if EPA wants to insulate the violator from a citizen
suit, Congress provided a mechanism for doing so: an action in open court
in which citizens could intervene, rather than in a consent administrative
order negotiated in private.438There is, of course, a large difference between
an administrative order on consent and a consent decree. The consent
decree must be reviewed and approved by the court as comporting with the
statute being enforced and citizens may intervene and oppose its entry.
The administrative order on consent is not subject to public notice, judicial approval,
or citizen intervention. In short, the consent decree is sub- ject to transparency, the consent administrative order is not. The transparency afforded by citizen participation in enforcement was one of the
purposes Congress had in authorizing citizen suits.
Although the Court's tertiary argument in Gwaltney was unnecessary, ill-conceived, and illogical, some courts have cited it in deciding
almost every legal issue under the citizen suit provisions narrowly to reeven when such interpretations ignore the
strict citizen suit
primary interpretive tool used by the Court in Gwaltney, the plain English reading of the present tense.440These courts viewed citizen enforce-

436 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(l)(B) (2000), barring a citizen suit if the government "is diligently prosecuting a civil action . . . to require compliance" (emphasis added).
437 See discussion supra accompanying notes 145-146.
438 Embodying such agreements in judicial consent decrees is more transparent and
protective of the public interest than embodying them in consent administrative orders.
Independent judges must approve consent decrees, reviewing them for consistency with the
statute being enforced and with the public interest. See United States v. Ketchikan Pulp
Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 85-86 (D. Alaska 1977). Moreover, the DOJ provides public notice
of proposed consent decrees enforcing environmental laws, soliciting public comment. It
makes the comments available to the judge and reserves the right to withdraw its consent
to a decree based on the public comments. DOJ, Consent Judgment in Actions to Enjoin
Discharges of Pollutants, 28 CFR 5 50.7 (2004).
439 Post-Gwalmey decisions unfavorable to citizen plaintiffs invariably cite, quote, and
rely on Gwalmey. See, e.g., N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949
F.2d 552, 555-58 (1st Cir. 1991).
M0 See Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-58, the most egregious example of disregarding the
plain English of the statute. Among other things, the decision held that violators against
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ment as undercutting the prosecutor's decisions not to enforce, to use enforcement remedies other than judicial, or to settle on unfavorable terms.
Their view that prosecutorial discretion should preclude enforcement action
by others is quite different from the rationale the Court set forth in Chaney
as the justification for prosecutorial discretion. There it viewed the imperative as the prosecutor's need to maximize enforcement through targeted use of his scarce enforcement resource^.^' Citizen suits, of course, do
not intrude on that imperative at all; indeed, they extend the prosecutor's
resources.
The Court reinforced its negative message toward citizen suits in
Gwaltney by a series of rulings limiting the standing of citizens to bring
The Court repudiated much of this repressive standing docsuch
trine443that may help to reverse the,perception that the Court has a generally negative view of citizen suits. The Court's positive view of citizen
suits in Laidlaw may reduce the divide between citizen-friendly courts
and prosecutor friendly courts, a divide that is evident throughout much
of citizen suit jurisprudence.
No court considering statutory preclusion issues has recognized that
the preclusion before it was part of the theme and variations pattern of
preclusions on both EPA and citizen enforcement in all of the environmental statutes. When that is recognized, it becomes abundantly clear
that Congress determined how much deference it intended be given to the
prosecutorial discretion of the first prosecutor to enforce and articulated
that intention in the constants and variations in the preclusions. It constructed a spectrum of preclusions on EPA enforcement, with weaker
ones applying to statutes or programs in which Congress intended states
to have no role in implementing. It constructed a different spectrum of
preclusions on citizen enforcement, with the weaker ones applying to
violations involving hazardous materials.444The preclusions on citizen
enforcement are usually, but not always, stronger than preclusions on EPA
enforcement. When ,courts understand this pattern, it should be easier for
them to apply the preclusions that Congress intended rather than fanciful
constructs in some judges' eyes.

whom a 9: 309(g) penalty has been assessed are not subject to actions seeking injunctions
for compliance, despite the fact that CWA Q: 309(g) provides only that persons against
whom Q: 309(g) administrative penalties have been assessed "shall not be subject of a civil
penalty action." 33 U.S.C. Q: 1319(g)(6)(A) (2000).
441 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); and Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
")Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000).
4 4 4 T h imakes
~
it easier for citizens to abate the most dangerous violations, those involving releases of health-threatening pollutants.
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IV. CONCLUSION:
UNIFIEDINTERPRETATION
OF PRECLUSIONS
IN
CITIZENSUITPROVISIONS
Congress enacted broad authority for citizen suits to promote compliance with environmental laws and to provide for citizen participation
in environmental protection. It believed citizen suit authority would promote compliance by encouraging more plentiful and more effective government enforcement and by providing default citizen enforcers if the
government failed to enforce or to enforce effectively. Congress qualified
this broad authority to limit disruption or conflict from successive actions, and limit undue harassment of defendants. One element of the device was the diligent prosecution bar. The purposes of the authority and
the qualification to it are not altogether complimentary, but are the result
of compromise. Thus different parts of the citizen suit provisions cannot
be interpreted through the lens of a single legislative purpose. Congressional intent is better understood by recognizing that Congress compromised this amalgam of purposes and qualifications in the particular ways
it worded and limited the provisions. While the best indicia of congressional intent is normally the words it uses in statutes, it is particularly
true when a provision, such as the citizen suit provision, is the result of
compromising multiple divergent goals. That conclusion is reinforced by
the theme and variations nature of the preclusion device, a device that
Congress repeated in the EPA and citizen suit provisions of the statutes,
but repeated with variations in each of its elements to express different
balances between its purposes and qualifications. The citizen suit provisions, then, are best interpreted by reference to their plain English meanings.
Most courts have used a plain English meaning interpretation of most
issues arising under the provisions, with straightforward and compatible
results. A minority of courts have reached tortured and aberrant results
by disregarding the plain meaning of the provisions and instead interpreting them to defer as much as possible to the government's enforcement
discretion. This elevates a qualification of the citizen suit provisions over
the purpose of the provisions, a perverse result. These interpretations and
their results are not true to, and indeed do violence to, the wording and
history of the provisions, and should be disregarded. That violators, not
prosecutors, are the vocal advocates of deference to prosecutorial decisions, underlines the perverse nature of the minority interpretation.
A plain English interpretation of the typical diligent prosecution bar
prevents citizens from filing a citizen suit complaint for a particular violation if, and only if, ( I ) prior to the time the citizen has filed her complaint, (2) the government has commenced (3) an enforcement action specified in the provision (4) by filing a complaint in the forum specified in
the provision; (5) the government action is still pending and (6) is being
diligently prosecuted; (7) and the government action addresses violations
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of the same requirements the citizen plaintiff alleged were violated (8) in
a manner capable of and calculated to require compliance.
If the forum specified in the provision is a court, the court must be
an Article I11 court or its state equivalent. An action is still pending if it
has not been resolved by a dispositive motion, a trial on the merits, or a
consent decree entered by the court. Diligent prosecution means the government is prosecuting the action with reasonable speed, energy, resources,
determination, and effectiveness calculated to achieve compliance. An action is capable of and calculated to require compliance if it seeks an injunction requiring compliance or penalties in an amount sufficient to deter violation, e.g., in an amount larger than necessary to recover the economic benefit the violator has secured by non-compliance.
This interpretation flows directly from the words used by Congress
in the EPA enforcement and citizen suit provisions, including the verbal
tenses it used in the provisions. The interpretation assures a vibrant use
of citizen suits to secure compliance with the pollution control statutes. It
also preserves the unfettered ability of government enforcers to prosecute
any violator, and to do so free of whatever complications citizen suits may
cause, as long as the prosecutor moves with reasonable dispatch to secure
compliance, uses the enforcement tools that Congress determined were
sufficient to do so, and seeks compliance.
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